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ABSTRACT 
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Teacher Retention in the Era of Accountability 
Jennifer Sallman 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of the standards-based accountability 
(SBA) provisions of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) on the retention of teachers of color.  I am 
interested in this impact, given the growing body of evidence suggesting a more diverse teacher 
workforce would benefit all students, particularly students of color (Villegas & Irvine, 2010); 
however, the teacher workforce is becoming increasingly homogenous and white, in part, due to 
the declining retention of teachers of color.  Overall, I hypothesize that the widespread 
introduction of SBA as prescribed by NCLB has changed teachers’ instructional practices, 
thereby changing teachers’ experiences of their job and ultimately their employment decisions.  
Further, I posit that those changes in teachers’ experience, particularly reductions in perceptions 
of classroom autonomy, disproportionately impacts the employment decisions of teachers of 
color (Ingersoll & May, 2011).   
In this study, I answer three research questions: (1) How have trends in teacher retention 
changed over time and, how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-, school-, 
and organizational-factors influence teacher retention, and how do those vary by teacher 
race/ethnicity? (3) How has the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB influenced 
teacher retention, and how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  I use the Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS) and its accompanying Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) to answer my 
three research questions.   
Overall, I confirm an increasing decline in the retention of black and Hispanic teachers 
and decreasing perceptions of classroom autonomy, which coincides with the widespread 
introduction of SBA through the signing of NCLB in 2002.  However, that decline in retention is 
only significant for black teachers and not for Hispanic teachers by 2007-08.  Additionally, using 
a linear probability model, I found that the relationship between perceptions of classroom 
autonomy and retention varies by teacher race/ethnicity, and that there is a significant 
relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for black teachers in 
2007.  However, I did not find that relationship for Hispanic teachers or white teachers.   
Ultimately, using a difference-in-difference (DD) model, I only found a significant 
decline in retention for Hispanic teachers as result of the SBA provisions of NCLB; however, it 
is unclear how the SBA provisions of NCLB is driving that decline, since I did not find a 
meaningful relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for Hispanic 
teachers.  In that DD model, I did not find a similar decline for black teachers.  On the contrary, I 
found that black teachers in 2007 in states that had previously adopted SBA provisions similar to 
those in NCLB (Prior states) experienced a significant decline retention and perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, despite previous exposures to those SBA provisions.  These 
counterintuitive results lead me to reinterpret my results applying institutional theory.  Using 
institutional theory, I concluded that Prior states were able to implement the SBA provisions of 
NCLB with greater fidelity and, therefore, the impact of NCLB on perceptions of classroom 
autonomy and retention was greatest for black teachers in those states.  Based on these results, I 
offer future research and policy recommendations to improve the diversity of the teacher 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of the standards-based accountability 
(SBA) provisions of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) on the retention of teachers of color.  
Overall, in my conceptual framework, I hypothesize that the widespread introduction of SBA 
through NCLB has changed teachers’ instructional practices, thereby changing teachers’ 
experiences of their job and ultimately their employment decisions.  Further, I posit that those 
changes in teachers’ experience, particularly reductions in perceptions of classroom autonomy, 
disproportionately impacts the employment decisions of teachers of color.  To test this 
conceptual framework and evaluate the SBA provisions of NCLB, I address the following three 
research questions: (1) How have trends in teacher retention changed over time and, how does 
that vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors 
influence teacher retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (3) How has the 
widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB influenced teacher retention, and how does that 
vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  Addressing these three research questions allows me to first 
confirm the problem that the retention for teachers of color has declined following the 
introduction of SBA through NCLB, and second establish the significant relationship between 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for teachers of color, but not for white 
teachers.  Establishing those relationships builds the foundation of my conceptual framework, 
which then allows me to ultimately evaluate the impact of SBA as introduced by NCLB on 
retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy by teacher race/ethnicity.   
This study focuses on the retention of teachers of color because, while the recruitment of 
teachers of color has increased the number of teachers entering over time, the retention of 
teachers of color has been declining at an increasing pace over the past two decades.  The 
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decrease in the retention of teachers of color accelerates the mismatch between student and 
teacher demographics, which is problematic given a growing body of evidence that suggests a 
more diverse teacher workforce would benefit all students, particularly students of color 
(Villegas & Irvine, 2010).  Therefore, it is important to understand if and how current policies 
are disproportionately influencing teachers of colors’ employment decisions so that policymakers 
can adjust those policies to increase the diversity of the teacher workforce and ultimately to 
make a more equitable education system for all students.       
Highlighting the Importance of a Diverse Teacher Workforce 
Teachers of color represent only about eighteen percent of the teacher workforce, while 
students of color make up about forty-eight percent of the student population (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2016b; U.S. Department of Education, 2013).  Teachers of color include teachers 
who self-identify as black or African-American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, or multiple race/ethnicities.  The 
limited diversity of the teacher workforce broadly and the mismatch between student and teacher 
demographics specifically is concerning.  Proponents of diversifying the teacher workforce argue 
that exposure to a diverse teacher workforce in our pluralistic society is needed for both students 
of color and white students (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  In particular, proponents are 
concerned about the negative signals a largely homogenous, white teacher workforce can send to 
students about the distribution of power, especially if students fail to see teachers of color in 
professional roles (Villegas & Irvine, 2010).   Additionally, proponents raise equity concerns and 
argue that a diverse teacher workforce improves the learning experience for all (Achinstein, 
Ogawa, Sexton, & Freitas, 2010).   
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Broadly, there are two sets of literature supporting the argument that teachers of color 
will improve the learning experiences of students of color.  The first set argues that teachers of 
color serve as role models for all students.   More specifically, this argument posits that teachers 
of color increase students of color’s self-worth, motivate students of color to pursue social 
success, and decrease the potential for students of color to feel alienated in school (Villegas & 
Irvine, 2010).  However, in their literature review, Villegas and Irvine (2010) found that, while 
these arguments are compelling, those arguments are not supported by empirical evidence.  The 
second set of literature provides empirical evidence illustrating that teachers of color improve 
standardized test scores and a broader range of student outcomes such as absenteeism, high 
school dropout rates, college-going rates, and enrollment rates in advanced-level high school 
courses, particularly for students of color (Villegas & Irvine, 2010).   
Improving standardized test scores. 
A number of studies provide evidence that students taught by a teacher with the same 
race/ethnicity (same-race) have higher standardized test scores than students taught by a teacher 
of a different race/ethnicity (other-race).  For example, leveraging Florida Department of 
Education data from 2001-02 through 2008-09, Egalite, Kisida, and Winters (2015) found a 
small, but significant positive effect in reading when black and white students are assigned to 
same-race teachers, and in math when black, white, and Asian/Pacific Islander students are 
assigned to same-race teachers.  Further, they find that the benefit of having a same-race teacher 
is particularly strong for lower-performing black and white students (Egalite, Kisida, & Winters, 
2015).  Similarly, leveraging test score data from the Tennessee Project STAR class-size 
experiment, Dee (2004) found that a year with a same-race teacher increased test scores by three 
to four percentage points in math and reading for both black and white students.  Hanushek 
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(1992) and Evans (1992) similarly found that black students experience a significant increase in 
vocabulary, reading, and economic literacy tests, respectively when black students are taught by 
black teachers, as compared to black students taught by other-race teachers.  Clewell, Puma, and 
McKay (2005) also found a significant and positive impact of students taught by same-race 
teachers; however, they find variation across student race/ethnicity and grade-level and subject.  
For example, they found that Hispanic fourth and sixth graders taught by Hispanic teachers had 
significantly higher test score gains in math than those students taught by other-race teachers.   
While they found a similar effect in reading, it was only evident at the fourth grade-level 
(Clewell, Puma, & McKay, 2005).   For black students taught by black teachers, they only found 
significantly higher impact in gains in math at the fourth grade-level (Clewell et al., 2005).  
Ouazad (2014) found that this positive impact appears as early as kindergarten and persists 
thereafter.  More specifically, he found that same-race teachers assess students who share that 
race more favorably than those students who do not (Ouazad, 2014).   
Another set of studies indirectly examines the influence of being taught by same-race 
teachers on test scores, by exploring the impact of being in a school or district that has a greater 
representation of teachers who share the racial background of the students in that school or 
district.  These studies draw from the theory of representative bureaucracy, where representative 
bureaucracies exist when the bureaucracy’s racial/ethnic representation is similar to the 
community’s population (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999).  In the education system, the street-
level bureaucrats, teachers, should be representative of the community, students, where the 
theory posits that all students, especially students of color, benefit from this representation since 
representative street-level bureaucrats will more likely share the same values and are, therefore, 
more likely to make decisions that benefit the community (Lipsky, 2010; Meier et al., 1999).  
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Pitts (2007) found evidence of the benefits of a representative bureaucracy, reporting that 
students of color in school districts where the racial composition of teachers was representative 
of the student racial composition had a significantly higher passing rate for high school 
graduation exams.  As another example, Meier (1993) found that Hispanic students attending 
school in districts with greater representation of Hispanic teachers were significantly more likely 
to pass high school graduation exams.  Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) continue to find a 
positive relationship between teacher representation and student outcomes, where students of 
color and white students both perform better in the presence of representative bureaucracies.  
These studies further support the argument that teachers of color will improve the learning 
experiences, particularly standardized test scores, of students of color.   
Improving a broader range of student outcomes.  
There is a wealth of studies illustrating the positive effects of having a same-race teacher 
or attending a school or district with greater representation on a wide range of broader student 
outcomes such as students’ perceptions, teachers’ perceptions and, therefore, second-generation 
discrimination outcomes, and graduation and college-attendance rates.  First, a few recent studies 
have illustrated the importance of exposure to same-race teachers on students’ perceptions of 
their educational experience.  For example, Cherng and Halpin (2016) find that, on average, all 
student race/ethnicities give ratings that are more positive to teachers of color.  They speculate 
that teachers of color can translate their experiences and identities to form rapport with students 
that do and do not share the same race/ethnicity and that they are rated particularly well by 
students of color, since they have personal experience navigating racial stereotypes about 
academic achievement and can equip students to combat these stereotypes (Cherng & Halpin, 
2016).  Similarly, using student survey data, Egalite and Kisida (2018) find that students 
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assigned to same-race or same-gender teachers reported positive benefits in terms of academic 
perceptions and attitudes, such as reports of personal effort, happiness in class, feeling cared for 
and motivated by their teacher, the quality of student-teacher communication, and college 
aspirations.   
Another set of studies illustrates teachers’ perceptions and expectations of students’ 
academic ability and behavior vary across same-race and other-race teachers.   For example, 
McGrady and Reynolds (2013) find that white teachers’ ratings of students’ academic ability and 
behaviors are susceptible to racial stereotypes, while teachers of colors’ ratings appear to be less 
so.  More specifically, they find that teachers of color rarely rate white or black students 
significantly differently; however, there is evidence to suggest Asian students are worse off when 
taught by a teacher of color (McGrady & Reynolds, 2013).  They further find differences in 
white and black teachers’ perceptions of students is larger in schools with a greater proportion of 
black students (McGrady & Reynolds, 2013).    Gershenson, Holt, and Papageorge (2015) 
similarly find that other-race teachers have significantly lower expectations for black students 
than black teachers do.  More specifically, they find that relative to same-race teachers, other-
race teachers were twelve percentage points less likely to expect black students to complete a 
four-year college degree (Gershenson, Holt, & Papageorge, 2015).  Further, they found that these 
effects grew for other-race and other-sex teachers, for black male students, and for math teachers 
(Gershenson et al., 2015).  Dee (2005) similarly finds that same-race and same-gender influenced 
teachers perceptions of students’ performance, where those effects associated with race appear to 
be strongest for students of low-income backgrounds and students in the south. 
Teachers’ perceptions matter since teacher discretion can lead to second-generation 
discrimination, which describes the use of disciplinary actions or academic sorting to separate 
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one racial group from another (Roca & Hawes, 2009).  For example, Lindsay and Hart (2017) 
found that black students that have exposure to same-race teachers receive lower rates of 
exclusionary discipline, such as out-of-school suspension, in-school suspension, and expulsion.  
Further, they found consistent evidence that same-race teachers lower office referrals, 
highlighting that teacher discretion plays a role in these results (Lindsay & Hart, 2017).  These 
findings were consistent for male and female students, students across different income 
backgrounds, and elementary, middle and high school students (Lindsay & Hart, 2017).  As 
another example, Holt and Gershenson (2017) found that representation among street-level 
bureaucrats (e.g., teachers) significantly decreases both students’ absences and suspensions.  
Similarly, Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Nicholson-Crotty (2009) found that the greater 
percentage of black teachers in a school, the less likely black students will be suspended.  These 
findings were particularly strong in the South (Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Nicholson-Crotty, 
2009).   
In addition to disciplinary actions, there is also evidence that same-race teachers or 
greater racial representation affects another second-generation outcome, placement in gifted and 
talented programs.  For example, Grissom and Redding (2016) found that black students are 
referred to gifted programs, particularly in reading, at significantly lower rates when taught by 
other-race teachers, even after controlling for test scores and other background factors such as 
socioeconomic status.  Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Nicholson-Crotty (2009) similarly find 
that a larger proportion of black teachers is associated with a larger proportion of black students 
in schools’ gifted programs.  Further, they find that those benefits are greatest for black students 
in the South, relative to other regions (Grissom et al., 2009).  Nicholson-Crotty, Grissom, and 
Nicholson-Crotty (2011) also find a greater representation of students of color in gifted and 
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talented classes when there is greater representation of teachers of color in their school.  
Similarly, Rocha and Hawes (2009) find that both Latino and black students experience lower 
levels of second-generation discrimination from having either Latino or black teachers. 
There is similar evidence that same-race teachers or greater racial representation affects 
placement into special education programs.  For example, Meier (1993) explored the impact of 
attending a school or school district with greater representation of teachers who share the racial 
background as their students on second-generation outcomes for Hispanic students.  As the 
representation of Hispanic teachers increased in the school district, Meier (1993) found Hispanic 
students were less likely to be assigned to special education, more likely to be placed in classes 
for the gifted, and had lower rates of suspension and expulsion.  Similarly, England and Meier 
(1986) found a significant decrease in second-generation discrimination such as placement into 
special education, admissions into gifted and talented programs, suspensions, high school 
dropout rates, and rates of vocational matriculation, in school districts as the proportion of black 
teachers increased with the enrollment of black students.   
Finally, several studies illustrate that exposure to same-race teachers reduces the 
likelihood of those students dropping out and increases their likelihood to aspire to or attend 
college.  For example, Gershenson, Hart, Lindsay, and Papageorge (2017) found that black male 
students, particularly low-income students, who have a black teacher in third, fourth, or fifth 
grades have a significantly lower probability of dropping out of high school.  Having at least one 
black teacher in those grades also increases the likelihood that black male and female students 
from low-income backgrounds aspire to attend a four-year college (Gershenson, Hart, Lindsay, 
& Papageorge, 2017).   Hess and Leal (1997) similarly found that a large urban school district 
with greater representation had significantly higher overall college matriculation rates.  As 
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another example, Fraga, Meier, and England (1986) found reduced dropout rates and increased 
college-going rates of Hispanic students when there was an increase in the proportion of 
Hispanic teachers in large urban high school systems with high Hispanic student enrollments.  
Overall, there is a wealth of studies illustrating the importance of the diversity of the teacher 
workforce on a broad range of student outcomes, which would improve the equity of our 
education system. 
Illustrating the Problem of Declining Retention of Teachers of Color 
The limited diversity of our teacher workforce is not new and dates back to the landmark 
1954 Brown versus the Board of Education Supreme Court case.  While some of the limited 
diversity in the teacher workforce might result from positive changes over time, such as an 
increase in professional opportunities for people of color, there have also been two waves of 
“threats” to the number of people of color in the teaching profession.  The first wave took place 
during the two decades immediately following the Brown decision.  During the first wave, 
massive displacement of black teachers dramatically shifted the diversity of the teacher 
workforce that continues to persist today (Fultz, 2004).  Black teachers were displaced by 
dismissals, demotions, forced resignations, “non-hiring,” non-renewal of contracts, token 
promotions, reduced salaries, diminished responsibility, school closures, coercion to teach 
subjects or grades other than those in which they were certified, and more (Fultz, 2004).  By 
1970, the representation of black teachers in public schools was almost entirely dissolved due to 
this displacement (Fultz, 2004).  The courts intervened during the early 1970s; however, the 
damage of displacement had already been done (Fultz, 2004; Cole, 1986).  By 1970, this 
displacement reduced the percentage of black teachers to 17.4 percent, where it had previously 
been growing from 14.9 percent in 1920 to 19.8 percent in 1950 (Fultz, 2004).   
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Simultaneously as the courts intervened to prevent the further displacement of black 
teachers, the second wave that threatened the overall diversity of the teacher workforce was 
rapidly adopted by numerous states and localities: passing competency test requirements to 
teach.  In 1970, only three states had adopted passing competency tests as a requirement to teach; 
however, by 1988, forty-five states had adopted such requirements (Fultz, 2004; Cole, 1986; 
Irvine, 1988; Rodman, 1985).  Despite no empirical evidence that passing competency tests are 
associated with effective teaching, competency test requirements created a sense of meritocracy 
that would prevent ethnic and political favoritism and discrimination (Collins, 2006).  In the 
majority of states that required passing competency tests for certification, about sixty-six percent 
of black prospective teachers failed the test as compared to only ten to twenty percent of white 
prospective teachers who failed the test (Rodman, 1985).  As a result, the number of black 
teachers entering the profession plummeted, leading some to refer to black teachers as 
“endangered species” (Cole, 1986; Rodman, 1985; Irvine, 1988).    
Given the rapidly declining number of black teachers throughout the 1980s, thirty-six 
states adopted policies in the early 1990s that sought to recruit more teachers of color (Villegas 
& Irvine, 2010).  These recruitment efforts are viewed as largely successful.  The number of 
black teachers entering the teacher workforce has increased by almost fifty percent, outpacing 
the growth of both the number of white teachers and students of color (Ingersoll & May, 2011).   
Despite that growth in entering the teacher workforce, there is still an overall decline in teachers 
of color (Ingersoll & May, 2011).  While numerous factors influence the diversity of the teacher 
workforce, a declining retention of teachers of color represents the most recent threat, which has 
significant policy implications.   
11 
Examining the departure rates over time paints a picture of turnover of teachers of color 
as worthy of concern.  In 1988-89, the percentage of black and white teachers not returning to 
their previous teaching position or any K-12 teaching position the following year was similar, 5.1 
percent and 5.7 percent, respectively (Luekens, Lyter, & Fox, 2004).  However, the percentage 
of black teachers leaving has grown, where the difference in the percentage of black versus white 
teachers leaving the profession increased to 2.8 percentage points by 2004-05 (Marvel, Lyter, 
Peltola, & Morton, 2006).  The departure of teachers of color is even more alarming when 
comparing the number of teachers who enter and exit each year.  In 2003-04, more black 
teachers (56,081) left the teacher workforce than entered (44,784) (Achinstein et al., 2010).   
More broadly, at the beginning of the 2003-04 school year, about 47,600 teachers of color 
entered the teacher workforce; however, the following year, about 56,000 teachers of color left 
the teaching workforce (Ingersoll & May, 2011).   This leaky bucket illustrates that retention is 
one of the pressing problems limiting the diversity of our teacher workforce.   
Summarizing 
Overall, I seek to evaluate the impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on the retention of 
teachers of color.  I focus on the retention of teachers of color because the retention of teachers 
of color has been declining at an increasing pace, which is problematic given a growing body of 
evidence that suggests a more diverse teacher workforce would benefit all students on a wide 
range of outcomes.  In the next chapter, I present my conceptual framework, where I begin to 
connect the dots between how the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB has changed 
teachers’ instructional practices, thereby changing teachers’ experiences of their job and 
ultimately their employment decisions.  More specifically, I first illustrate how the introduction 
of SBA has shifted instructional practices such as adjusting time allocated to tested subjects and 
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narrowing instructional practices.  Next, I discuss how those shifts influence teachers’ experience 
of their job, ultimately leading to a decrease in perceptions of classroom autonomy, a lower 
perception of job security, and a decrease in satisfaction.  Lastly, I explore how those changes in 
teachers’ perceptions have influenced teachers’ employment decisions, where those changes 
disproportionately impact teachers’ of color employment decisions.   
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I review the literature to build and present my conceptual framework.  
More specifically, this review connects the dots between how the widespread introduction of 
standards-based accountability (SBA) through No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has changed 
teachers’ instructional practices, thereby changing teachers’ experiences of their job and 
ultimately their employment decisions.  First, I start by providing a brief overview of our 
education system’s historical institutional setting and discussing how the theory of action of SBA 
seeks to change that institutional setting.  Second, I provide a brief overview of NCLB.  Next, I 
present a set of literature that illustrates how SBA shifted teachers’ instructional practices.  More 
specifically, I illustrate how the introduction of SBA has shifted instructional practices such as 
adjusting time allocated to tested subjects and narrowing instructional practices to focus on X to 
the exclusion of Y.  Fourth, I discuss how these changes in instructional practices impact 
teachers’ experiences, particularly their perception of classroom autonomy, perception of job 
security, and satisfaction.  Lastly, I conclude by exploring how those changes in teachers’ 
experiences and perceptions have influenced teachers’ employment decisions, where those 
changes disproportionately impact teachers’ of color retention.   
Describing the Historical Institutional Setting of the United States Public Education System 
Historically, the United States public education system’s institutional setting can be best 
described as “loosely coupled” (Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Weick, 1976).  In “loosely coupled” 
organizations, structures are disconnected from the organization’s technical core, where those 
organizations use ambiguous technologies to produce outputs that are difficult to monitor and 
evaluate (Meyer & Rowan, 1978).  As a result, in “loosely coupled” organizations, stakeholders 
have difficulty monitoring the activities and outcomes of the organization (Figlio & Loeb, 2011).   
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Meyer and Rowan (2006) go further to articulate the new institutionalism theory, which posits 
that school systems conform to institutionalized myths for survival and decouple the technical 
core from the consequences of institutional conformity.  This process enables education to 
maintain an appearance that things are working even if they are not (Meyer & Rowan 1978; 
Rowan & Miskel, 1999). This description accurately represents most of the history of our 
education system, where it has often been difficult for stakeholders, such as administrators and 
parents, to monitor and connect the technical core (instruction) to outputs (student outcomes).  
This difficulty in monitoring helps explain the common saying, “once a teacher closed the 
classroom door, it was anyone’s guess what was happening in there” (Manna, 2011).     
SBA is a potential mechanism for addressing this difficulty by making the institutional 
setting more “tightly coupled,” thereby establishing a more effective way for stakeholders to 
monitor the activities and outcomes of schools (Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Hamilton et al., 2007; 
Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Lee, 2010).  SBA’s theory of action involves 
creating a feedback loop intended to change and improve educational practices, thereby 
improving student outcomes (Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Hamilton et al., 2007).  The feedback 
loops start with states defining content and performance standards, which directly inform a 
common student assessment (Hamilton et al., 2007).  Next, districts and schools align their 
curriculum, professional development, and other practices to those standards (Hamilton et al., 
2007).  Concurrently, teachers respond by aligning their instructional practices to those standards 
by focusing on the state standards and deprioritizing content not found in those standards 
(Hamilton et al., 2007).  Lastly, students are assessed, and their scores are used to determine a 
school’s performance, resulting in rewards or consequences (Hamilton et al., 2007).   As a result, 
SBA can drive change because it directly ties resources, rewards, and consequences to 
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compliance and performance (Hallett, 2010).  The 2002 NCLB Act brought this type of SBA to 
scale across the United States, directly applying the theory of SBA in hopes of improving 
academic achievement for disadvantaged students.1  Today, the most recent reauthorization, 
Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), is positioned to continue NCLB’s principles of SBA by 
continuing the requirements of annual statewide assessments that measure students' progress 
toward rigorous standards.  
Introducing Wide-Spread Standards-Based Accountability Through No Child Left Behind 
The NCLB Act represented the most far-reaching education policy in the United States 
since its origin, the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).  NCLB required 
states to develop content and achievement standards, administer annual student assessments 
linked to those standards, identify schools that did not make adequate yearly progress (AYP), 
and deliver consequences based on a school’s AYP status (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Manna, 2011).  
Together, these requirements are consistent with SBA’s theory of action.  More specifically, 
NCLB required: 
(1) The measurement of student proficiency through standardized tests administered in math 
and reading in grades three through eight and at least once during high school by the 
2005-2006 school year.  Additionally, science tests were required only one time in third 
to fifth grade, sixth to ninth grade, and tenth to twelfth grade by the 2007-2008 school 
year.  States had the flexibility to phase in these tests by designing their own 
implementation strategy to meet the 2005-2006 deadline.     
                                                          
1 “Disadvantaged students” defined by NCLB include students of color, low-income students, and students with 
limited English proficiency or with learning disabilities.  
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(2) The monitoring of academic proficiency across subgroups of students through requiring 
states to report school test results by race/ethnicity, low-income, students with 
disabilities, and English-language learners.  Depending on a student’s characteristics, an 
individual’s student score could count towards more than one subgroup.  States only 
calculated subgroup results for schools that met the minimum group thresholds, where 
the states set those minimum group sizes. 
(3) The use of those annual standardized test results, plus test participation and student 
attendance for the year, to establish if schools and districts met the minimum bar of 
performance, known as AYP.  To determine AYP, states had to first establish a test score 
to represent proficiency if met or exceeded.  Next, states had to define the percentage of 
students who needed to be proficient in those subjects, such that by 2014, all students in 
each state would be proficient in math, reading, and science.  If any subgroup of students 
did not have the required percentage of students scoring at proficient levels or above, the 
school would be labeled as not having met AYP.  Consequences are then attached to not 
meeting AYP, where those consequences increase with each consecutive year.    In the 
first couple of years of missing AYP, a school is placed on watch and must offer school 
choice; however, by the sixth consecutive year, the sanctions continue to increase such 
that a school must implement a restructuring plan (Manna, 2011).   
NCLB represented a major shift in policy regimes from an equity regime to a standards 
and accountability regime.  McGuinn (2006) defines a policy regime as a “set of ideas, interests, 
and institutions that structures governmental activity in a particular issue and that tends to be 
quite durable over time.”  The equity regime was started with the landmark 1954 Brown versus 
the Board of Education Supreme Court case and includes the creation of ESEA.  During the 
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equity regime, it was assumed that the majority of schools were doing well and that the reform’s 
efforts targeted schools with high percentages of low-income and of students of color (McGuinn, 
2006).  However, the 1983 publication, “A Nation at Risk,” questioned the assumption that, on 
average, schools were doing well and thereby started to shift education from local policy agendas 
to the national policy agenda and from a focus on inputs to a focus on outcomes (McGuinn, 
2006).   Further, “A Nation at Risk” raised questions about the legitimacy of the institution of 
schools.  Therefore, in the 1980s, the shift from equity to standards and accountability regime 
began.  While the shift began in the 1980s, Hanushek and Raymond (2005) call the 1990s the 
beginning of the age of accountability, during which numerous states developed standards for 
each grade and subject, linked to those standards to student assessments, and developed school 
rating systems based on students’ performance (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005).  President H.W. 
Bush’s America 2000 and President Clinton’s Goals 2000 further laid the groundwork for the 
standards and accountability regime, whereby 1997, twelve states had adopted accountability 
system and that grew to twenty-seven by the signing of NCLB (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005).  
NCLB fully shifted the country to standards and accountability by requiring all states to engage 
and by being the first federal law to require sanctions for not meeting the bar (McGuinn, 2006).   
Shifting of the Institutional Setting in Response to SBA 
The introduction of SBA has resulted in a significant shift to the traditionally decoupled 
or “loosely coupled” institutional setting of education.  Given stakeholders’ enhanced ability to 
monitor the activities and outputs of a school resulting from SBA, schools are now facing 
pressure for improved technical performance alongside the demands for institutional conformity 
(Rowan & Miskel, 1999).  This pressure is likely to push the education system to enact multiple 
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strategies to maximize their survival by adopting practices they believe the federal government 
deems legitimate (Lee, 2010).   
Following NCLB’s introduction of SBA, there is evidence that there were shifts in the 
institutional setting since schools and teachers have, indeed, been responsive to increased 
accountability, leading to widespread changes in district and principal actions (Feng, Figlio, & 
Sass, 2010).  For example, Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, and Figlio (2013) surveyed principals 
in Florida before and after increased accountability, where they found that schools made a 
number of changes when facing increased accountability pressures, including focusing on low-
performing students, lengthening the amount of time for instruction, reorganizing the day and 
learning environment, increasing resources for teachers, and decreasing principal control.  As 
another example, Hamilton et al. (2007) examined three states’ implementation of NCLB and 
found that most district superintendents and principals reported aligning curriculum with 
standards and offering professional development opportunities.  District superintendents and 
principals also reported implementing progress tests to have more frequent assessment data, 
adopting the use of student test results for instructional planning, and introducing test preparation 
activities (Hamilton et al., 2007).  Those changes align with the spirit of SBA and may be viewed 
as educationally beneficial.   
However, not all responses are considered educationally beneficial, where another set of 
studies identified some concerning responses to the type of SBA defined by NCLB.  More 
specifically, NCLB’s focus on students meeting proficiency rather than on student growth, 
potentially led to concerning responses such as cheating (Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Koretz, 2017) 
and altering the testing pool of students by reclassifying low-achieving students as disabled or by 
suspending low-achieving students during the testing season (Feng et al., 2010; Koretz, 2017).  
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These responses are likely to have a negative impact on teaching and learning and are not 
considered to be educationally beneficial.   Those responses are aligned with Campbell’s law: 
“The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject 
it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social 
processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell, 1979; Berliner, 2011).  Campbell explicitly 
warns against achievement tests:  
“Achievement tests may well be valuable indicators of…achievement under conditions of 
normal teaching aimed at general competence. But when test scores become the goal of 
the teaching process, they both lose their value as indicators of educational status and 
distort the educational process in undesirable ways” (Koretz, 2017).  
While the studies on both educationally beneficial and non-beneficial practices do not offer a 
national perspective on the influence of SBA on district and principal responses to SBA, they 
provide evidence that districts and principals adjusted their actions in response to the 
introduction of SBA.   
SBA impact on teacher instructional practice. 
In addition to districts and principals adjusting their actions, there is much evidence that 
teachers have been responsive to the SBA provisions of NCLB.  Next, I focus on how SBA’s 
feedback loop of measuring, reporting, and imposing consequences based on standardized test 
scores leads teachers to adjust their practice, and how those adjustments have also impacted 
teacher perceptions and teacher employment decisions and retention.   The literature 
distinguishes these adjustments as “instructional triage” or “educational triage” (Finkeldei, 
2016).  Instructional triage includes instructional adjustments such as emphasizing test-taking 
20 
skills, narrowing curriculum to maximize time on tested material, and matching instruction to the 
format of the assessment, while educational triage includes adjustments such as focusing 
resources to the students closest to meeting proficiency at the expense of other low- or high-
performing students (Finkeldei, 2016; Booher-Jennings, 2006; Ambrose, 2012).  Given SBA’s 
theory of action hypothesizes that teachers will adjust their instructional practices to improve 
outcomes, I focus on instructional triage rather than on educational triage.  More specifically, I 
focus on the two primary adjustments teachers made to their instructional practices in response to 
SBA: (1) adjusting time allocated to tested and non-tested subjects and (2) narrowing 
instructional practices. 
Adjusting time allocated to tested and non-tested subjects. 
The first adjustment to instructional practice involves changing the allocation of time 
spent on subjects taught.  This adjustment, often referred to as “narrowing the curriculum,” 
illustrates the pressure associated with NCLB to increase time devoted to the tested-subjects of 
reading and math at the expense of other non-tested subjects (Crocco & Costigan, 2007).  There 
is much evidence from the national- and state-level suggesting that the SBA provisions of NCLB 
have led schools and teachers to narrow the curriculum (Hamilton et al., 2007; Jennings & 
Rentner, 2006; Dee & Jacob, 2010; Rubin & Kazanian, 2011).  For example, based on the 
National Board of Educational Testing and Public Policy’s national teacher survey, Pedulla et al. 
(2003) found that teachers reported responding to state testing programs by increasing time spent 
on subject areas that are tested and decreasing time on those not tested.  As another example, 
using the nationally representative Schools and Staffing Survey, Hannaway and Hamilton (2008) 
found that the amount of math instruction in elementary schools increased forty percent from the 
1999-2000 to the 2003-2004 school year.  In that study, the data only captures the first year of 
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NCLB, 2003-2004.  However, given the flexibility states had in rolling out testing requirements 
until 2005-2006, NCLB was not fully implemented until school year 2005-2006 and, therefore, 
changes in instructional practices prior to 2005-2006 may not have been a direct result of NCLB.    
However, there are a number of studies that go beyond school year 2005-2006, showing 
similar changes to instructional practices.  For example, leveraging the 1994-2008 
administrations of the nationally representative Schools and Staffing Survey, Dee and Jacobs 
(2010) found evidence that teachers responded to NCLB by reallocating instructional time away 
from social studies and science towards tested subjects like reading.  Additionally, they noted 
that the effects were larger in states that had not previously adopted school accountability plans 
similar to those required by NCLB (Dee & Jacobs, 2010).  In line with these findings, the Center 
on Education Policy found in their annual 2006-2007 nationally representative survey of school 
districts that sixty-two percent of districts reported increased time in math or English language 
arts (ELA) since the year NCLB was enacted (McMurrer, 2007).  More specifically, they found 
substantial increases in time devoted to math and ELA instruction, by thirty-seven and forty-
seven percent, respectively (McMurrer, 2007).  As districts increased instructional time in math 
and ELA, forty-four percent of districts reported decreasing time from one or more subjects or 
activities such as social studies, science, music, physical education, and lunch (McMurrer, 2007).  
However, they found variation in these adjustments, where increases in ELA instruction and 
decreases in non-tested subjects or activities are more prevalent in districts with schools 
identified for improvement (McMurrer, 2007).   
Not surprisingly, state-level studies find similar adjustments to time spent on tested and 
non-tested subjects.  In RAND’s study of the implementation of NCLB in California, Georgia, 
and Pennsylvania, teachers reported narrowing of the curriculum and instruction towards tested 
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topics and problem styles and formats found on the tests (Hamilton et al., 2007).  Sunderman, 
Tracey, Kim, and Orfield (2004) similarly found in a survey of teachers in Fresno, CA and 
Richmond, VA that teachers shifted their attention away from non-tested subjects to tested 
subjects.  In a phone and written survey of 1000 randomly selected Colorado teachers, Taylor, 
Shepard, Kinner, and Rosenthal (2003) found that teachers reported adding content such as 
reading and writing and reducing or eliminating the time they spent teaching science and social 
studies in response to direct advisement from school or district officials.  In a meta-analysis of 
forty-nine studies of the impact of high-stakes testing on instructional practices, Au (2007) 
confirmed that in the significant majority, there was a narrowing of the curriculum (e.g., increase 
in ELA and math and reduction in social studies and science).    
Allocating more time on math and ELA as a result of SBA can be viewed as precisely the 
point of NCLB and educationally beneficial.  However, this reallocation of time is one kind of 
“teaching to the test,” which can result in either positive or negative educational outcomes.  
Reallocating between and within subjects may improve mastery of standards; however, it cannot 
be inferred that students learned more as a whole (Jennings & Bearak, 2014; Koretz, 2008).  If 
the standards represent the skills and knowledge desirable for students to learn, then this 
reallocation and resulting increase in scores may be considered a positive outcome (Jennings & 
Bearak, 2014).  However, it cannot be inferred that students are “learning more” as a whole since 
the reallocation of time may have come at the expense of untested subjects like science and 
social studies (Jennings & Bearak, 2014).   As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor commented,  
“…[A]t least half of the states no longer make the teaching of civics and government a 
requirement for high school graduation. This leaves a huge gap, and we can’t forget that 
the primary purpose of public schools in America has always been to help produce 
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citizens who have the knowledge and the skills and the values to sustain our republic as a 
nation, our democratic form of government” (Schiesel, 2008).   
However, determining the educational costs and benefits of this adjustment is out of the scope of 
this study.   Overall, these studies illustrate how SBA has resulted in teachers changing their 
instructional practices, which may also impact their teaching experience and ultimately their 
employment decisions.   
Narrowing instructional practices. 
The second adjustment to practice involves narrowing instructional practices.  There is a 
rich set of literature on a number of ways that high-stakes testing has influenced how teachers 
teach including (i) using more homogenous instructional practices, particularly focusing more on 
basic skills and less on long-term projects or labs, and (ii) spending more time on test 
preparation.  In that literature, there is concerning evidence that those adjustments to 
instructional practices do not improve student learning.  Additionally, the level of those 
adjustments varies across a number of contexts, some of which raise equity concerns.   
i. Using more homogenous instructional practices. 
The first set of literature illustrates the use of homogenous instructional practices in 
response to SBA.  In particular, the format of the state test can lead to positive or negative shifts 
in instructional practice depending on the level of rigor or higher-order thinking the test requires.  
For example, in Kentucky the Kentucky Instructional Results Information Systems include 
performance-assessment components such as portfolios (Koretz, Mitchelle, Barron, & Keith, 
1996).   In a representative sample of Kentucky teachers, Koretz, Mitchelle, Barron, and Keith 
(1996) found that eighty percent of the fourth and eighth-grade mathematics teachers increased 
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emphasis on problem-solving and writing as a result of the portfolio-based state test.  
Unfortunately, it seems that the format of most states’ tests does not require that type of higher-
order thinking.  Berliner (2011) argues that the format of large-scale high stakes tests are 
restricted given limited budgets.  The cheapest testing items to produce for large-scale testing are 
often multiple-choice, machine-scorable items, which, he argues, do not require higher-order 
thinking (Berliner, 2011).  Testing items that require higher-order thinking are often too 
expensive to score given they often require human raters with content knowledge (Berliner, 
2011).  As a result, Berliner (2011) suggests that these large-scale tests promote an 
“impoverishment in teaching activities,” where instructional practices require memorization and 
mastery of rote procedures.   
In fact, a number of studies suggest that teachers respond to the commonly used test 
formats, such as multiple-choice, by narrowing their instructional practices to focus on a 
homogenous set of pedagogies aligned with those testing formats (Hannaway & Hamilton, 
2008).  In a meta-analysis of forty-nine studies of the impact of high-stakes testing on 
instructional practices, Au (2007) found that a significant number of teachers reported that they 
shifted their instructional practice to more teacher-centered instruction such as lecturing and 
direct transmission of test-related facts.  As teachers are spending more time on basic skills 
aligned to the format of the tests, they are moving away from higher-order skills.  For example, 
based on the National Board of Educational Testing and Public Policy’s national teacher survey, 
Pedulla et al. (2003) found that the majority of teachers agreed that the state testing programs are 
influencing the amount of time they spend using a variety of instructional practices, such as 
whole-group instruction, individual-seat work, cooperative learning, and using problems similar 
to those on the test.  In particular, Pedulla et al. (2003) found that teachers decreased the use of 
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more time-consuming instructional practices and enrichment activities.  Roughly seven in ten 
teachers in high-stakes states reported that the state test negatively influences their instructional 
practices by requiring modes of instruction that are contrary to teachers’ opinion of good 
instructional practice (Pedulla et al., 2003).  Overall, teachers felt that attaching high stakes to 
test limits the quality of instruction (Pedulla et al., 2003).  While this study pre-dates NCLB, it is 
most likely that the influence of high-stakes testing either remained the same or increased under 
NCLB (rather than decreased), since the school reporting and performance sanctions required by 
NCLB were strong relative to prior state accountability policies (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Dee, 
Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).    
These changes in instructional practice are also found in state-level studies.  In interviews 
with North Carolina teachers, Jackson (2008) found increased homogeneity in instructional 
practices across schools, where teachers increased the use of textbooks and worksheets and 
decreased the use of student-centered teaching methods such as inquiry-based or project-based 
methods.  Teachers justified these changes in instructional practice due to the ease of accessing 
and grading the worksheets and the alignment of the worksheets’ format to the end-of-grade 
test’s format (Jackson, 2008).  Drawing from the literature on the impact of high-stakes testing in 
Texas and Chicago, Hong and Youngs (2008) similarly found that schools emphasized basic 
skills and rote learning, while de-emphasizing broad intellectual skills such as higher-order 
thinking, writing, and problem-solving skills.    
A few state-level studies present mixed evidence of changes to instructional practices, 
where some of those changes may promote higher-order thinking and others do not.  For 
example, Taylor et al. (2003) found in a survey of 1000 randomly selected Colorado teachers 
that they were focusing more on problem solving and having students explain their reasoning, 
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instructional practices that may promote higher-order thinking.  However, Taylor et al. (2003) 
also found that teachers were reducing the number of expended projects, labs, and field trips.  As 
another example, in a survey of science teachers from across fourteen states, Aydeniz and 
Southerland (2012) surfaced that science teachers who believed students should learn a 
substantial amount of scientific knowledge advocated for standardized tests since they believed 
testing encouraged teachers to cover all of the standards.  However, science teachers who 
believed in students’ development of scientific inquiry and critical thinking skills opposed the 
administration of the standardized tests for accountability purposes since they believed testing 
limited the type of knowledge and skills students are learning by encouraging factual information 
and discouraging critical thinking and inquiry skills (Aydeniz & Southerland, 2012).  As another 
example from Illinois, Srikantaiah (2008) heard from administrators and teachers that they had 
aligned their instructional practices to match the content and format of the Illinois Standards 
Achievement Tests, such as requiring students to write essays in a similar format to the writing 
prompts on the test and giving students practice extended-response questions.  However, teachers 
noted that they could teach more creative, broader-themed, or project-oriented lessons after the 
state test was administered (Srikantaiah, 2008).  
In addition to changing instructional practices away from those that require higher-order 
thinking, there are other instructional consequences surfaced in the literature.  In a meta-analysis 
of forty-nine studies of the impact of high-stakes testing on instructional practices, Au (2007) 
also highlighted that these changes in instructional practices led to teachers increasing the 
fragmentation of knowledge.  Fragmentation occurred as a result of teaching content in small, 
isolated test-sized pieces, where teachers teach in direct relation to the test rather than in relation 
to other subject matter knowledge (Au, 2007).  Another consequence of the format of state tests 
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is the use of technology in the classroom.  Through a national survey of teachers, Russell and 
Abrams (2004) found that a substantial percentage of teachers believe they are decreasing 
instructional uses of computers to teach writing because students are required to construct 
handwritten responses on the state test.  All of these studies suggest a narrowing of the 
curriculum or of instructional practices that may not be aligned to higher-order thinking, and 
therefore may not be aligned with improving student learning.  These actions may explain why 
states launched an effort to develop the Common Core State Standards in 2009, which sought to 
increase the rigor of state standards and design tests that emphasized higher-order thinking. 
ii. Spending more time on test preparation. 
Numerous studies have also found that teachers responded to high-stakes testing by 
spending more time on test preparation.  For example, based on the National Board of 
Educational Testing and Public Policy’s national teacher survey, Pedulla et al. (2003) found that 
the number of hours given to test preparation is higher for all teachers across grade-levels in 
high-stakes states.  Using a nationally stratified random sample, Moon, Callahan, and Tomlinson 
(2003) similarly found that teachers reported spending substantial time on preparing students for 
state-mandated tests.   
In line with national studies, state-level studies also consistently found increased time 
dedicated to test preparation.  In a survey of 1000 randomly selected Colorado teachers, Taylor 
et al. (2003) found that teachers spent time instructing their students on test-taking strategies, 
including writing in complete sentences, organizing responses, answering all parts of the 
question, and writing on the lines.  Similarly, in Illinois, interviews of administrators and 
teachers revealed that teachers had integrated test preparation into their instruction throughout 
the year using various forms of test preparation to familiarize students with the types of 
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questions on the state test (Srikantaiah, 2008).  In a survey of North Carolina teachers, Jones et 
al. (1999) found that eighty percent of the teachers indicated that students spend more than 
twenty percent of their total instructional time practicing for the end of year tests, while more 
than twenty-eight percent indicated that students spend more than sixty percent of instructional 
time practicing for tests. Additionally, more than seventy percent of teachers indicated that 
students were spending more time practicing for the end of year tests than in the past (Jones et 
al., 1999).  In a survey of reading teachers in Texas, Hoffman, Assaf, and Paris (2001) found 
that, on average, teachers spent eight to ten hours per week preparing students for the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).  SBA’s feedback loop is intended to change 
instructional practices in educationally beneficial ways to improve student outcomes.  However, 
overuse of test preparation has not been shown to be educationally beneficial.   
On the contrary, there is evidence that much of the test preparation occurring as a result 
of SBA is not educationally beneficial.  Abrams (2004) highlights that preparation activities such 
as coaching, teaching test-taking skills, and instruction geared towards the test can yield invalid 
test results through score inflation; therefore, if trends are not similar across different tests, the 
accuracy of a particular test as an indicator of student achievement is questionable.  Koretz 
(2008) and Koretz (2017) similarly warns that coaching frequently inflates scores as evident 
students demonstrating gains on a specific test, but not on other tests of the same domain.  
Koretz and Barron (1998) validate these concerns when they compare Kentucky students’ fourth-
grade math gains on the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) to those 
gains in fourth grade on external examinations such as the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP).  Overall, they found that, while there were gains in scores on KIRIS, all 
external comparisons showed either no gains or far smaller gains, thereby suggesting score 
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inflation on KIRIS (Koretz & Barron, 1998).  In particular, Koretz and Barron (1998) attribute 
this inflation largely to highly assessed or reused items, where they found an increase in 
performance on reused items followed by a decrease in performance on new items.  Similarly, 
Jennings and Sohn (2014) find that teachers facing accountability pressures engage in 
educational triage, focusing on students near proficiency, and instructional triage, emphasizing 
test-specific skills with students near proficiency, practices that result in score inflation.   
This type of score inflation, resulting from focusing on or coaching towards highly 
assessed standards, standards that are frequently and predictably tested, is another type of 
teaching to the test that has validity consequences (Jennings & Bearak, 2014).  If students 
demonstrate the ability to correctly answer questions assessing the same skill, but in different 
formats, then this may represent real learning and a positive outcome.  However, if students are 
only able to correctly answer questions in a particular format, then this type of teaching to the 
test invalidates inferences from test scores (Jennings & Bearak, 2014).  Using third grade New 
York City math and ELA exams from 2006-2009, Jennings and Bearak (2014) found that “state 
tests predictably emphasized some state standards while consistently excluding others,” where a 
small number of standards typically accounted for a substantial fraction of test points.   Similar 
to Koretz and Barron (1998), they found that students performed better on frequently assessed 
standard items, which suggests that teachers targeted their instruction towards these predictably 
tested skills (Jennings & Bearak, 2014).    
In numerous surveys, teachers reported that they were aware of and concerned about this 
score inflation, which does not represent real increases in student learning.   Leveraging previous 
studies and their own interviews, Murnane and Papay (2010) found that teachers believe that test 
preparation may increase students’ scores on tests, but it does not represent students learning of 
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the underlying skills and knowledge.   As a result, many teachers resent spending so much time 
on test preparation rather than on activities they believe are educationally beneficial (Murnane & 
Papay, 2010).  In a nationally administered survey, Abrams (2004) found that forty percent of 
teachers reported that they had found ways to raise state test scores without improving student 
learning.  Using a nationally stratified random sample, Moon et al. (2003) found that teachers did 
not believe that increases in test scores were necessarily a result of increased student learning, 
but more of test preparation.  In a survey of Texas teachers, Hoffman, Assaf, and Paris (2001) 
similarly found that about fifty percent of teachers did not think the increase in their state test 
scores were a result of increased student learning, but were a result of teaching test-taking 
strategies and teaching to the format of the test (Hoffman, Assaf, & Paris, 2001).  These studies 
illustrating an increase in time spent on test preparation is concerning since the resulting score 
inflation is contrary the underlying purpose of SBA: to improve student learning.  Further, test 
preparation seems to have redefined the definition of “good instruction,” where raising test 
scores has become the ultimate goal and therefore the best indicator of a “good teacher” (Koretz, 
2017).  Koretz (2017) warns that raising scores will only improve students’ later success if the 
methods used to raise their scores are educationally beneficial.    Additionally, increases in time 
spent on test preparation varies across contexts raising equity concerns.  Overall, these studies 
continue to illustrate how SBA has changed teachers’ instructional practices, which may also 
impact their teaching experience and ultimately their employment decisions.   
Varying impact on instructional practices across different contexts.  
Although the literature above provides evidence that SBA has led to widespread change 
in instructional practices, those changes are not homogenous across contexts and vary depending 
on the level of stakes of tests or level of affluence of students.   The level of stakes, comparing 
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states with high-stakes versus low-stakes testing or comparing schools within a high-stakes 
testing environment who are labeled at different levels of performance, may influence how much 
instructional practice changes.  For example, based on the National Board on Educational 
Testing and Public Policy’s national teacher survey, Pedulla et al. (2003) found that teachers in 
high-stake testing environments are more likely than teachers from states without such programs 
to start test preparation earlier in the year, spend more time on preparation, and use test 
preparation materials or released items from the state tests.  In line with those findings, in a 
survey of 1000 randomly selected Colorado teachers, Taylor et al. (2003) found that the amount 
of time spent on test-taking strategies varied across school ratings.  Whereas 76.5 percent of 
teachers in “Excellent” schools spent five days or less on test-taking strategies, 63.1 percent of 
teachers in “Unsatisfactory” schools spent two or more weeks on test-taking strategies (Taylor, 
Shepard, Kinner, & Rosenthal, 2003).  Similarly, in Illinois, Sirkantaiah (2008) found in surveys 
and interviews of administrators and teachers that schools identified for improvement under 
NCLB spent more time than higher-achieving schools teaching with overhead technology, 
leading small group instruction, asking closed questions, and modeling problems.  Though 
teachers in higher-achieving schools used a wider range of instructional practices, those 
identified for improvement primarily used a narrower range of instructional practices such as 
hands-on activities, students’ seat work, students’ read aloud, and learning centers (Sirkantaiah, 
2008).  Using 2001-2004 administrative data from Houston Independent schools, Jennings and 
Sohn (2014) also uncovered suggestive evidence that difference between the effects of high- and 
low-stakes tests is most pronounced in the lowest performing schools, where teachers emphasize 
test-specific skills to students near proficiency in low-performing schools in high-stakes 
environments. 
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Additionally, the level of affluence of students attending a school has been shown to 
influence the degree to which changes are made to instructional practices in response to SBA.  
Given the strong correlation between income-status and student achievement and NCLB’s focus 
on proficiency rather than growth, schools serving high proportions of low-income students are 
more likely to feel accountability pressure and adjust their instructional practices accordingly.  
As Koretz (2017) reflects,  
“Teachers of high-achieving students have less reason to indulge in bad preparation for 
high-stakes testing because the majority of their students will score adequately without it 
– in particular, above the ‘proficient’ cut score that counts for accountability purposes. So 
one would expect that test preparation would be a more severe problem in schools 
serving high concentrations of disadvantaged students.  Once again, disadvantaged 
students are getting the short end of the stick.”   
Using a nationally stratified random sample of public school teachers, Moon et al. (2003) 
confirms that instructional practices were most affected for teachers in schools serving low-
income students.  For example, teachers in schools with high percentages of low-income students 
reported spending more time on direct test preparation activities, such as instruction focused on 
test-taking strategies and practicing state released test items, than teachers in schools with low 
percentages of low-income students (Moon, Callahan, Tomlinson, 2003).  As another example in 
North Carolina, Jackson (2008) found that teachers in schools serving low-income students were 
more likely to report decreased student-centered teaching methods than teachers in schools 
serving their high-income peers.  Additionally, Jackson (2008) found that schools serving low-
income students face greater pressure resulting in greater homogeneity in teaching methods, 
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where there is increased collaboration in lesson planning and pressure from administrators to use 
particular teaching methods.    
Overall, these studies suggest that SBA is narrowing instructional practices and that the 
schools most affected by that narrowing are those low-performing schools serving low-income 
students.   This type of differential access to rigorous instructional practices will likely 
perpetuate social inequities between low-income and high-income students, which run counter to 
the purpose of NCLB (Berliner, 2011).  In their Wall Street Journal article, Finn and Ravitch 
(2007) warn of the inequities that will follow from this narrowing of the curriculum:  
“The well-to-do who understand the value of liberal learning may be the only ones able 
to purchase it for their children. Top private schools and a few suburban systems will 
stick with education broadly defined, as will elite colleges. Rich kids will study 
philosophy and art, music and history, while their poor peers fill in bubbles on test 
sheets.”    
Additionally, if teachers of color are more likely to teach in low-performing schools serving low-
income students, teachers of color are more likely to experience this narrowing of instructional 
practice or reduction of classroom autonomy, which might disproportionately impact their 
satisfaction and retention in teaching.   
SBA impact on teachers’ experience of their job. 
Given the impact of SBA on teachers’ instructional practices, it might be expected that 
SBA would also greatly influence how teachers experience the job, including their perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, perceptions of job security, and their overall satisfaction.  There is 
evidence that teachers overwhelmingly support the principles underlying NCLB (Murnane & 
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Papay, 2010, Rentner et al., 2006, Hamilton et al., 2007).  In particular, teachers applaud the 
pressure to develop rigorous content standards and curriculum and believe that the accountability 
sets clearer expectations for what students need to learn and what teachers need to work on 
(Murnane & Papay, 2010).  Additionally, teachers agree with NCLB’s focus on identifying 
achievement gaps between subgroups of students, which allows for more targeted interventions 
and funding to flow where it is needed (Margolis, Meese, & Doring, 2016).  Despite that support 
and praise, there is also evidence that SBA broadly and NCLB specifically has influenced 
teachers’ experience of their job by (1) decreasing perceptions of classroom autonomy, (2) 
lowering perceptions of job security, and (3) decreasing teacher satisfaction. 
Decreasing perceptions of classroom autonomy. 
Given changes to instructional practices in response to SBA, teachers’ perceptions of 
classroom autonomy have decreased.  In Center for Education Policy (CEP)’s national survey, 
Rentner et al. (2006) found that districts have become more prescriptive about how teachers do 
their job.  For example, in Oakland Unified School District, the district created a pacing plan so 
that teachers teaching the same grade will be teaching the same lesson on the same day (Rentner 
et al., 2006).  As another example, Escondido Union Elementary School District in California 
mandated teachers to cover all of the tested standards and instituted a pacing guide for math and 
reading (Rentner et al., 2006).  Woody, Buttles, Kafka, Park, and Russell (2004) also heard of 
this loss of classroom autonomy in interviews in California, where teachers reported that many 
components of California’s accountability system tightened controls over school policies and 
practices such that teachers felt less control over their classrooms (Woody, Buttles, Kafka, Park, 
& Russell 2004).    Overall, teachers reported feeling constrained in their ability to teach because 
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of the accountability system, which is leading those teachers to experience a loss of professional 
satisfaction (Woody et al., 2004). 
The CEP case studies also highlight these trends in Wake County, North Carolina 
(Rentner et al., 2006).  Schools that are at-risk of being identified as “needing improvement” 
were encouraged to become “Project Achieve” schools, where schools trade their autonomy for 
district support (Rentner et al., 2006).  The district support includes focused lessons that are 
highly prescribed plans for math and reading (Rentner et al., 2006).  In interviews with teachers 
in North Carolina, Jackson (2008) also heard teachers report a perceived loss of classroom 
autonomy, which is leading to lower morale.  More specifically, teachers reported a loss of 
creativity, heightened student boredom, and a negative change in work ethic due to increased 
reliance on textbooks and worksheets that mirror the state exam (Jackson, 2008).  Teachers in 
schools serving low-income students particularly report experiencing these losses, where they 
believed administrators feel the pressure from NCLB to prescribe how and when content is 
taught (Jackson, 2008).  Teachers also reported an increase in visits from district administrators, 
where teachers perceived the purpose of those visits was “to make sure they are on task” 
(Jackson, 2008).  
These reports of loss of classroom autonomy are not limited to California and North 
Carolina.  In case studies of Phoenix schools, Smith (1991) similarly found that the narrowing of 
the curriculum to focus on tested material has reduced teachers’ perceptions of classroom 
autonomy.  Similarly, in interviews of new middle and high school teachers in New York City, 
Crocco and Costigan (2007) found that teachers feel a diminished sense of personal and 
professional identity development, classroom autonomy, and ability to build relationships with 
students as a result of imposed scripted lessons and mandated curriculum.  Additionally, new 
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teachers did not believe the tests were a meaningful indicator of students’ progress and therefore 
found themselves negotiating the demands of their administrators to raise test scores and their 
own judgment as teachers (Crocco & Costigan, 2007).  Hodges, Tippins, and Oliver (2013) 
similarly find with a small group of science teachers in the rural South highlighted that the de-
professionalization of teachers in the name of standardization made it more likely for them to 
consider leaving.   
In their review of the literature, Rubin and Kazanjian (2011) describe the standardization 
and curriculum narrowing as a method of educational quality control, where the “process of 
teaching and learning is predetermined, pre-paced, and pre-structured,” leaving little space for 
teacher or student autonomy.  These concerns were made public when the Washington Post 
published a veteran teacher’s resignation letter:  
“‘[D]ata driven’ education seeks only conformity, standardization, testing and a zombie-
like adherence to the shallow and generic Common Core, along with a lockstep of 
oversimplified so-called Essential Learnings. Creativity, academic freedom, teacher 
autonomy, experimentation and innovation are being stifled in a misguided effort to fix 
what is not broken in our system of public education” (Strauss, 2013).   
Overall, all of these studies illustrate how the changes in instructional practices following the 
introduction of SBA have also changed teachers’ perceptions of classroom autonomy, which 
may influence their employment decisions.     
Lowering perceptions of job security. 
The accountability pressure resulting from the SBA provisions of NCLB has also 
influenced teachers’ perceptions of job security.  Leveraging the nationally representative 
Schools and Staffing Survey and a comprehensive database of schools’ NCLB-accountability 
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metrics, Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) found that accountability pressure from NCLB 
lowered teachers’ perceptions of job security.  Comparing schools just above and below the AYP 
margin, they found that teachers in schools at the margin or below AYP are 3.8 percentage points 
and 9.7 percentage points more likely to report concerns over their job security (Reback, 
Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014).  These differences are even greater and continue to be significant 
when looking across teacher experience, where teachers with less than ten years of experience 
and teaching in schools at the AYP margin or below are 9.8 percentage points and 19.0 
percentage points more likely to report concern over their job security (Reback, Rockoff, & 
Schwartz, 2014).   In line with these findings, Moon et al. (2003) found that teachers in schools 
serving high percentages of low-income students expressed concern of potential job loss, 
reassignment, or reprimand as a consequence of poor test scores, whereas teachers in schools 
serving high percentages of higher-income students largely reported little to no consequences for 
poor test scores.  This reduced perception of job security resulting from SBA further decreases 
teacher morale.     
Decreasing teacher satisfaction. 
Given changes to instructional practices in response to SBA, teachers’ satisfaction and 
morale may also change as a result of SBA.  For example, in CEP’s national survey, Rentner et 
al. (2006) found that teachers reported constant pressure to raise test scores resulting in great 
stress and negatively affecting teachers’ morale.  In particular, teachers and principals report 
becoming disheartened when their schools have made improvements, yet are still identified as 
failing when they miss AYP targets (Rentner et al., 2006).  As another example, Murnane and 
Papay (2010) leveraged previous studies and their own interviews, finding that teachers in 
schools serving low-income students are concerned about pressure from administrators to raise 
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student test scores without any guidance on how to do so in a way that is educationally 
beneficial.   
Those national-level studies are consistent in a number of state-level studies.  For 
example, in a survey of North Carolina teachers, Jones et al. (1999) found that more than 
seventy-seven percent of teachers felt their morale was lower and that their jobs were more 
stressful than before North Carolina’s accountability program was implemented.  Years later, 
Jackson (2008) continued to find lower morale resulting from accountability, wherein interviews, 
teachers reported and attributed lower morale due to the pressure from school- and district-level 
administrators and from outsiders (e.g., the media) to raise test scores.  In particular, thirty-three 
percent of teachers believed that the tests scores were not an accurate measure of student 
achievement and felt that using the scores was unfair, since they did not provide a complete or 
accurate picture of the classroom (Jackson, 2008).  In line with these findings, teachers in 
Arizona public schools reported that high-stakes testing increased their stress due to pressure 
from inside and outside their schools to increase test scores (Smith, 1991).  Interviews in 
California surfaced similar findings, where teachers reported that they felt stressed due to the 
time pressure to cover content standards, to frequent testing, to pressure to perform, and to 
consequences for failure to improve (Woody et al., 2004).  Overall, these internal and external 
pressures to raise test scores are increasing stress and decreasing morale.   
Additionally, the perception of limited classroom autonomy resulting from SBA has been 
shown to influence overall job satisfaction.  For example, in a survey of teachers across the 
nation, Kim and Loadman (1994) found that professional autonomy is significantly related to 
teachers’ satisfaction.  In a more recent study, using the nationally representative Schools and 
Staffing Survey, Moore (2012) similarly found that increased teacher control decreases 
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dissatisfaction, where teachers who perceive more control over their classrooms are more 
satisfied with their jobs.  In this study, teacher control includes control over teaching practices, 
grading, discipline, and homework (Moore, 2012).  This relationship is also established in state-
level studies.  For example, in a survey and interviews with California high school teachers, 
Brunetti (2001) found that perceptions of classroom autonomy were a driving factor of overall 
satisfaction.  In a survey of randomly selected Florida teachers, Pearson and Moomaw (2005) 
found that increases in curriculum autonomy decreased on-the-job stress.  While they did not 
find a significant relationship between curricular autonomy and overall job satisfaction, they did 
find that autonomy was related to having greater perceived empowerment and professionalism, 
which are related to greater job satisfaction (Pearson & Moomaw, 2005).  This relationship is 
also found in a study of sixty public school teachers in New York, where Kreis and Brockopp 
(1986) found that perception of classroom autonomy was significantly related to job satisfaction.  
Ultimately, these studies suggest that perceptions of classroom autonomy are relevant to teacher 
satisfaction.   
Further, teachers’ decreased perception of classroom autonomy, lower perception of job 
security and overall decreased satisfaction and morale are exacerbated by the belief that state 
tests do not accurately capture student learning.  There is much variation in the level of rigor of 
content standards and of proficiency standards on assessments across states, where a level of 
performance considered proficient in one state might not be considered proficient in another 
(Mills, 2008).  In other words, proficiency rates set by some states represent a lower level of 
absolute performance than proficiency in other states.  States’ proficiency scores cannot be 
directly compared to each other, since they use different exams; therefore, to understand the 
differences in proficiency standards, it is helpful to look at their equivalent to a nationally 
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administered exam such as NAEP.  Murnane and Papay (2010) show that not all states’ 
proficiency scores are at or higher than the designated level of proficiency set by NAEP.  For 
example, Massachusetts’ proficiency score for eighth grade is 302, while Tennessee’s 
proficiency score is only 234; however, the NAEP proficiency score for eighth grade is 299 
(Murnane & Papay, 2010).  Indeed, much research has illustrated significant discrepancies 
between NAEP and state assessments results, where discrepancies can largely be attributed to the 
differences in the rigor of their standards, where most states’ proficiency standards fall below the 
NAEP proficiency standard (Lee, 2010).   
This variation in proficiency standards and general lack of rigor make teachers critical of 
the pressures to improve students’ test scores on tests they do not respect and do not encourage 
students to master higher-order thinking skills necessary for twenty-first century jobs (Murnane 
& Papay, 2010).  Ironically, in their review of the literature, Jennings and Sohn (2014) find that 
low-performing students appear to benefit when the proficiency standard is low (Clotfelter, 
Ladd, & Vigdor, 2009; Ladd & Lauen, 2009; Reback, 2008), but do not benefit when it is high 
(Jacob, 2005; Lauen & Gaddis, 2016; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010).  In their study of California, 
Georgia, and Pennsylvania’s implementation of NCLB, Hamilton et al. (2007) found that the 
majority of teachers were also critical of the test scores and did not believe scores accurately 
reflected student achievement or that they led to improvements in student learning.  In interviews 
with Phoenix teachers, Smith (1991) also found that teachers did not believe in the validity of the 
tests, where this belief and pressure to raise state test scores created feelings of dissonance and 
alienation.  Overall, this evidence of decreased perceptions of classroom autonomy, lowered 
perceptions of job security, and decreased satisfaction and morale may have strong implications 
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for teachers’ commitment to the profession and for employment decisions to enter the teacher 
workforce, where to enter, and, once in the workforce, whether or not to stay.   
SBA impact on teacher employment decisions: Decreasing retention.  
Given SBA’s widespread impact on school and teacher practices and experiences, it 
might be expected that SBA will affect teachers’ employment decisions about whether to join the 
teacher workforce, where to work, and, once in the workforce, whether to stay in the teacher 
workforce (Figlio & Loeb, 2011).   However, it is unclear how SBA might influence teacher 
retention, where there are a number of potential directions.  One, SBA may increase or decrease 
overall mobility, which would increase or decrease recruitment and hiring costs.  Two, SBA may 
differentially influence more or less effective teachers to stay or leave.  For example, 
administrators might respond to the pressure to improve test scores by encouraging effective 
teachers to stay and discouraging their less effective teachers to leave (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; 
Loeb & Cunha, 2007).  As another example, effective teachers may appreciate the emphasis on 
test scores more than less effective teachers, thereby making them more likely to enter or stay 
(Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Loeb & Cunha, 2007).  Three, SBA may influence the sorting of teachers 
into tested and non-tested grades and subjects.  For example, administrators may encourage their 
most effective teachers to move into tested grades and subjects (Loeb & Cunha, 2007).  Four, 
SBA may differentially influence more or less experienced teachers to stay or leave.  Less 
experienced teachers may be more sensitive to the pressure, stress, and lower job security 
resulting from SBA; however, more experienced teachers may also strongly respond to these 
changes in policies (Loeb & Cunha, 2007).  Lastly, SBA may influence teachers’ choices to 
enter, stay, or leave schools identified as more or less effective.  A school labeled as “failing” 
under NCLB’s AYP provision may be less attractive to teachers, given the potential stigma and 
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increased pressure and stress of teaching in that environment (Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010; 
Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, & Diaz, 2004).  However, additional resources such as coaches and 
professional development provided to those schools may balance the costs and benefits of 
working in less effective schools (Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2010).   Overall, the impact of SBA on 
teachers’ employment decisions may prove to be nuanced and therefore difficult to capture.    
While there is a rich set of literature on the impact of SBA and separately on teacher 
retention, there is a much less research that empirically explores the impact of SBA on teacher 
retention, and these literatures are inconsistent with each other.  Two studies have found that 
accountability has limited or positive impacts on teacher retention.  Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2008) found that the turnover of fourth-grade teachers in New York City decreased 
relative to teachers in other elementary grades following the introduction of testing from 1994-
1995 through 2001-2002.  Additionally, they found teachers entering the fourth grade are less 
likely to be inexperienced than those teachers moving into other elementary grades (Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2008).  Earlier, using the 2000-2001 nationally representative 
Teach Follow-up Survey, Loeb and Cunha (2007) found that accountability reforms have 
relatively small influences on turnover, where only one percent of teachers who transferred or 
left schools reported that disagreement with reforms was very or extremely important in their 
decision to leave.  Additionally, they found that reforms differentially influence retention across 
types of teachers (Loeb & Cunha, 2007).   However, both of these studies explore the impact of 
accountability before NCLB was passed and implemented.   
Conversely, four studies have found that accountability has a negative impact on teacher 
retention with differential impacts on schools identified as more or less effective.  First, 
Clotfelter et al. (2004) found that North Carolina’s accountability system increased turnover in 
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less-effective schools; however, it is unclear if and how that turnover influenced the overall 
quality of teachers in those schools.  Second, similar to Clotfelter et al. (2004), Feng, Figlio, and 
Sass (2010) found evidence that accountability negatively influences turnover in less effective 
schools in Florida.  In particular, they found that teachers are more likely to leave schools that 
have been identified as less effective and teachers are less likely to leave a school that has been 
identified as more effective (Feng et al., 2010).  Third, Sims (2009) explored the impact of 
NCLB on less effective schools by comparing attrition in California schools with subgroups 
large enough to qualify for subgroup-based assessment to similar schools with slightly smaller 
subgroups that do not qualify.  Sims found that schools with subgroups large enough to qualify 
for subgroup-based assessments were more likely to fail to meet AYP and more likely to have 
increased teacher turnover than similar schools with slightly smaller subgroups that did not 
qualify (Sims, 2009).  And fourth, Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) combined the 
nationally representative Schools and Staffing Survey, Teacher Follow-up Survey, and a 
comprehensive dataset of NCLB-related metrics to estimate the differences in employment 
decisions for teachers across schools that made AYP to those schools at or below the margin. 
Similar to Feng, Figlio, and Sass (2010), they found that teachers in schools at or below the AYP 
margin are less likely to plan on staying in the teacher workforce until retirement as compared to 
teachers teaching in schools meeting AYP (Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014).  Additionally, 
they found that teachers teaching in schools below the AYP margin are statistically significantly 
more likely to take non-teaching jobs or leave the teacher workforce the following year (Reback, 
Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014).   
 In addition to these empirical studies, there are a number of descriptive studies 
suggesting that SBA has reduced teacher retention.  For example, Jackson (2008) found in 
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interviews of North Carolina teachers that teachers in schools serving high-income students and 
teachers in schools serving low-income students felt that accountability had increased teacher 
turnover in their schools, where they attributed this turnover to increased pressure to raise test 
schools.  Additionally, teachers who reported that they were considering transferring schools 
were primarily teaching in schools serving low-income students, where they name the pressure to 
raise test scores and the preparedness of their students as factors in their decision-making 
(Jackson, 2008).    Similarly, in their study of elementary schools in North Carolina, Jones et al. 
(1999) found that more than half of the teachers who responded to the North Carolina survey 
indicated that they would consider leaving if their school was designated as low-performing.   
These findings are not limited to North Carolina.  Sunderman et al. (2004) found in a 
survey of teachers in Fresno, CA and Richmond, VA that teachers in improvement schools were 
more likely plan on leaving teaching within five years than those teachers in adequate progress 
schools.  In a survey of Chapman University teacher education graduates in California, Tye and 
O’Brien (2002) found that teachers who left the profession ranked accountability as their main 
reason for leaving.  Those teachers felt accountability made them overly focus on the test, 
limited the curriculum, and reduced their creativity and autonomy (Tye & O’Bryan, 2002).  In 
Texas, Fuller and Alexander (2002) found that schools designated as low-performing had higher 
rates of teachers quitting, transferring or turnover rates.  For example, in 2001, the turnover rate 
for teachers in schools designated as low-performing was 40.4 percent, which is almost twice as 
high as all other levels of performance ratings (Fuller & Alexander, 2002).   
There is evidence that SBA also influences a teachers’ decision to teach in tested and 
non-tested grades and subjects.  For example, in a survey of Texas teachers, Hoffman, Assaf, and 
Paris (2001) find that some teachers were transferring to non-tested grades and subjects rather 
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than leaving the teacher workforce to avoid the pressure they felt in tested grades and subjects.  
Additionally, they found that eighty-five percent of teachers believed the best teachers were 
leaving the field because of Texas’s high-stakes testing (Hoffman, Assaf, & Paris, 2001).  Based 
on the National Board on Educational Testing and Public Policy’s national teacher survey, 
Pedulla et al. (2003) similarly found a higher percentage of teachers from higher-stakes states 
report that teachers at their school want to transfer out of tested grades than the percentage of 
teachers in moderate- or low-stakes states.  In line with those findings, in a study of Florida 
teachers, Abrams (2004) found that a higher percentage of Florida teachers reported teachers in 
their schools wanting to transfer out of tested grades than teachers in other high-stakes states.   In 
their study of four elementary schools in a Midwestern state, Deniston and Gerrity (2010) found 
that forty-six percent of teachers agreed to some extent that ramifications of NCLB had 
negatively affected teacher morale and that nearly eighty percent indicated that they were 
considering leaving the teacher workforce due to those ramifications.  Of course, it is challenging 
to disentangle the impact of high-stakes teacher accountability, where the high-stakes test scores 
can result in value-added scores that have consequences for individual teachers, from school 
accountability.   
Overall, it is concerning that accountability may be decreasing the retention of teachers in 
schools identified as less effective or in tested grades and subjects.  In particular, decreased 
retention in schools identified as less effective may have important equity implications.  
Clotfelter et al. (2004) highlight that, under most accountability systems, schools serving high-
income students are more likely to be identified as effective than schools that are serving low-
income students.   Indeed, Davidson, Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2015) found differences 
between non-failing and AYP-failing schools.  Looking nationwide from 2003 to 2005, on 
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average, schools that failed all three years had nearly twice the percentage of low-income 
students, fewer teachers per students, were disproportionately located in urban school districts 
and had higher proportions of students of color (Davidson, Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2015).  
If teachers are more likely to leave schools identified as less effective, the introduction of 
accountability may create incentives for teachers to favor effective schools, which tend to serve 
high-income students, over less-effective schools, which tend to serve low-income students 
(Clotfelter et al., 2004; Jackson, 2008).   
SBA differential impact on teachers of color. 
In addition to the differential impact SBA has on teacher retention in schools identified as 
less effective, there is also a differential impact of SBA across teachers’ race/ethnicity.  In 
particular, there is a small set of literature that suggests changes in instructional practices 
resulting from SBA, particularly the decreased perception of classroom autonomy, may impact 
teachers of color differently than white teachers and, thereby, influence their retention 
differently.  More specifically, SBA is likely to negatively impact the retention of teachers of 
colors given the potential conflict between teachers of colors’ motivation to join the teacher 
workforce and to engage in social-justice oriented, culturally relevant practices, and the 
limitations SBA places on their classroom autonomy to engage in such instructional practices.  
Additionally, this negative impact is likely further exacerbated since teachers of color are more 
likely to teach in schools that feel the most pressure of SBA (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011; 
Achinstein, Ogawa, & Speiglman, 2004).   
The literature suggests that teachers of color pursue teaching for reasons related to social 
justice (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011; Dixon, 2003; Dixon & Dingus, 2008; Santoro, 2011).  For 
example, Achinstein and Ogawa (2011) found in a case study of twenty-one new teachers of 
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color in southern California that those teachers are social justice oriented and, more specifically, 
are committed to improving educational opportunities for students from low-income and 
culturally and linguistically non-dominant backgrounds.  Those teachers are motivated to act as 
role models, engage in culturally responsive practices, and thus serve as agents of change in 
schools (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  As another example, Dixon and Dingus (2008) found in 
their interviews with African American female teachers that they entered the teaching profession 
to remain connected to black communities.  Similar to the teachers in Achinstein and Ogawa’s 
(2011) study, these African American female teachers were motivated to act as cultural workers 
incorporating humanistic pedagogical approaches to their classroom (Dixon & Dingus, 2008).  In 
a case study of fifty-six teacher candidates, Su (1997) reported significant differences between 
teachers of color and White teachers, with teachers of color wanting to teach in urban schools 
and make a difference in the lives of low-income students of color.  In fact, a number of other 
studies have similarly found that pre-service teachers of color, compared to white pre-service 
teachers, were more likely to report their primary motivation for joining the teacher workforce 
was their desire to improve the educational outcomes of students of color (Achinstein et al., 
2010).  
However, these social-justice orientations might be in tension with the instructional 
response to the SBA provisions from NCLB.  As Nieto (2009) called out: “Too many teachers 
are leaving the profession because the ideals that brought them to teaching are fast 
disappearing.”  While equity in educational opportunity is one of the primary goals of NCLB, 
equity is narrowly defined through the lens of increased test scores, and the reality of SBA might 
exacerbate inequity (Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Berliner, 2011; Finn and Ravitch, 2007).  In their 
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case study of twenty-one new teachers of color in southern California, Achinstein and Ogawa 
(2011) surfaced and named some of those tensions.  The first tension is between cultural 
relevance and standardization.  The teachers in the study reported that the curriculum standards 
and assessments that came with SBA limit their classroom autonomy and therefore their ability 
to engage in culturally responsive practices (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  One teacher shared,  
“I like the idea of accountability, but having tests as the measure is problematic. It’s 
normalized to the dominant culture, so the test is biased and very language-based, which 
excludes a lot of students, students of color” (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).   
The second tension is between the classroom climate they would like to create and the one 
created by standardization.  The teachers in the study expressed interest in creating a 
collaborative and culturally responsive classroom; however, the standardized instructional 
programs and pacing guides adopted by the districts forced them to engage in instructional 
practices, such as transmission-oriented teaching, that run counter to collaborative, culturally 
responsive practices (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).   
A number of studies have similarly identified these tensions between teachers of colors’ 
interest in engaging in culturally responsive practices and the limited classroom autonomy that 
may result from SBA.  For example, in their interviews of thirteen experienced teachers from 
high-poverty schools who left the work they loved, Santoro and Morehouse (2011) found that 
those teachers faced the dilemma of teaching and consenting to engage in practices that they felt 
were wrong.  For those teachers, what they felt was good teaching was being replaced by the 
need to pass the test and make AYP (Santoro & Morehouse, 2011).   One teacher reported that it 
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felt impossible to teach in a way aligned with her definition of good teaching once her school 
adopted mandated curricular materials and fidelity to a regimented curriculum sequence (Santoro 
& Morehouse, 2011).   As another example, in the study of Hispanic teachers in Los Angeles 
County, Ochoa (2007) found that Hispanic teachers experienced the pressure of high-stakes 
testing linked to NCLB as in tension to supporting the needs of Latino students.  In particular, 
they felt that high-stakes testing limited their opportunities to engage students in multicultural 
curriculum and critical pedagogy (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  Similarly, in a survey of African 
American male teachers in Louisiana, Lewis (2006) found that participants ranked “contributions 
to humanity” third and second, respectively, when asked what recruitment and retention 
strategies were most effective in their decision to join or remain in teaching.  “Job security” was 
the only factor ranked higher than “contributions to humanity” in their decision to remain in the 
teaching profession (Lewis, 2006); however, the perception of job security has also decreased as 
a result of SBA (e.g., see Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014).   In line with those findings, 
Pabon (2016) also found those tensions surface in his study of four African American male 
teachers in New York City.  More specifically, his participants felt that the transition to 
standardized curriculum removed their classroom autonomy and conflicted with culturally 
relevant pedagogy.  One participant, Byron, felt “that the pressure for him and other teachers at 
his school to shift to a standardized curriculum was forcing him to take part in what he saw as an 
injustice to his students” (Pabon, 2016).  Overall, the reduced classroom autonomy attributed to 
SBA limits teachers of color’s ability to engage in the type of instructional practices that they 
believe are most beneficial to their students, which may ultimately turn them away from the 
teaching profession.  
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This tension is likely further exacerbated since teachers of color are more likely to teach 
in schools serving high percentages of low-income students or students of color, the schools 
most likely impacted by SBA (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011; Kim & Sunderman, 2005; Berliner, 
2011, Finn and Ravitch, 2007; Diamond & Spillane, 2004).  NCLB’s subgroup policy put 
schools serving a racially diverse student population at greatest risk of failing AYP (Kim & 
Sunderman, 2005).  As a result, those schools are most likely to feel the pressure of 
accountability and thereby most likely to have teachers report even lower levels of classroom 
autonomy as compared to schools with more affluent students (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011; 
Achinstein et al., 2010).  Given these tensions, the reduced classroom autonomy resulting from 
SBA may disproportionately affect the turnover of teachers of color.  Using the 2003-05 SASS 
and its TFS, Ingersoll and May (2011) found that teachers of color report greater dissatisfaction 
with teaching than white teachers, where less positive organizational conditions in school 
account for a higher rate of teachers of color turnover (Ingersoll & May, 2011).  More 
specifically, collective faculty decision-making and the degree of classroom autonomy are the 
strongest organizational conditions related to teachers of colors’ turnover (Ingersoll & May, 
2011).  Therefore, classroom autonomy  
“may be particularly salient for teachers of color who may enter teaching with 
commitments to communities of color and are teaching in school settings that historically 
have underserved such communities. Such teachers may seek greater control over 
instructional and school-wide decision making, and require administrative support if they 
plan to ‘teach against the grain’” (Cochran-Smith, 1991).    
However, teachers of color seem to be teaching in the schools where that classroom autonomy is 
restricted most, given increased pressures resulting from the SBA provisions of NCLB.  
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Therefore, the changes in teachers’ instructional practices and their perceptions of their job 
following the introduction of SBA may further result in a disproportionately negative impact on 
the retention of teachers of color. 
Summarizing 
Overall, I seek to add to this literature by evaluating how the widespread introduction of 
SBA through NCLB affects the retention of teachers of color.  Connecting the dots, I 
hypothesize that the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB has changed teachers’ 
instructional practices, thereby changing teachers’ experiences of their job and ultimately their 
employment decisions.  More specifically, I posit that the introduction of SBA disproportionately 
affects the retention of teachers of color through the following chain of events.  First, the 
introduction of SBA through NCLB has shifted instructional practices such as adjusting time 
allocated to tested subjects and narrowing instructional practices.  Second, those shifts influence 
teachers’ experience of their job, ultimately leading to a decrease in perceptions of classroom 
autonomy, a lower perception of job security, and a decrease in satisfaction. Lastly, those 
changes in teachers’ perceptions influences teachers’ employment decisions, where those 
changes disproportionately affect teachers’ of color employment decisions.  Figure 2.1 below 









Figure 2. 1: Conceptual framework 
 
In the next chapter, I discuss the data and methodology that I use to answer my three 
research questions: (1) How have trends in teacher retention changed over time and, how does 
that vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors 
influence teacher retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (3) How has the 
widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB influenced teacher retention, and how does that 
vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  More specifically, I first describe the data I use to answer my 
three research questions.  In the following three sections, I provide an overview of the 
methodologies I use to answer those research questions.  I also include an in-depth overview of 
my identification strategy and my models.  I close by discussing the limitations of those 
methodologies.   
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the data and methodology I use to address my 
three research questions: (1) How have trends in teacher retention changed over time and, how 
does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors 
influence teacher retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (3) How has the 
widespread introduction of standards-based accountability (SBA) through No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) influenced teacher retention, and how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  First, I 
describe the data I use to examine my three research questions.  In the following two sections, I 
provide an overview of the methodologies I use to answer my first two research questions, where 
those answers help build the foundation of my conceptual framework.  In the final section, I 
discuss the methodology I use to answer my third research question, which seeks to evaluate the 
impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on the retention of teachers overall and by race/ethnicity.  
I also include an in-depth overview of my identification strategy and my model.  I conclude by 
discussing the limitations of those methodologies.   
Leveraging the Schools and Staffing Survey and Teacher Follow-Up Survey 
I leverage the periodic administration of the nationally representative Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS) and its accompanying Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS) to answer my 
three research questions.  These rich data offer insights into retention rates and the factors that 
influenced a teacher’s employment decisions before and after NCLB brought SBA to a national 
scale.  These data comes from the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES).  To create a 
nationally representative sample, the United States (U.S.) Census Bureau collects SASS and TFS 
data for NCES from a random sample of schools using a stratified probability sample design.  
This design ensures the samples of schools, principals, teachers, and districts consist of a 
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sufficient number of cases to generate reliable estimates by oversampling schools based on 
certain characteristics.  Once schools are stratified and sampled, teachers within the school are 
also stratified and sampled based on their characteristics.  To date, there have been eight cycles 
of SASS: 1987-88, 1990-91, 1993-94, 1999-00, 2003-04, 2007-08, 2011-12, and 2015-16.   
These data represent the largest and most comprehensive source on the staffing, occupational, 
and organizational aspects of elementary and secondary schools, capturing a wide variety of 
topics from teacher and principal characteristics and teachers’ and principal’s perceptions of 
schools and experiences in those schools.  Additionally, many of the same survey questions are 
used in each cycle of the survey, enabling the observance of trends over time.    
There are four components to SASS: The School Questionnaire, the Teacher 
Questionnaire, the Principal Questionnaire, and the School District Questionnaire.   Additionally, 
twelve months following the administration of the SASS, the TFS is administered to the same 
schools, all of those in the original teacher sample who had departed from their school, and a 
representative sample of those who remained at their school.  Like SASS, the TFS is 
comprehensive and nationally representative, and captures self-reported reasons for teachers’ 
departure and their perspective on the characteristics and conditions of the schools.  These data 
are the ideal source to answer my three research questions, by providing nationally representative 
data on the staffing, occupational, and organizational aspects of schools.  Additionally, these data 
are available before and after NCLB was implemented, thereby providing me the opportunity to 
explore differences before and after the widespread introduction of SBA as defined in NCLB.   
Defining the Sample Used for This Study 
For this study, I limit my sample in a few important ways.  First, I limit the sample to 
full-time public school teachers, since ninety percent of teachers of color are employed in public 
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schools and the focus of my study is on the impact of NCLB, which applies to public schools 
(Keigher, 2010).  Second, I limit my sample to black, Hispanic, and white teachers.  Black 
teachers and Hispanic teachers make up about seven percent and six percent of the teacher 
population, respectively, while white teachers make up about eighty-four percent of the full-time 
public school teacher population.  I exclude Asian American, Pacific Islander and Indian 
teachers, since they make up less than two percent and less than one percent of the public school 
teacher population, respectively.  These small sample sizes would limit the statistical power of 
looking at trends in retention within those racial groups.   
Third, I limit my sample to the 1999-01, 2003-05, 2007-09, and 2011-13 SASS and TFS 
administrations.  Previous literature and this study all define years before the school year 2001-
2002 as “pre-NCLB;” therefore, the 1999-01 SASS administration represents my pre-NCLB 
cohort.  Previous literature additionally defines years following the school year 2002-2003 as 
“post-NCLB.”  However, given state’s ability to establish their NCLB implementation plan, 
which led to an uneven rollout, “full implementation” of the SBA provisions of NCLB did not 
exist before the school year 2005-2006.  While the 2003-2004 administration of SASS 
technically falls in the “post-NCLB” timeframe, I cannot feel confident that the SBA provisions 
of NCLB were fully implemented until after 2005-2006.  Therefore, the 2007-2008 and the 
2011-12 administrations of SASS are the only administrations of SASS following the full 
implementation of SBA provisions of NCLB.  That said, there are reasons to be skeptical that the 
2011-12 administration of SASS captures the full implementation of NCLB.  Starting in 2011, 
the U.S. Department of Education started permitting states to apply for waivers to NCLB 
requirements; by 2013, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had received waivers in 
exchange for creating new accountability systems (Polikoff, McEachin, Wrabel, & Duque, 
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2013).  As a result, I excluded the 2011-12 SASS administration, and I focus on and feel most 
confident that the 2007-2008 administration of the SASS data reflects the full implementation of 
the SBA provisions as articulated in NCLB.  Table 3.1 displays the number of teachers overall, 
by year, and by race/ethnicity used in my analyses.   
Table 3. 1: Number and percentage of full-time public school teachers by survey 
administration and by race/ethnicity 
 All years 1999-00 2003-04 2007-08 
# Teachers 106,260 36,200 36,780 33,270 
# Black teachers 









# Hispanic teachers 









# White teachers 









Describing the Methodology for My First Research Question  
My first research question seeks to confirm the problem that I am trying to solve for, the 
declining retention of teachers of color over time.  To do so, I first present changes over time in 
the size and characteristics of the full-time public school teacher population overall and by 
teacher race/ethnicity.  Next, to illustrate the trends in teacher retention over time, I calculate 
descriptive statistics for teacher retention rates and across teacher race/ethnicity over time.  For 
this study, I define teacher retention as a teacher who is teaching in the same school as last year.  
I choose to define teacher retention at the school level rather than from the overall teaching 
profession for a few reasons.  One, schools and their students experience the cost of turnover at 
the school level.  Two, my conceptual framework posits that teachers of color leave given 
organizational-level factors, such as low-levels of classroom autonomy; therefore, whether 
teachers depart to another organization or from the occupation entirely, their departures similarly 
impact and are impacted by the organization (Ingersoll & May, 2011).  And three, in the 
57 
remainder of the study I will explore retention across teacher race/ethnicity, specifically across 
black, Hispanic, and white teachers.  I look at black and Hispanic teachers separately, rather than 
teachers of color broadly, to uncover any important differences in trends across those groups.  
Given that black teachers and Hispanic teachers make up about seven percent and six percent of 
the teacher population, respectively, further distinguishing between leavers, teachers who depart 
the profession entirely, and movers, teachers who move from one school to another, may leave 
subgroups prohibitively small and therefore lack the statistical power to detect small group 
differences.  
Lastly, I calculate retention rates over time across black, Hispanic, and white teachers.  I 
use teachers’ self-identified race/ethnicity from the SASS questionnaires.  I define black teachers 
as those teachers who self-identify as Black or African American, non-Hispanic.  I define 
Hispanic teachers as those teachers who self-identify as Hispanic.  I define white teachers as 
those teachers who self-identify as white, non-Hispanic.  Overall, these descriptive statistics 
should help to illustrate and confirm the problem of a decline in the retention of teachers of 
color, which coincides with the introduction of SBA through NCLB.   
Describing the Methodology for My Second Research Question  
My second research question seeks to establish the relationship between changes in 
teachers’ experiences, such as changes in the perceptions of classroom autonomy, and their 
retention.  More specifically, to explore the relationship between teacher-, school-, and 
organizational factors and teacher retention, I use a linear probability model to examine the 
likelihood that a teacher will stay in their current school as it relates to measures of 
organizational factors while controlling for teacher- and school-factors.   Similar to Ingersoll and 
May (2011), I explore if and how those relationships differ across teacher race/ethnicity, which 
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will set me up to explain the disproportionate impact of SBA on the retention of teachers of 
color.  Equation (1) below sets out the model I estimate.  
(1) ௜ܻ௝௦௧ =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ +  ߚଶ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߚଷܱ௜௧ + ߚସܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧ + ߚହܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧ + ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
In line with the literature on teacher retention, I control for specific teacher (ܺ௜௧) and 
school characteristics ( ௝ܵ௧).  Teacher characteristics controlled for include gender, age, 
experience (six years or more), holds a master’s degree, and union member.  Age is broken down 
into three categories: younger (less than 30), middle-aged (31-50), and older (greater than 50) 
(Ingersoll, 2001).  School characteristics controlled for include school level, tested subject 
(grades 3-8 teaching math or ELA), school size, whether the school is urban, rural, or suburban, 
the proportion of each school’s student population at or below the poverty level (e.g., eligible for 
free or reduced lunch), the proportion of each school’s student population that identify as 
students of color, and the proportion of the school’s faculty that identify as teachers of color 
(Ingersoll & May, 2011).   
I focus on the following four organizational characteristics (ܱ௜௧) that the literature has 
considered important, are relevant for policy, and are available from SASS dataset: salary, school 
leadership and support, school resources, and low autonomy (Ingersoll & May, 2011).  Teacher 
salary and school resources are self-reported responses to the following respective SASS 
questions, “What is your academic year base teaching salary?” and “Necessary materials such as 
textbooks, supplies, and copy machines are available as needed by the staff,” respectively.    
School leadership and support and low autonomy, however, are composites of relevant 
SASS questions.  To confirm internal consistency and feel confident in the composite’s 
reliability, I calculate the Cronbach’s alpha for both these composites.   School leadership and 
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support is a composite of four school leadership and support questions (principal communicates 
expectations, the administration is supportive, principal enforces rules for student discipline, and 
the staff is recognized for a job well done).  The Cronbach’s alpha for school leadership and 
support is 0.82 in 1999, 0.82 in 2003, and 0.84 in 2007, consistently falling in the “good” range 
for internal consistency and reliability.  Low autonomy is a composite of six areas of control in 
their classroom (selecting textbooks and other instructional materials; selecting content, topics, 
and skills to be taught; selecting teaching techniques; evaluating and grading students; 
determining the amount of homework to be assigned, and disciplining students).  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for low autonomy varies slightly for each administration, where it is 0.76 in 
1999, 0.74 in 2003, and 0.72 in 2007; however, it consistently falls in the “acceptable” range for 
internal consistency and reliability.    
It is also important to note that, while the six classroom autonomy survey questions have 
remained consistent over time, the response options for those questions changed between the 
1999-00 and 2003-04 administrations of SASS.  More specifically, the scale shifted from a five 
point scale of “no control” through “complete control” to a four point scale of “no control” 
through “a great deal of control.”  “No control” represents the only consistent response option 
over time.  Therefore, to create a comparable low autonomy variable over time, I first create a 
dummy variable for each of the six questions, where 1 equals “no control” and all other response 
take the value of 0, and then I take the average across those questions.  The resulting low 
autonomy variable represents the proportion of the classroom autonomy questions a teacher 
responded “no control.”  As a result, an increase in the low autonomy variable indicates a 
decrease in perceptions of classroom autonomy, since such an increase represents an increase in 
“no control” responses.  While I might approach the change in scale a number of ways, including 
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calculating z-scores, this approach allows me to keep all observations and compare over the 
years, whereas z-scores would have a mean of zero within waves, and not be able to pick up 
temporal changes.  
Unlike Ingersoll and May (2011), I am particularly interested in understanding how the 
relationship between those organizational factors and teacher retention change over time since 
my conceptual framework posits that the SBA provisions of NCLB have changed those 
organizational factors, thereby potentially changing those relationships.  As a result, I include all 
three administrations of SASS and the TFS (1999-01, 2003-05, 2007-09) in my sample and add 
an interaction between survey administration year and those organizational factors so that I can 
see changes in the significance and magnitude of those relationships with retention over time.  
Equation (2) below reflects this update.  
(2) ௜ܻ௝௦௧ =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ +  ߚଶ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߚଷିହ( ௜ܱ௧ × ܻ݁ܽݎ1999௧) + ߚ଺ି଼( ௜ܱ௧ ×
ܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧) + ߚଽିଵଵ( ௜ܱ௧ × ܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧) +  ߚଵଶܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧ + ߚଵଷܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧ +
ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ +  ߛ௦ +  ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
Further, I am most interested in the relationship between those organizational factors and 
retention in 2007, the administration of SASS we can feel most confident will capture the full 
implementation of the SBA provisions of NCLB.  In addition to controlling for teacher- and 
school-factors, in models (1) and (2) I also include a control for the survey administration year 
(ߚଵଶܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧ + ߚଵଷܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧) and whether or not a state had previously adopted 
consequential accountability similar to those required by NCLB before 2002 (ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦) since 
my sample includes three administrations of the SASS/TFS.  I control for survey administration 
year to account for any changes over time.  I also include a control for whether or not a state 
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adopted consequential accountability similar to those required by NCLB before 2002 (see Table 
3.2 for an overview of how I identify states that had adopted consequential accountability prior 
to NCLB), since about half of the states had adopted consequential accountability similar to 
those required by NCLB by 2000.   
Lastly, in addition to the teacher-, school-, and organizational-variables described above, 
I include sampling weights in my models.  The model must include the weights to ensure the 
data are not over- or under-sampling certain groups of the teacher population.  Also, I include a 
state fixed effect (ߛ௦), mean-zero random error (ߝ௜௝௦௧), and cluster the standard errors at the 
school-level.    
I define my dependent variable, teacher retention, as whether or not a teacher remained 
within the same school within one year after administration of the SASS.  To have retention data 
for all teachers in the 1999-00, 2003-04, and 2007-08 SASS samples, I combine two measures of 
retention: (1) the teacher’s self-reported status from the TFS and (2) the principal-reported status 
for all teachers in SASS.  The teacher’s self-reported status variable comes from the TFS, which 
only represents ten to twelve percent of teachers from the original SASS sample, since the TFS 
only samples those teachers who departed and a representative sample of those who remained 
teaching in their school.  To increase my sample size, I combine the TFS teachers’ self-reported 
status variable with the principal’s reported Teacher Status Variable, which provides retention 
data for all teachers in the original SASS administration.  By leveraging the principal-reported 
teacher status variable, I increased my sample size from 14,820 to 106,260 full-time public 
school teachers.   
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The principal-reported teacher status variable is not a perfect measure of teacher 
retention.  However, the Cohen’s kappa between teachers’ self-reported status and principal’s 
reports of teachers’ status is high at 0.89, suggesting a strong level of agreement and increasing 
my confidence in using the principal’s report of a teacher’s status when that teacher was not 
included or did not respond to the TFS.  Further adding to my confidence, principals’ reports 
matched teachers’ reported status for 94.3 percent of the TFS sample; in only 4.2 percent of 
cases did principals report that a teacher stayed when that teacher reported they left, and in 1.3 
percent of cases did principals report that a teacher left when that teacher reported they stayed.  
Overall, model (2) further builds the foundation of my conceptual framework by setting me up to 
confirm the relationship between changes in organizational factors in response to the SBA 
provisions of NCLB and teacher retention, particularly how that varies by race/ethnicity.   
Describing the Methodology for My Third Research Question 
My third question seeks to evaluate the impact of the introduction of SBA as articulated 
by NCLB on teacher retention broadly and by teacher race/ethnicity.  However, directly testing 
the impact of NCLB on an outcome is challenging for a couple of reasons.  First, the law was 
simultaneously applicable to schools nation-wide, thereby making it hard to establish or identify 
a credible control group to act as a counterfactual, representing what would have happened in the 
absence of school-based accountability.  Second, the law has many components, making it hard 
to isolate the impact of one specific component, thereby avoiding confounding factors.  To 
address the first challenge, it will be critical to establish an identification strategy that identifies a 
credible control group.  The identification strategy may also address the second challenge by 
establishing comparison groups based exclusively on factors related to the SBA provisions of 
NCLB.   
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Given the importance of the identification strategy to the credibility of my analysis, I first 
review identification strategies used in previous studies that seeks to understand the impact of 
NCLB or of state- and district-specific consequential accountability systems similar to those 
required by NCLB.  After this review of the literature, I establish my methodology for the 
analysis.  In doing so, I articulate the identification strategy and describe the model used for this 
study.  I conclude by addressing some of the limitations of this methodology.     
Reviewing identification strategies. 
A number of identification strategies have been used to define a comparison group for 
evaluating NCLB.  The first set of studies draws conclusions about the influence of NCLB on 
key outcomes primarily by making descriptive comparisons across groups that have or have not 
been subjected to the SBA provisions of NCLB, while the second set sought to make a causal 
argument.  A subset of research in the first set of studies relied on comparing results immediately 
before and immediately following the introduction of accountability.  For example, Cronin, 
Kingsbury, McCall, and Bowe (2005) used NWEA test scores to compare achievement and 
student growth immediately prior (2001-2002) and immediately following (2003-2004) NCLB 
implementation.  Similarly, Neal and Schazenbach (2007) compared students who took specific 
high-stakes tests under a new accountability system (e.g., NCLB) with students who took the 
same test under low-stakes in the year before the accountability system was implemented in 
Chicago.   
Another subset of research leverage the introduction of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).  
For example, Springer (2008) compared differences in NWEA test score gains or losses across 
achievement distributions between schools that did or did not make AYP from 2002-2005.  As 
another example, Ballou and Springer (2016) relied on the fact that NCLB was phased in, where 
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states had the ability to designate which grades were to be counted towards AYP; therefore, they 
compare mathematics achievement distributions in grades immediately before and after it 
becomes a designated high-stakes grade.  Similarly, Jennings and Sohn (2014) followed and 
compared two cohorts of Houston students who took both high- and low-stakes tests in sixth and 
eighth grade, where both cohorts’ sixth grade exams were taken prior to NCLB, while only one 
cohort was tested in eighth grade following the “treatment” of NCLB (one year after AYP rates 
were first released).   
While this first set of studies makes descriptive comparisons, the second set consisting of 
seven studies seeks to make a causal argument (Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014; Dee & 
Jacob, 2011; Dee, Jacob & Schwartz, 2013; Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Harrington, 2014; 
Shirrell, Forthcoming; Lauen & Gaddis, 2012).   Those seven studies used one of three broad 
identification strategies to define a credible comparison group to make a causal argument.  The 
first strategy leveraged the variation in states’ rules for satisfying AYP across states at a given 
point in time.  The second strategy used the cutoffs for subgroup-specific accountability to 
compare student and teacher outcomes in schools that were or were not held accountable for a 
particular subgroup.  The final strategy took advantage of the variation in timing of when states 
adopted SBA policies similar to those policies required in NCLB.   
First, one study used rules for satisfying AYP to identify a comparison group to 
understand the impact of NCLB.  Reback, Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) examined the impact of 
NCLB on the behavior of school personnel and student outcomes by exploiting the fact that each 
state established its own rules for satisfying AYP, where there are schools near the margin for 
satisfying its own state’s AYP requirements that would have clearly failed or passed AYP if it 
were located in another state.  This variation in satisfying AYP allowed them to implement a 
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cross-sectional identification strategy similar to a difference-in-difference approach, where they 
compare within-state differences between schools on and away from the AYP failure margin to 
differences between similar schools in other states that are on and away from the AYP failure 
margin (Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014).  Similarly, five state- or district-specific studies 
exploited discontinuities in school accountability grades to understand the impact of those state- 
or district-specific consequential accountability policies.  More specifically, they used regression 
discontinuity to compare schools before and after receiving a failing grade (Rouse, Hannaway, 
Goldhaber, & Figlio 2013; Chiang, 2009; Rockoff & Turner, 2010; Dizon-Ross, 2013; Ahn & 
Vigdor, 2014).  One concern with studies that rely on AYP thresholds is that they may only 
capture a partial impact of the policy, since all schools in the studies may have been impacted by 
NCLB to some extent.   
Second, two studies used the second strategy, which leverages the cutoffs for subgroup-
specific accountability.  These studies do not seek to evaluate the impact of NCLB broadly, but 
seek to understand the impact of NCLB’s subgroup-specific accountability specifically.  
Additionally, these studies explored the impact of subgroup-specific accountability in North 
Carolina, a state that had strong accountability policies prior to NCLB; therefore, the 
counterfactual to subgroup-specific accountability in these studies are a strong state-level 
accountability system that did not have a subgroup-specific component.  One, Lauen and Gaddis 
(2012) used a difference-in-difference (DD) model to examine whether subgroup-specific 
accountability pressure had a larger effect on student test scores in the post-NCLB period than in 
the pre-NCLB period.  Two, Shirrell (forthcoming) used a regression discontinuity model to 
determine the impact of subgroup-specific accountability on teacher retention.  Similar to the 
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concern for the first strategy, subgroup-specific cutoffs may only capture a partial impact of the 
policy, since NCLB may have affected all schools in these studies to some extent.  
To overcome those concerns, the remaining four studies in the second set that sought to 
make a causal argument used an identification strategy that leverages the variation in timing of 
when states adopted accountability policies similar to those required in NCLB.  Three studies, 
Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington (2014), and Dee and Jacob (2011), and Dee, Jacob, 
and Schwartz (2013), used the nationally representative SASS dataset and applied both DD and 
comparative interrupted time series (CITS) methodologies to estimate the impact of NCLB on 
teacher outcomes.  Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington (2014) sought to understand the 
impact of NCLB on teacher attitudes across time, and took advantage of the differences in the 
presence and strength of prior state accountability systems.  More specifically, they adopted the 
Demand-Control-Support (DCS) model, positing that changes to job demands, classroom 
autonomy, and support from the school are likely to be primary factors through which NCLB 
will influence teacher satisfaction (Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Harrington, 2014).  In their 
DD and CITS models, Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington (2014) primarily relied on a 
dichotomous variable that indicates if a state had prior accountability systems or not.  Of course, 
simply categorizing states as having or not having accountability systems before NCLB ignores 
important variations in the features of these state accountability systems.  Given that variation in 
prior accountability systems, they also estimated their DD model incorporating Carnoy and 
Loeb’s (2002) index to distinguish among states based on the “strength” of their accountability 
system.   
Dee and Jacob (2011) and Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz (2013) explored the impact of 
NCLB on student achievement, and on the district, school, and teacher traits, respectively.  They 
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used a CITS design that compares deviations from pre-existing trends following the introduction 
of NCLB in states with and without consequential school accountability before NCLB (Dee, 
Jacob, & Schwartz, 2013).  Unlike Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington (2014), who used 
Carnoy and Loeb’s (2002) index, Dee and Jacob (2011) and Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz (2013) 
updated and used Hanushek and Raymond’s (2005) taxonomy, since that taxonomy most closely 
tracks the key school accountability features of NCLB.   
In the fourth study, Lee and Reeves (2012) examined the impact of high-stakes 
accountability under NCLB on 1990-2009 math and reading NAEP state assessment data.  Lee 
and Reeves (2012) used the same identification strategy as Dee and Jacob (2011) and estimated a 
CITS model.  However, there are a few key differences in their study.  First, Lee and Reeves 
(2012) addressed the fidelity of NCLB implementation and federal-state policy interactions by 
adding pre- and post-NCLB policy variables.  Next, they used a two-level hierarchical linear 
model to follow states’ patterns of academic growth and to examine interstate variation, where 
level one represents the time-level and level two represents the state-level.  Overall, these studies 
surface a number of identification strategies and methodologies I could use to evaluate the 
impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on teacher retention.   
Establishing my methodology.  
To evaluate how the changes in the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB have 
influenced teacher retention and how that varies by teacher race/ethnicity, I use Dee and Jacob’s 
(2011) updated version of Hanushek and Raymond’s (2005) taxonomy and modify Grissom, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Harrington’s (2014) DD model as my main model.   
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Articulating the identification strategy. 
The strength of a DD design relies on the plausibility that the comparison group was not 
affected by the intervention under examination.  To do so, I leverage the heterogeneous 
implementation of consequential school accountability in states before the passage of NCLB.  In 
particular, I distinguish between the states that had implemented consequential school 
accountability before the passage of NCLB, called Prior states, and the states that did not have 
consequential school accountability before the passage of NCLB, No Prior states (Lee & Reeves, 
2012).    The rationale is that No Prior states would be more likely to experience the effect of 
NCLB, while Prior states would experience little or no impact, given their previous exposure to 
such policies (Lee & Reeves, 2012; Dee, Jacob, & Schwartz, 2013; Dee & Jacob, 2011; 
Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, & Harrington, 2014).  Therefore, to 
the extent that NCLB-like accountability had a positive or negative effect on outcomes, I expect 
to see the within-state changes most distinctly in states that did not adopt consequential 
accountability before NCLB (No Prior states). 
To distinguish between states that had adopted accountability policies similar to those 
policies required by NCLB before the introduction of NCLB and states that had not previously 
adopted those policies, I build on the taxonomy used by Hanushek and Raymond (2005), 
incorporating the updates made by Dee and Jacobs (2011).  Hanushek and Raymond (2005) 
relied on a number of data sources to feel confident in their labeling of states.  First, data on 
accountability comes from survey and analysis of all states by CREDO, a non-partisan research 
group at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University (Fletcher & Raymond, 2002).  These data 
established when a state introduced an accountability system, where accountability systems were 
distinguished as “consequential” and “report card” (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005).  States 
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labeled as “consequential” had systems that publicly reported school performance and attached 
consequences to that performance, whereas states labeled as “report cards” only provided public 
reports on school performance, but did not attach a consequence to that performance (Hanushek 
& Raymond, 2005).  There was a wide range of different types of consequences across states that 
had “consequential” accountability systems such as financial rewards for schools, potential state 
takeover of schools, or opportunities for students in failing schools to move schools (Hanushek 
& Raymond, 2005).   
There was a major wave of adoption in the five years leading up to the passage of NCLB, 
whereas before 1997, only twelve states had adopted consequential accountability systems; 
however, by the signing of NCLB, twenty-seven states had adopted consequential accountability 
systems (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005).  To ensure that there were no meaningful differences 
between the “early adopters,” who adopted accountability systems prior to 1997, and “late 
adopters,” who adopted accountability systems in 1997 and beyond, Hanushek and Raymond 
(2005) compared those states on general characteristics of their populations, political 
preferences, and school system characteristics and did not find any meaningful differences.   
Dee and Jacobs (2011) added to and updated Hanushek and Raymond’s taxonomy.  First, 
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) omitted a small number of states from their taxonomy (AK, IA, 
ID, IL, NH, NJ, OH, PA, and SD), and Dee and Jacobs (2011) found that two of those states (IL 
and AK) had implemented consequential accountability prior to the signing of NCLB.  
Additionally, Dee and Jacobs (2011) adjusted the timing of consequential accountability policies 
in eight states (Connecticut, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana, Kansas, 
Wisconsin, Virginia) based on new information.  Table 3.2 indicates which states had prior 
consequential accountability.   
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Table 3. 2: States with consequential accountability prior to NCLB (Dee and Jacobs, 2011) 
Implementation Hanushek and Raymond (2005) Dee and Jacobs (2011) 
State Year   
IL 1992 N/A Consequential  
WI 1993 Consequential School-rating  
TX 1994 Consequential Consequential 
IN 1995 Report card (1993) Consequential  
KS 1995 Report card (1993) Consequential  
KY 1995 Consequential Consequential 
NC 1996 Consequential (1993) Consequential 
NV 1996 Consequential Consequential 
OK 1996 Consequential Consequential 
AL 1997 Consequential Consequential 
RI 1997 Consequential Consequential 
WV 1997 Consequential Consequential 
DE 1998 Consequential Consequential 
MA 1998 Consequential Consequential 
MI 1998 Consequential Consequential 
NM 1998 Consequential (2003) Consequential 
NY 1998 Consequential Consequential 
VA 1998 Consequential School-rating 
AR 1999 Consequential Consequential 
CA 1999 Consequential Consequential 
CT 1999 Consequential (1993) Consequential 
FL 1999 Consequential Consequential 
LA 1999 Consequential Consequential 
MD 1999 Consequential Consequential 
SC 1999 Consequential Consequential 
VT 1999 Consequential Consequential 
GA 2000 Consequential Consequential 
TN 2000 Consequential (1996) Consequential 
AK 2001 N/A Consequential 
 
Describing the model. 
First, I estimate the following DD regression model: 
(3) ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܰܥܮܤ௧ +  ߚଶܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ +  ߚହ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  ×  ܰܥܮܤ௧) +  ߚସܺ௦௧ +
 ߚହ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
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Where ௜ܻ௝௦௧ is the outcome measure observed for teacher i, in school j, state s and year t.  ܰܥܮܤ௦ 
is a dummy equal to 1 for observations from the NCLB era beginning in 2002-2003.  
ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ is a dummy equal to 1 for states that did not have consequential accountability 
polices prior to 2002.  The interaction variable, (ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  ×  ܰܥܮܤ௧), represents the impact 
of NCLB in states that did not have prior accountability policies in years 2003 and 2007 as 
compared to those states in 1999.  ܺ௜௧ represents teacher characteristics in year t, including 
teacher’s gender, teacher’s age (younger and older, with middle omitted), teacher’s experience (6 
or more years), teacher holds a master’s degree, and teacher is a union member.  ௝ܵ௧ represents 
school characteristics in year t, including school’s percentage of students of color, school’s 
percentage of students qualifying for free or reduced lunch, school’s percentage of teaches of 
color, school enrollment size, suburban and rural location (urban omitted), school level (middle 
or high, with elementary omitted), and tested subject.   ߝ௦௧ represents a mean-zero random error.  
 Model (3) assumes a linear relationship across years following the signing of NCLB; 
however, I do not believe the relationship is linear.  Given the uneven rollout of NCLB, full 
implementation of the SBA provisions of NCLB did not exist before the school year 2005-2006 
deadline.  Therefore, in model (4), I break up NCLB into dummy variables for the years in which 
SASS was administered and interact those dummy variables with ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦.  
(4) ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ +  ߚଶܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ +  ߚଷܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ +
 ߚସ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧) +  ߚହ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  × ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧) + ߚ଺ܺ௦௧ +
 ߚ଻ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
Similar to model (3), ௜ܻ௝௦௧ is the outcome measure observed for teacher i, in school j, state s and 
year t.  ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ is a dummy equal to 1 for states that did not have consequential 
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accountability polices prior to 2002.  ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
observations from school year 2003-04, and ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
observations from school year 2007-08.   These YEAR variables represent the impact of 
consequential accountability in states that had previous consequential accountability in years 
2003 or 2007 compared those states in year 1999.  The interaction between ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ and 
ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ or ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ represents the impact of NCLB in states that did not have prior 
accountability policies in years 2003 and 2007 respectively as compared to those states in 1999.  
Since I expect to see the within-state changes most distinctly in states that did not adopt 
consequential accountability prior to NCLB, ߚହ represents the full impact of the SBA provisions 
of NCLB.  Applying my identification strategy to my conceptual framework, I distinguish the 
chain of events that take place following the widespread introduction of SBA by states that had 
previously adopted similar policies (Prior states) and states that had not previously adopted 
similar policies (No Prior states) as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3. 1: Applying my identification strategy to my conceptual framework 
 
I use ordinary least square, rather than logit, models for models (3) and (4), thereby 
making it easier to interpret the results.  However, I estimated models (3) and (4) as a logit, 
confirming that it does not tell a different story.  Further, I estimate this model overall and 
separately by black teachers, Hispanic teachers, and white teachers to understand the differential 
impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on teacher retention across race/ethnicity.  Additionally, 
I estimate this model for two subsets of teachers that may feel a concentrated effect of NCLB: 
(1) teachers who teach in a tested subject and (2) teachers who teach in schools serving high 
percentages of low-income students.  These subsets of teachers may experience the concentrated 
impact of the law, given NCLB’s focus on testing math and ELA in grades three through eight 
and since NCLB sanction provisions were targeted at low-performing Title I schools.  I define 
low-income schools as those schools with fifty percent or more of their students qualifying for 
free- or reduced-lunch.  I define teachers teaching in a tested subject using a combination of the 
“assign” variable and “grade taught” variables.  Teachers are defined as “tested subject” if they 
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teach “elementary,” “mathematics,” or “English or Language Arts” from the “assign” variable, 
and teach in a tested grades (e.g., third through eighth).   Table 3.3 defines the key variables used 
in my models, and Table 3.4 provides the means and standard deviations for those variables.  
Table 3. 3: Definitions of variables used in my models 
Teacher retention.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = teaching in the same school as the 
previous year and 0 = not teaching in the same school as last year.  
Teacher characteristics.  
 Male. A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a male teacher and 0 = a female teacher. 
 Younger.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a teacher less than 30 years of age and 0 = 
a teacher 30 years of age or older.  
 Older. A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a teacher older than 50 years of age and 0= a 
teacher 50 years of age or younger.  
 Experience.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a teacher with 6 or more years of 
experience and 0 = a teacher with 5 or fewer years of experience. 
 Master. A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a teacher holds a master’s degree and 0 = a 
teacher that does not hold a master’s degree. 
 Union. A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a teacher is a union member and 0 = a teacher 
is not a union member. 
School characteristics. 
 Secondary level.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = junior or senior secondary and 0 = 
elementary, middle, or combined (K-12).  
 Tested subject.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = teaching math or ELA in grades 3-8 
and 0 = all other teaching grades and subjects. 
 School size.  Number of students enrolled at the teacher’s school. 
 Rural.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a school based in a rural location and 0 = a 
school based in a suburban or urban location. 
 Suburban.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a school based in a suburban location 
and 0 = a school based in an urban or rural location.  
 Poverty enrollment.  The proportion of students eligible for federal free or reduced-
priced lunch program for students from families below the poverty level. 
 Students of color enrollment.  The proportion of students who identify as students of 
color. 





Table 3. 3: Definitions of variables used my models (continued) 
Organizational conditions. 
 Salary.  A teachers’ self-reported annual salary.  
 School leadership and support.  On a scale of 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly 
agree, the average of a teacher’s responses for four school leadership and support 
questions: principal communicates expectations, administration is supportive, principal 
enforces rules for student discipline, and staff are recognized for job well done.  
 School resources.  On a scale of 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree, a teachers’ 
response to the question related to necessary materials such as textbooks, supplies and 
copy machines are available as needed by staff. 
 Low autonomy.  The proportion of a teacher’s “no control” response to six teachers 
control in their classroom questions: selecting textbooks and other instructional 
materials, selecting content, topics and skills to be taught, selecting teaching techniques, 
evaluating and grading students, determining the amount of homework to be assigned, 
and disciplining students. 
Difference-in-Difference variables.  
 NO_PRIORs.  A dichotomous variable, where 1 = a state that did not previously adopt 
SBA provisions similar to those in NCLB and 0 = a state that had previously adopted 
SBA provisions similar to those in NCLB. 
 YEAR_2003t. A dichotomous variable, where 1 = observations for the 2003-04 SASS 
administration. 




Table 3. 4: Means and standard deviations of independent variables used in my models by 
black, Hispanic, and white teachers 
 Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White  





















































































































































My primary outcome of interest is teacher retention, defined as a teacher who is teaching in 
the same school as last year.  Additionally, I examine teachers’ perceptions of classroom 
autonomy since my conceptual framework posits that the SBA provisions of NCLB decreases 
the retention of teachers of color because SBA reduces perceptions of classroom autonomy.  If 
perceptions of classroom autonomy declined as a result of the SBA provisions of NCLB, I would 
expect to see a positive relationship, since the low autonomy dependent variable represents the 
proportion of “no control” responses, in 2007 for states that had not previously adopted SBA 
provisions similar to those in NCLB (ߚହ).      
In addition to the SBA provisions included in NCLB, the highly qualified teacher 
provision may have also influenced my primary outcome of interest, teacher retention.  NCLB 
required that all teachers be “highly qualified” by 2005-06.  NCLB defines “highly qualified” as 
teachers having: (1) a bachelor's degree, (2) full state certification or licensure, and (3) proven 
knowledge of the subject they teach (U.S. Department of Education, 2004).  Teachers may 
“prove” their knowledge of their subject matter by having a major or the credit equivalent of in 
the subject they teach, having a graduate degree, or passing a state-developed test (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2004).  To address this potentially confounding factor, I estimate 
model (5), shown below, which incorporates the highly qualified teacher provision into the 
model.  To do so, I identify states that did or did not have provisions similar to the highly 
qualified teacher provisions before and after the introduction of NCLB.  More specifically, I 
combine whether or not a state required a content-specific bachelor’s degree and whether or not 
a state required an assessment of academic content to establish my prior and no prior highly 
qualified teacher states.   See Table 3.5 for states requiring a content-specific bachelor’s degree 
and assessing academic content for teacher certification/licensure. 
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(5) ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ + ߚଶܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ +  ߚଷ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ)  +
 ߚସܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ +  ߚହܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ +  ߚ଺(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ ×
ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧) +  ߚ଻(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  ×  ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ × ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧) +  ߚ଼ܺ௦௧ +
 ߚଽ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
Where  ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ is a dummy equal to 1 for states that did not have consequential 
accountability polices prior to 2002.  ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ is a dummy equal to 1 for states that did not have 
“highly qualified teacher” polices prior to 2002.   The interaction between ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ and 
ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ is a dummy equal to 1 for states that did not have consequential accountability nor 
highly qualified teacher polices prior to 2002.   Similar to model 4, ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for observations from school year 2003-04, and ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for observations from school year 2007-08.   These YEAR variables represent 
the impact of consequential accountability in states that had previous consequential 
accountability in years 2003 or 2007 compared those states in year 1999.  The interaction 
between ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ and ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ with ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ or ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧ represents the impact 
of NCLB in states that did not have prior accountability nor highly qualified teacher policies in 
years 2003 and 2007 respectively as compared to those states in 1999.  Since I expect to see the 
within-state changes most distinctly in states that did not adopt consequential accountability nor 
highly qualified teacher provision prior to NCLB, ߚ଻ represents the full impact of the SBA and 
HQT provisions of NCLB.  Table 3.6 presents all models used for my analyses.  
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Table 3. 5: States requiring content-specific bachelor’s degree and assessing academic 
content for teacher certification/licensure (U.S. Department of Education, 2004) 
 States requiring content-
specific bachelor’s degree 




State Prior to 2003 Added in 2003 
or after 
Prior to 2001 Post-2001  
AL  X  X  
AK  X  X  
AZ  X X   
AR  X X   
CA X  X  X 
CO X  X  X 
CT X  X  X 
DC  X X   
DE X   X  
FL X  X  X 
GA X  X  X 
HI  X X   
ID  X  X  
IL  X X   
IN  X X   
IA X   X  
KS X   X  
KY X  X  X 
LA  X X   
ME  X  X  
MD  X X   
MA X  X  X 
MI X  X  X 
MN X   X  
MS X  X  X 
MO  X X   
MT X   X  
NE  X  X  
NV  X X   
NH X  X  X 
NJ X  X  X 
NM X   X  
NY X  X  X 
NC  X X   
ND X   X  




Table 3.5: States requiring content-specific bachelor’s degree and assessing of academic 
content for teacher certification/licensure (continued) 
 States requiring content-
specific bachelor’s degree 




State Prior to 2003 Added in 2003 
or after 
Prior to 2001 Post-2001  
OK X  X  X 
OR  X X   
PA X  X  X 
RI X   X  
SC X  X  X 
SD X   X  
TN  X X   
TX X  X  X 
UT X   X  
VT X  X  X 
VA X  X  X 
WA  X  X  
WV X  X  X 
WI  X  X  
WY X   X  
 




1 ௜ܻ௝௦௧ =  ߚ଴ + ߚଵܺ௜௧ +  ߚଶ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߚଷܱ௜௧ + ߚସܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧ + ߚହܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧ +  ߛ௦
+ ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
2 ௜ܻ௝௦௧ =  ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ +  ߚଶ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߚଷିହ(ܱ௜௧ × ܻ݁ܽݎ1999௧)
+  ߚ଺ି଼( ௜ܱ௧ × ܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧) +  ߚଽିଵଵ( ௜ܱ௧ × ܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧)
+  ߚଵଶܻ݁ܽݎ2003௧ + ߚଵଷܻ݁ܽݎ2007௧ + ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ + ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
3 ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܰܥܮܤ௧ +  ߚଶܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ +  ߚହ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  ×  ܰܥܮܤ௧) +  ߚସܺ௦௧
+  ߚହ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
4 ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ +  ߚଶܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ +  ߚଷܻܧܣܴ_2007௧
+  ߚସ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧)
+  ߚହ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  × ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧) +  ߚ଺ܺ௦௧ + ߚ଻ ௝ܵ௧ +  ߛ௦ + ߝ௜௝௦௧ 
5 ௜ܻ௝௦௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ + ߚଶܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ +  ߚଷ(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ)  
+  ߚସܻܧܣܴ_2003௧ + ߚହܻܧܣܴ_2007௧
+  ߚ଺(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦ × ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ × ܻܧܣܴ_2003௧)
+  ߚ଻(ܱܰ_ܴܲܫܱܴ௦  ×  ܱܰ_ܪܳ ௦ܶ × ܻܧܣܴ_2007௧) +  ߚ଼ܺ௦௧ +  ߚଽ ௝ܵ௧




Addressing limitations of this methodology. 
 Given the strengths of the DD methodology and identification strategy, I feel confident in 
interpreting the results of the model as an indication of the impact of the SBA provisions of 
NCLB on teacher retention.  Despite those strengths, some potential threats or limitations are 
worth discussing.   
First, previous literature and this study all define years before the school year 2001-2002 
as “pre-NCLB,” and years following the school year 2002-2003 as “post-NCLB.”  However, 
given state’s ability to establish their implementation plan, full implementation of the SBA 
provisions of NCLB did not exist before the school year 2005-2006 deadline.  Therefore, I rely 
on the 2007-2008 administration of SASS in my analysis as the first post-NCLB wave.  In fact, 
Lee (2010) created an NCLB policy implementation rating and found that the states’ average 
rating as of 2007 was 2.76 on a three-point scale.  However, Lee (2010) uncovered much 
variation across states, ranging from 2.26 to 2.97, where Prior states were able to implement 
NCLB more actively than No Prior states.  Given this uneven implementation, the identification 
strategy I use to distinguish between Prior and No Prior states may not fully capture the impact 
of NCLB since it assumes all states are subject to the same “dosage” of accountability (Lee & 
Reeves, 2012).    
Additionally, if the comparison states were to some extent influenced by NCLB, the 
contrast between the comparison and treatment states would be weakened, and this approach 
could potentially under- or overestimate the impact of accountability policies (Dee & Jacobs, 
2011; Dee, Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).  For example, if comparison states weakened their pre-
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existing accountability policies in response to NCLB, my DD approach would overestimate the 
effects of NCLB (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Dee, Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).  While this example is 
possible, it is unlikely, because NCLB’s requirements were strong relative to prior state 
accountability policies (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Dee, Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).  For example, 
NCLB not only requires states to disaggregate their data for key subgroups of students, but AYP 
stipulates that schools must meet the bar for each of those subgroups or face consequences.  This 
subgroup-specific accountability requirement likely makes NCLB more rigorous than those 
previous accountability policies.  My identification strategy would ideally be able to distinguish 
between states that had this type of subgroup-specific accountability prior to NCLB; however, 
that information is not readily available.  As a result, my identification strategy may 
underestimate the effects of NCLB since Prior states may have had to increase the strength of 
their previous accountability policies to meet these new requirements.  Lastly, if the states that 
had the most to gain from accountability provisions were the same states that implemented those 
policies prior to NCLB (my comparison states), then my estimates will underestimate the impact 
of those policies, since my model assumes No Prior states would have a similar “dosage” of the 
treatment as Prior states (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Dee, Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).  Further, the 
“dosage” of the treatment may not be directly comparable since Prior states voluntarily 
implemented these policies and had the ability to do so incrementally, which may differ from No 
Prior states that were not doing so voluntarily and had to implement the policies under a tight 
timeline with limited resources.   
Next, the primary threat to internal validity of this approach would be if there were 
unobserved determinants of teacher retention that varied contemporaneously with the 
introduction of SBA provisions of NCLB (Dee & Jacobs, 2011; Dee, Jacobs, & Schwartz, 2013).  
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For example, the “highly qualified teacher” (HQT) provision of NCLB may influence a teacher’s 
employment decisions.  However, similar to the SBA provisions of NCLB, some states had 
already introduced teacher certification/licensure requirements similar to those articulated in the 
HQT provisions before NCLB.  If there is a direct overlap between those states that had 
previously introduced SBA before NCLB and those that had previously introduced HQT 
provisions, then the HQT provision is likely an important confounding factor.  However, when 
comparing the states that had previous HQT-like policies and those that had previous SBA-like 
policies, there is not a direct overlap.  More specifically, about seventeen states previously 
adopted both SBA and HQT provisions similar to those in NCLB; nine states had adopted 
similar SBA provisions, but not HQT provisions; thirteen had adopted similar HQT provisions, 
but not SBA provisions; and the remaining states had neither the SBA nor the HQT provisions 
prior to NCLB.   
Another potential confounding factor that could influence teacher retention during the 
timeframe of my study is the broader economy.  While the timeframe of my study is somewhat 
bookmarked by recessions, the ten-month 2001 recession and the 2007-2009 Great Recession, 
the majority of this study takes place during economic growth.  Generally speaking, teacher 
retention increases during periods of economic tightening and decreases during periods of 
economic growth.  Given the 2003-05 and 2007-09 SASS/TFS administrations were taking place 
during a period of economic growth, changes in retention rates during that time may be attributed 
to the economy, thereby potentially overestimating the impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB.   
The 2001 recession unlikely affected my data since the recession took place between 
March and November of 2001, which did not likely yet influence the 1999-2000 administration 
of SASS or its 2000-2001 TFS, given the timing of the administration of those surveys.  On the 
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other hand, the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 greatly influenced schools and state policies.  Adopted in Feb 2009, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided financial relief to school districts that helped them 
avoid mass layoffs; however, that stimulus only covered the fiscal year 2009 and 2010.  While it 
is difficult to quantify the impact of the Great Recession on education, particularly since it varied 
across each state, it is possible that the Great Recession influenced teachers’ employment 
decisions. The Great Recession is another reason why I limit my analysis to the 2007-2008 
administration of SASS and do not include the 2011-2012 administration.   
Finally, my identification strategy focuses at the state-level and does not take into 
consideration potential differences at the district-level.  For example, big cities, such as New 
York City or Chicago, are mixed alongside mid-sized districts such as Buffalo, NY or, 
Champaign, IL, which potentially have different accountability policies.  Not only may those 
cities have different accountability policies, large urban districts are also more likely to have a 
higher percentage of teachers of color.  As a result, the state-level focus of my model may mask 
important nuances at the district-level and, thereby, attenuate the impact of the SBA provisions 
of NCLB as captured by my model.       
Summarizing 
I will leverage the periodic administration of the nationally representative SASS and its 
accompanying TFS to answer my three research questions: (1) How have trends in teacher 
retention changed over time and, how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-
, school-, and organizational-factors influence teacher retention, and how do those vary by 
teacher race/ethnicity? (3) How has the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB 
influenced teacher retention, and how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  Answering the 
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first question will help me confirm the problem that the retention for teachers of color has 
declined following the introduction of SBA through NCLB by presenting those descriptive 
statistics over time.   The second question will help me establish the significant relationship 
between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for teachers of color, but not for white 
teachers, where I will leverage a linear probability model.  Establishing those relationships build 
the foundation of my conceptual framework.  My third research question will help me establish 
and explain a causal relationship between the introduction SBA through NCLB and retention and 
perceptions of classroom autonomy by teacher race/ethnicity.  More specifically, I will leverage 
the heterogeneous implementation of SBA in states before the passage of NCLB and a DD 
model to evaluate the impact of NCLB by teacher race/ethnicity.    
In the following two chapters, I present the results of my three research questions.  
Chapter 4 builds the foundation of my conceptual framework by presenting the results of my first 
two research questions.  I start by presenting my first research question results.  More 
specifically, I present changes over time in the size and characteristics of the full-time public 
school teacher population and changes in teacher retention over time overall and by teacher 
race/ethnicity.  These analyses seek to confirm the problem that the retention for teachers of 
color has declined following the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB.  In the next 
section, I present the results of my second research question.  More specifically, present the 
results of my linear probability model that examines the likelihood that a teacher will stay in 
their current school as it relates to measures of organizational factors.  These analyses seek to 
establish a significant relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for 
teachers of color, but not for white teachers.   
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Finally, in chapter 5, I present the results for my third research question.  More 
specifically, I present results of the DD model that evaluates how the widespread introduction of 
SBA through NCLB has influenced teacher retention and perceptions of classroom and how that 
varies by teacher race/ethnicity.  This chapter ultimately seeks to establish a causal relationship 
between the introduction SBA through NCLB and retention and perceptions of classroom 
autonomy by teacher race/ethnicity.  Understanding these relationships will give us important 
insights to design future research and policy that seeks to improve the diversity of the teacher 
workforce.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS FOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO 
In this chapter, I present the results of my first and second research question: (1) How 
have trends in teacher retention changed over time and, how does that vary by teacher 
race/ethnicity?  And (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors influence teacher 
retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  These research questions act as a 
foundation for my conceptual framework.  The first research question does so by seeking to 
confirm the problem I hope to address: a decline in the retention of teachers of color and how 
that coincides with the widespread introduction of standards-based accountability (SBA) through 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB). The second research question does so by seeking to illustrate 
how organizational factors related to the SBA policies of NCLB, such as perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, differentially influences the employment decisions of teachers of color.  I 
present the results of these two research questions in two separate sections.   
Presenting the Results of My First Research Question 
In this first section, I present the results to my first research question: How have trends in 
teacher retention changed over time and, how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity?   I start 
here to build the foundation of my conceptual framework by seeking to confirm the problem of a 
decline in the retention of teachers of color over time.  More specifically, I present changes in the 
full-time public school teacher population overall and by teacher race/ethnicity and then I 
highlight how those populations differ from each other.  Finally, I show changes in the retention 
of full-time public school teachers overall and by race/ethnicity.   
Changes in the full-time public school teacher population over time. 
The full-time public school teacher population has grown eighteen percent from 1999-00 
to 2011-12 as illustrated in Figure 4.1.  Over that same period, the number of teachers of color 
88 
has increase by forty-one percent, where there were 572,930 teachers of color in 2011-12 as 
compared to 405,540 teachers of color in 1999-00.  This increase in the number of teachers of 
color further increased their representation, where teachers of color represented eighteen percent 
of the teacher population in 2011-12 as compared to fifteen percent in 1999-00.   
Figure 4. 1: Percent increase of full-time public school teachers by black, Hispanic, and 
white teachers between 1999-00 and 2011-12 
 
This growth has improved the overall representation of teachers of color and the 
alignment between the percentage of teachers of color (18 percent) and the percentage of people 
of color in the U.S. population (20 percent).  However, this level of growth and overall 
representation has not been even across race/ethnicity.  More specifically, black teachers 
continue to be under-represented in the teaching population.  Despite the seven percent increase 
in the number of black teachers, they still only represented seven percent of the teaching 
population in 2011-12 while they represent thirteen percent of the overall U.S. population.  This 
under-representation is further alarming when comparing black teachers’ representation to the 
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 Similar to black teachers, Hispanic teachers also continue to be under-represented in the 
teaching population.  Despite their seventy-three percent growth in numbers, Hispanic teachers 
only represented eight percent of the teaching population in 2011-12 while they represent fifteen 
percent of the overall U.S. population.  Their under-representation is further concerning when 
comparing Hispanic teachers’ representation to the Hispanic student population, which make up 
twenty-five percent of the student population.    
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Table 4. 1: Number of percentage of full-time public school teachers by black, Hispanic, 
and white teachers: 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, and 2011-12 
 2000-01 2004-05 2008-09 2012-13 
U.S. Population 275,306,000 285,266,000 295,009,000 304,764,000 
% People of 
Color 
18 18 19 20 
% White 82 82 81 80 
% Black 13 13 13 13 
% Hispanic 12 13 14 15 
# FT Public 
School 
Teachers 
2,629,230 2,901,350 3,057,240 3,107,340 














































47,672,000 49,113,000 49,361,000 50,045,000 
% Students of 
color 
40 43 46 50 
% White 
students 
60 57 54 50 
% Black 
students 
17 17 17 16 
% Hispanic 
students 
17 20 22 25 
NOTE: Data drawn from references U. S. Census Bureau, 2000 and U.S. Department of 
Education, 2016a. 
Differences in characteristics of teachers by race/ethnicity.  
 In addition to being under-represented, black and Hispanic teachers differ from white 
teachers in a few ways.  First, black and Hispanic teachers are more likely to teach in large, 
urban schools and schools with a higher percentage of low-income students, students of color, 
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and teachers of color (see Table 3.3).  They are also less likely to teach in secondary schools and 
be a member of the union than their white peers.  Additionally, they have less teaching 
experience than their white peers do.  
Black and Hispanic teachers also differ from each other in important ways.   Black 
teachers are more likely to be female and to teach in tested subjects than their Hispanic and white 
peers.  In fact, black, Hispanic, and white teachers had a similar likelihood of teaching in a tested 
subject in 1999-00 prior to the introduction of NCLB.  However, black teachers were more likely 
to teach in a tested subject following the introduction of NCLB in 2003-04 and 2007-08.  
Additionally, Hispanic teachers are more likely to be younger and less likely to have a master’s 
degree than their black and white peers are.   
These differences matter since those characteristics influence the likelihood that a teacher 
remains in their school, thereby furthering the differences in retention across teachers of color 
and white teachers.  For example, Table 4.2 shows that younger teachers are less likely to remain 
in their school the following year; however, Hispanic teachers are more likely to be younger.  As 
another example, if a teacher is a member of the union, they are more likely to remain in their 
school; however, white teachers are more likely to be a member of the union than black and 
Hispanic teachers.   
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Table 4. 2: Relationship between teacher characteristics, and retention and low autonomy 
 Retention Low autonomy 
 
   
Male -0.015*** -0.003** 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Younger -0.050*** -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.002) 
Older -0.045*** 0.003* 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Master -0.015*** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Union 0.022*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Experience 0.061*** -0.006*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Tested subject 0.003 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Secondary level 0.003 -0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
School size 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural 0.003 -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Suburban -0.006 -0.006*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Poverty enrollment -0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Students of color enrollment -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Teachers of color -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Low autonomy  -0.026  
 (0.019)  
School leadership and support 0.032***  
 (0.003)  
School resources 0.009***  
 (0.002)  
Salary 0.001***  
 (0.000)  
Constant 0.693*** 0.030*** 
 (0.017) (0.004) 
   
Observations 106,260 106,260 
R-squared 0.031 0.067 
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These differences further matter since they also influence a teachers’ perception of 
classroom autonomy, where my conceptual framework posits that teachers’ perceptions of 
classroom autonomy influence a teachers’ likelihood of retention.  For example, teachers 
teaching in a tested subject, and who teach in urban schools, and in schools with a greater 
percentage of low-income students and students of color have lower perceptions of classroom 
autonomy.  However, black and Hispanic teachers are more likely to teach in those schools, 
which may further influence their likelihood to remain in teaching.   
Changes in the retention of full-time public school teacher population over time and 
by teacher race/ethnicity. 
The annual retention of full-time public school teachers fell two percentage points from 
eighty-seven percent in 2000-01 to eighty-five percent in 2004-05.  However, as illustrated in 
Table 4.3, overall retention of teachers has remained relatively stable in the eighty-five percent 
range since 2004-05.  While this decline might appear small, it is statistically significant.  
Looking more closely, the two percentage-point decrease between 2000-01 and 2004-05 was 
largely driven by an increase in “leavers,” teachers who leave the profession entirely.   
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Table 4. 3: Number and Percentage of full-time public school teachers by retention status: 
2000-01, 2004-05, 2008-09, and 2012-13 
School year Stayers Overall turnover Turnover by type 
Movers Leavers 
1988-89 2,065,800 320,700 188,400 132,300 
 86.6 13.4 7.9 5.5 
1991-92 2,237,300 316,200 185,700 130,500 
 87.6 12.4 7.3 5.1 
1994-95 2,205,300 350,500 182,900 167,600 
 86.3 13.7 7.2 6.5 
2000-01 2,287,920 341,320 196,130 145,190 
  87.0 13.0 7.5 5.5 
2004-05 2,461,590 439,760 222,120 217,640 
  84.8 15.2 7.7 7.5 
2008-09 2,608,870 448,370 227,710 220,660 
  85.3 14.7 7.4 7.2 
2012-13 2,664,520 442,830 231,760 211,060 
  85.7 14.3 7.5 6.8 
 
Looking at retention across black, Hispanic, and white teachers during the same period 
tells a more nuanced story.  Figure 4.2 shows that the trajectory of teacher retention varies by 
teacher race/ethnicity.  The retention of black teachers has consistently and significantly declined 
in between 2000-01 and 2012-13, where it has overall fallen by six percentage points.  The 
retention of Hispanic teachers increased from 2000-01 to 2004-05 and then declined from 2004-
05 to 2008-09 and again from 2008-09 to 2012-13.  That decline is not significant by 2008-09; 
however, becomes significant change by 2012-13.  White teachers, on the other hand, have 
relatively stable retention from 2000-01 and 2008-09 until 2012-13 when there was a slight 
decline.   Despite these different trajectories over time, all teachers experience at least a small 
decline in retention starting in 2004-05.   
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Figure 4. 2: Teacher retention by black, Hispanic, and white teachers: 2000-01, 2004-05, 
2008-09, and 2012-13 
 
Note: 2012-13 retention rates are strictly based-off of the TFS data, since the principal-reported 
Teacher Status variable was not available in the 2012-13 administration.   
 
These differences in retention matter since, despite the growth in the percentage of black 
and Hispanic teachers over time, they continue to be under-represented in part because of lower 
and more rapidly decreasing retention rates.  To illustrate further, the difference in retention 
between black teachers and white teachers was three percentage points in 2000-01; however, the 
difference between black and white teachers’ retention has continued to grow over time to seven 
percentage points by 2012-13.  Similarly, the difference in retention between Hispanic and white 
teachers was only two percentage points in 2000-01 and grew to five percentage points by 2012-
13.   
Presenting the Results of My Second Research Question 
In this section, I present the results of my second research question: What teacher-, 

























race/ethnicity?  This research question continues to build the foundation of my conceptual 
framework by seeking to illustrate how organizational factors related to the SBA policies of 
NCLB, such as perceptions of classroom autonomy, differentially influences the employment 
decisions of teachers of color.  More specifically, I start by showing how organizational factors 
have changed over time, broadly and by teacher race/ethnicity.  Then I examine the relationship 
between those organizational factors and teacher retention overall and over time, broadly and by 
teacher race/ethnicity.   
Changes in organizational factors over time and by race/ethnicity. 
 The introduction of widespread SBA through the signing of NCLB in 2002 has led to a 
number of changes to the teaching experience, including to organizational factors.  Changes in 
those organizational factors, such as perceptions of classroom autonomy, perceptions of school 
leadership and support, perceptions of school resources, and teachers’ salaries, matter since they 
may influence teachers’ employment decisions.  Those factors are also important to understand, 
given their policy relevance.  Table 4.4 presents how perceptions of classroom autonomy (low 
autonomy), perceptions of school leadership and support, perceptions of school resources, and 




Table 4. 4: Perceptions of organizational factors over time by black, Hispanic, and white 
teachers 




All teachers .04 .05 .07 .07 
Black teachers .07 .07 .10 .11 
Hispanic teachers .05 .06 .11 .09 





All teachers 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 
Black teachers 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 
Hispanic teachers 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.2 
White teachers 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 
School 
resources 
All teachers 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 
Black teachers 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 
Hispanic teachers 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 
White teachers 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Salary 
All teachers 41,583 46,225 49,534 54,732 
Black teachers 41,265 45,024 48,832 54,102 
Hispanic teachers 40,176 46,027 49,343 55,241 
White teachers 41,708 46,357 49,612 54,736 
 
Broadly, perceptions of classroom autonomy consistently decreased from 1999-00 before 
the passage of NCLB through 2011-12 following the passage of NCLB.  More specifically, the 
proportion of teachers’ responses of “no control” significantly increased over that time from four 
percent to seven percent.  The increase in low autonomy from 1999-00 to 2011-12 aligns with 
my hypothesis that the SBA provisions of NCLB reduces perceptions of classroom autonomy.  
However, looking at the percentage of “no control” for each of the individual classroom 
autonomy questions (see Figures 4.3-4.8), I only find that two of the six classroom autonomy 
survey questions see a significant increase in response to “no control” over that time period, 
while the remaining four classroom autonomy survey questions only see slight fluctuations.  The 
two classroom autonomy survey questions that experience meaningful increases of “no control” 
responses are (1) “Selecting textbooks and other instructional materials,” and (2) “Selecting 
content, topics, and skills to be taught.”  It is not surprising that NCLB would influence some 
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aspects of classroom autonomy more than other aspects, given NCLB’s emphasis on content and 
standards, but its limited guidance to other aspects of the classroom.    
Figure 4. 3: Percent “no control” response of classroom autonomy survey question: 
“Selecting textbooks and other instructional materials” 
 
Figure 4. 4: Percent “no control” response to classroom autonomy survey question: 









































Figure 4. 5: Percent “no control” response of classroom autonomy survey question: 
“Selecting teaching techniques” 
 
Figure 4. 6: Percent “no control” response of classroom autonomy survey question: 





































Figure 4. 7: Percent “no control” response of classroom autonomy survey question: 
“Disciplining students” 
 
Figure 4. 8: Percent “no control” response of classroom autonomy survey question: 
“Determining the amount of homework to be assigned” 
 
Further, looking at the changes in low autonomy by race/ethnicity surfaces additional 
nuance (see Figure 4.9).  First, overall white teachers consistently have higher perceptions of 
classroom autonomy than their black and Hispanic peers do.  More specifically, white teachers’ 



































two percentage points less than black and Hispanic teachers, respectively.  While those 
differences might appear small, they are significantly different from zero.   
Figure 4. 9: Low autonomy over time and by race/ethnicity 
 
Looking at changes over time, black teachers and white teachers follow a similar pattern 
over time as the full sample, whereas Hispanic teachers follow a slightly different pattern over 
time.  Similar to black and white teachers, Hispanic teachers experience a decrease in 
perceptions of classroom autonomy between 1999-00 and 2007-08.  However, unlike black and 
white teachers who experience a continued decline in perceptions of classroom autonomy (or a 
continued increase in low autonomy), Hispanic teachers experience an increase in perceptions of 
classroom autonomy from 2007-08 to 2011-12 (or a decrease in low autonomy).  Broadly, 
Hispanic teachers and black teachers have similar teacher, school, and organizational 
characteristics; however, Hispanic teachers are significantly less likely to teach in a tested 
subject.  Since teaching in a tested subject is associated with having lower perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, this difference in likelihood to teach in a tested subject may help explain 



































Figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate changes in perceptions of school leadership and support 
and perceptions of school resources over time and by race/ethnicity.  Broadly, while there was an 
increase in the perceptions in leadership in 2003-04 and 2007-08, there has not been a 
meaningful change in perceptions of school leadership and support over time.  This pattern is 
relatively consistent by race/ethnicity.  Similarly, while there has been a general increase in 
perceptions of school resources over time, those changes are not significant.  However, black and 
Hispanic teachers have consistently and significantly lower perceptions of school resources than 
their white peers do.  These limited changes in school leadership and support and school 
resources are not surprising, since I did not predict that the introduction of SBA through NCLB 
would have influenced those organizational factors.   






























Figure 4. 11: Perceptions of school resources over time and by race/ethnicity 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.12, teacher self-reported salary has consistently increased over 
time, where there is limited variation across race/ethnicity.  However, black teachers’ self-
reported salaries are significantly lower than salaries reported by their white peers at every time 
point.  These increases in salary is not surprising, given highly qualified teacher provision of 
NCLB, which resulted in a greater percentage of teachers holding a master’s degree.  Given that 
most teacher’s salaries increase with greater attainment of education, the increase in the 
























Figure 4. 12: Teacher self-reported salary over time and by race/ethnicity 
 
 For the remainder of this section, I focus on perceptions of classroom autonomy, 
particularly its relationship with teacher retention.   I focus on perceptions of classroom 
autonomy because my conceptual framework posits that SBA reduces perceptions of classroom 
autonomy and that there is a relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and 
teacher retention.  Further, I posit that the relationship differs across race/ethnicity, where 
teachers of colors’ perceptions of classroom autonomy has a stronger relationship with retention 
than white teachers, which in turn may drive the decline in retention of teachers of color 
following the introduction of widespread SBA through NCLB.  Additionally, I focus on 
perceptions of classroom autonomy since I found meaningful changes in perceptions of 
classroom autonomy over time and across race/ethnicity, but I did not find meaningful changes 
in perceptions of school leadership and support or school resources over time or meaningful 

















Relationships between those organizational factors and teacher retention overtime 
and by race/ethnicity. 
I begin by examining the relationship between organizational factors and teacher 
retention.  Table 4.5, column I shows a positive and significant relationship between school 
leadership and support, school resources, and salary and teacher retention; however, it does not 
show a significant relationship with low autonomy.  Columns II-IV explores those relationships 
across race/ethnicity, where I continue to not find a significant relationship with low autonomy.  
These findings do not match my predictions based on previous literature, as I predicted to see a 
significant relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for teachers of 
color.   However, this model does not give us insights into how the relationship between 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention has changed over time, where I would predict 
to see a relationship between low autonomy and retention in 2007-08 once NCLB has been fully 
implemented.   
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Table 4. 5: Likelihood of full-time public school black, Hispanic, and white teacher 
retention (Model 1) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 











School leadership and support 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.029** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) 
School resources 0.009*** 0.002 -0.001 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) 
Salary 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.693*** 0.550*** 0.704*** 0.706*** 
 (0.017) (0.067) (0.085) (0.017) 
     
Observations 106,260   6,480   4,580 95,200 
R-squared 0.031 0.038 0.040 0.033 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member), school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color), survey administration year, and if a state had prior SBA provisions.  All models also 
include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
Next, I continue to explore the relationship between organizational factors and retention 
overall and by race/ethnicity; however, in this next model (Model 2), I interact each 
organizational factor and survey administration year so that I can see how if and how the 
relationship between those organizational factors and retention have changed over time.  Further, 
I am most interested in the relationship between low autonomy and retention in 2007, the 
administration of SASS I feel most confident will capture the full impact of the SBA provisions 
of NCLB.  In Table 4.6, column I, I continue to find relatively consistent positive and significant 
between school leadership and support, school resources, and salary, and teacher retention over 
time (with the exception of resources in 1999-00).  However, columns II-IV uncover a more 
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nuanced story across race/ethnicity over time.  Unlike my findings in Table 4.5, I find a 
significant relationship between low autonomy and retention in 2007 for black teachers (-0.208).   
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Table 4. 6: Likelihood of full-time public school black, Hispanic, and white teacher 
retention over time (Model 2) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 



































































































     
Salary*1999 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Salary*2003 0.000* 0.003** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Salary*2007 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.666*** 0.546*** 0.517*** 0.689*** 
 (0.021) (0.085) (0.101) (0.022) 
     
Observations 106,260    6,480    4,580   95,200 
R-squared 0.031 0.040 0.049 0.033 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member), school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
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proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color), survey administration year, and if a state had prior SBA provisions.  All models also 
include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
A stronger relationship between low autonomy and retention for black teachers as 
compared to white teachers in 2007 is consistent with previous research and provides the 
foundation for the argument that NCLB may disproportionately influence black teachers’ 
retention given the introduction of SBA likely reduces perceptions of classroom autonomy.  
However, the lack of a significant relationship between low autonomy and retention for Hispanic 
teachers does not match my predictions and, as a result, I may not see the same relationship 
between the introduction of widespread SBA and retention for Hispanic teachers as I do for 
Black teachers.  Unfortunately, previous research has often focused on differences between black 
and white teachers or teachers of color and white teachers.  These narrow focuses may have 
masked important differences across teachers of color.   
Summarizing 
In this chapter, I presented the results of my first and second research questions: (1) How 
have trends in teacher retention changed over time and, how does that vary by teacher 
race/ethnicity?, and (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors influence teacher 
retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  In the first section, I presented the 
results to my first research question to start building the foundation of my conceptual framework 
by confirming the problem I hope to address.  First, I illustrated that, despite the increase in 
teachers of color in the teaching population, black and Hispanic teachers continued to be under-
represented.  This under-representation creates an even greater discrepancy between the teacher- 
and student-populations, which is problematic given the growing body of research that finds that 
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similar representations of teacher and student populations led to greater outcomes for students 
(Achinstein et al., 2010).  Next, I confirmed a significant decline in the retention of black 
teachers and show that decline coincides with the introduction of SBA as proscribed by NCLB.  
However, I did not find a significant decline for Hispanic teachers by 2008-09 or for white 
teachers overall.  The increasing decline in the retention of black teachers is one cause of this 
under-representation that has policy implications.  While numerous factors likely influence the 
decline in the retention of black teachers over this period, the decline coincides with the 
widespread introduction of SBA through the signing of NCLB in 2002.  Overall, these results 
start to build the foundation of my conceptual framework by confirming the problem I am 
interested in solving.   
In the second section, I presented the results of my second research question: What 
teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors influence teacher retention, and how do those vary 
by teacher race/ethnicity?  This second research question continues to build the foundation of my 
conceptual framework by confirming that organizational factors related to the SBA provisions of 
NCLB, particularly perceptions of classroom autonomy, have changed over time and that those 
changes differentially relate to the employment decisions of black teachers.  More specifically, I 
found that perceptions of classroom autonomy have declined over time for all teachers regardless 
of race/ethnicity and that this decline coincides with the widespread introduction of SBA.   
Further, I found that black and Hispanic teachers’ perceptions of classroom autonomy are 
consistently lower than white teachers’ perceptions.  Next, I posited that perceptions of 
classroom autonomy influences teacher retention, where previous research suggests that 
relationship is stronger for teachers of color than white teachers (Ingersoll & May, 2011) and, 
therefore, may be a driver of the decline in the retention of teachers of color.  I confirmed that 
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there is a significant relationship between low autonomy and retention for black teachers in 
2007.  However, I also would have predicted to find a significant relationship with Hispanic 
teachers, which acts as an important reminder that grouping different races/ethnicities together 
can lead to false conclusions and masks important differences across race/ethnicity.  
Understanding these differences is critical to continue to improve the diversity of the teacher 
workforce.   
 In the next chapter, I present the results to my third research question, which evaluates 
how the introduction of SBA through NCLB has influenced retention and perception of 
classroom autonomy.  My conceptual framework posits the combination of the reduced 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and the significant relationship between low autonomy and 
retention would result in lower retention rates for teachers of color than for white teachers.  
However, since I did not find a significant relationship between low autonomy and retention for 
Hispanic teachers, I may only find an effect of NCLB on black teachers’ retention and not on 
Hispanic teachers’ retention.    
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS FOR MY THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION 
In this chapter, I present the results of my third research question: How has the 
widespread introduction of standards-based accountability (SBA) through No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) influenced teacher retention, and how does that vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  My first 
two research questions set the foundation for answering this final question by first illustrating the 
problem of declining retention of teachers of color and by confirming a significant relationship 
between low autonomy and black teachers’ retention.  Now I evaluate the impact that the SBA 
provisions of NCLB has had on the perceptions of classroom autonomy and ultimately on the 
retention of teachers of color.  I do so by first exploring changes in retention across states with 
and without prior NCLB-like SBA provisions.  I also explore those changes in perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, given I posit that SBA reduces perceptions of classroom autonomy and that 
there is a significant relationship between retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy.  
Next, I examine impact of NCLB on teacher retention, broadly and between black, Hispanic, and 
white teachers, using a difference-in-difference (DD) model.  I also examine that impact on 
perceptions of classroom autonomy.    
Changes in Retention across States that had or had Not Previously Adopted NCLB-Like 
SBA Provisions 
I begin by examining the potential impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on teachers’ 
retention.  To do so, I compare the retention rates of teachers across states that had previously 
adopted SBA provisions similar to those required by NCLB (Prior states) and states that had not 
previously adopted those policies (No Prior states).   Figure 5.1 displays teacher retention across 
No Prior and Prior states.  No Prior states experienced a consistent decline in retention between 
2000-01 and 2004-05 from 87.5 to 87.2 and again between 2004-05 and 2008-09 from 87.2 to 
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86.8.  Prior states followed a different pattern over that period.  Overall, Prior states had similar 
retention rates in 2000-01 and 2008-09; however, those states experienced a small increase in 
retention in 2004-05.    
Figure 5. 1: Teacher retention over time across No Prior and Prior states 
 
Before the passage of NCLB, in 2000-01 No Prior states retention rates (87.5 percent) 
were statistically significantly higher than Prior states (85.9 percent).  That difference in 
retention shrinks to 0.8 and 0.9 percentage points in 2004-05 and 2008-09, respectively, between 
No Prior states and Prior states.  Despite the narrowing difference in retention rates, No Prior 
states’ retention in 2008-09 (86.8 percent) is still significantly higher than Prior states’ retention 
rates at that time (85.9 percent).  The initial difference in 2000-01 aligns with my hypothesis that 
SBA would result in lower retention since the states that have not yet experienced SBA (No Prior 
states) have higher retention rates than those states (Prior) that have already adopted such 
policies.  However, I would have predicted No Prior states’ retention rates to significantly 
decline following the introduction of SBA since my model assumes the greatest within state 
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trends do not match my predictions, those trends represent all full-time black, Hispanic, and 
white public school teachers, where I may find those trends next when I breakdown retention 
rates by teacher race/ethnicity.  More specifically, I predict to find those trends for black teachers 
and not Hispanic or white teachers, given the significant relationship I found between 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for black teachers (Table 4.6 column II).   
Changes in Retention across No Prior and Prior States by Black, Hispanic, and White 
Teachers 
I continue to examine the potential impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on teachers’ 
retention by comparing the retention rates of black, Hispanic, and white teachers across No Prior 
and Prior states.  Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 display the trend in teacher retention across Prior and 
No Prior states for black, Hispanic, and white teachers, respectively.   Those figures illustrate 
both differences in retention patterns within race across No Prior and Prior states and in retention 
patterns across No Prior and Prior states across races. 



























Before the passage of NCLB, in 2000-01 retention rates for black teachers across Prior 
and No Prior states had relatively similar retention rates at 84.2 percent and 84.4 percent, 
respectively.  While the No Prior states have higher retention rates than the Prior states for black 
teachers, I would have predicted the difference to be much greater, since the black teachers in No 
Prior states had not yet had exposure to SBA.  That said, in chapter 4, I did not find a significant 
relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for black teachers in 
1999-00; therefore, perhaps it should not be surprising that No Prior and Prior states have similar 
retention rates at that time.   
Following the introduction of NCLB, in 2004-05 there is a retention decline for both 
Prior and No Prior states, where that decline is greater for No Prior states.  This 3.7 percentage 
point decline in No Prior states is in line with the hypothesis that No Prior states would 
experience a decline following the introduction of SBA; however, it is counterintuitive that Prior 
states would also experience a decline (1.3 percentage points), since those states have already 
implemented SBA.  Even more surprising, black teachers in No Prior states see a 4.2 percentage 
point retention increase between 2004-05 and 2008-09, while Prior states continue to see a 
significant decline of 3.4 percentage points during that period.  Although there is an overall 1.6 
percentage point decline in retention for black teachers in No Prior states from 2000-01 to 2008-
09, I would have predicted to see a significant and steeper decline for No Prior states rather than 
in Prior states.  Overall and counterintuitively, black teachers in Prior states experienced a 
significant, 4.7 percentage point decline in annual retention from 2000-01 to 2008-09.   This 
finding is puzzling because teachers in those states were already exposed to the SBA provisions 
that I hypothesize might reduce retention.  
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Figure 5. 3: Hispanic teachers’ retention rates, over time and across No Prior and Prior 
states 
 
Patterns in retention over time differ for Hispanic teachers, where Hispanic teachers in 
both Prior and No Prior states see an increase in retention between 2000-01 and 2004-05 and 
then a decrease between 2004-05 and 2008-09.  However, the magnitude of those increases and 
then decreases vary across Prior and No Prior states.  More specifically, the retention of Hispanic 
teachers in No Prior states increased by 1.1 percentage points, while it increased by 2.4 
percentage points in Prior states between 2000-01 and 2004-05.  Between 2004-05 and 2008-09 
the retention of Hispanic teachers in No Prior declined more rapidly than Hispanic teachers in 
Prior states, where it significantly fell by 7.3 percentage points in No Prior states and only 1.8 
percentage points in Prior states.  Overall, Hispanic teachers’ retention in No Prior states 
significantly fell 5.6 percentage points from 2000-01 to 2008-09, though their retention in Prior 
states did not meaningfully change.  Given those changes, the difference in retention of Hispanic 
teachers in No Prior and Prior states decreased from positive 4.5 percentage points in 2000-01 to 
negative 3.1 percentage points in 2008-09.  Broadly, these patterns align with my hypotheses; I 

























introduction of SBA through NCLB, and that their within state retention rates would fall more 
greatly than Prior states as is true.  Strangely, in the previous chapter, I did not find a significant 
relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for Hispanic teachers that 
would have supported my overarching conceptual framework that SBA reduces perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, thereby disproportionately reducing retention for teachers of color.  
Figure 5. 4: White teachers’ retention rates, over time and across No Prior and Prior states 
 
I continue to see different patterns in the retention of white teachers over time and across 
No Prior and Prior states.  Before NCLB was law, in 2000-01 retention rates for white teachers 
in No Prior states were significantly higher (1.4 percentage points higher) than for white teachers 
in Prior states.  Following the signing of NCLB, the retention of white teachers did not 
significantly change in No Prior or Prior states.  However, the difference between No Prior and 
Prior states’ retention rates in 2008-09 (0.5 percentage points) is not significant, as it was in 
2000-01.  These patterns in retention rates for white teachers in No Prior and Prior states match 
my hypotheses that the impact of SBA varies across teacher race/ethnicity.  More specifically, I 























4 that there is not a meaningful relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and 
retention for white teachers.   
Changes in Perceptions of Classroom Autonomy across No Prior and Prior States by Black, 
Hispanic, and White Teachers 
To continue understanding these retention patterns, next I explore changes in perceptions 
of classroom autonomy across No Prior and Prior states and by race/ethnicity.  Overall, I predict 
decreases in the perception of classroom autonomy for all teachers, regardless of race/ethnicity, 
in No Prior states following the introduction of widespread SBA through NCLB.  Figure 5.5 
illustrates the changes in low autonomy over time and across Prior and No Prior states.  Before 
NCLB in 1999-00, teachers in No Prior states have slightly, but significantly higher perceptions 
of classroom autonomy as compared to teachers in Prior states.  More specifically, the proportion 
of “no control” responses is significantly lower in No Prior states (three percent) than Prior states 
(four percent).  These differences are in line with my hypothesis that teachers in states without 
SBA would have greater perceptions of classroom autonomy than teachers in states with SBA.  
However, low autonomy surprisingly follow similar trends between 1999-00 and 2011-12 
regardless if teachers are in Prior or No Prior states.   More specifically, both No Prior and Prior 
states see significant decrease in the perception of classroom autonomy or significant increases 
in “no control” responses, over time.  These increases in low autonomy match the conventional 
wisdom that SBA reduces perceptions of classroom autonomy.  However, my conceptual 
framework would have predicted that I would only find a significant decrease in No Prior states, 
and would find little change in perceptions in Prior states given those teachers’ previous 
exposure to SBA policies.    
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Figure 5. 5: Low autonomy, over time and across No Prior and Prior states 
 
Changes in Perceptions of Classroom Autonomy across No Prior and Prior States by Black, 
Hispanic, and White Teachers 
Similar to the overall trends, black, Hispanic, and white teachers all experience a 
decrease in perceptions of classroom autonomy over time; however, the significance of those 
decrease over time and across No Prior and Prior states varies by race/ethnicity.  More 
specifically, Figure 5.6 illustrates that black teachers in No Prior states experience fluctuations in 
their perceptions of classroom autonomy between 1999-00 and 2011-12, whereas there is not a 
meaningful difference between black teachers’ perceptions of classroom autonomy in No Prior 
states before or after NCLB (from 1999-00 to 2011-12).  However, black teachers in Prior states 
experience a consistent decrease in perceptions of classroom autonomy, where there is a 
significant increase in their “no control” responses between 1999-00 and 2011-12.  These 
findings are the opposite of what I predicted; I anticipated seeing a significant change in No Prior 
states rather than in Prior states since black teachers were already exposed to SBA prior to 
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in Prior states helps explain the decline in retention in Prior states, given the significant 
relationship between low autonomy and retention for black teachers in 2007 (Table 4.6 column 
II).   
Figure 5. 6: Black teachers’ low autonomy, over time and across No Prior and Prior states 
 
In Figures 5.7 and 5.8, I find that both Hispanic and white teachers across No Prior and 
Prior states report a significant decrease in their perception of classroom autonomy (or a 
significant increase in low autonomy) over time from 1999-00 to 2011-12.  While there was a 
significant change in perceptions over time, the differences between Hispanic teachers’ “no 
control” response across No Prior and Prior states were not meaningfully different at each time 
point, whereas white teachers’ “no control” responses across No Prior and Prior states were 
significantly different at each time point.  These results do not match my predictions, where I 
only predicted to see significant changes over time in No Prior states.  Further, I see meaningful 
changes for Hispanic and white teachers regardless of whether or not their states had previously 
adopted SBA provisions, and I see meaningfully lower perceptions of classroom autonomy (or 






































Figure 5. 7: Hispanic teachers’ low autonomy, over time and across No Prior and Prior 
states 
 
Figure 5. 8: White teachers’ low autonomy, over time and across No Prior and Prior states 
 
Impact of NCLB on Retention of Teachers Overall and by Black, Hispanic, and White 
Teachers 
Next, I evaluate the impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB on the retention of teachers 













































































a positive or negative effect on retention, I predict to see the within-state changes most distinctly 
in states that did not adopt SBA prior to NCLB (No Prior states).  Additionally, given my 
conceptual framework, I predict a larger negative effect for the black and Hispanic teachers in 
my sample.  Table 5.1 presents the DD results (Model 3), where “No Prior” represents 
differences in retention between No Prior and Prior states in 1999-00 before NCLB, “NCLB” 
represents differences in retention in Prior states between the two time points following the 
passage of NCLB (2003-04 and 2007-08),and the one time point prior (1999-00), and “No 
Prior_NCLB” estimates any differential change following NCLB in states with and without prior 
accountability systems.  Therefore, a meaningful coefficient on the interaction variable 
represents the impact of SBA provision of NCLB on retention comparing No Prior states before 
(1999-00) and after (2003-04 and 2007-08) NCLB.   
Table 5. 1: Impact of NCLB on retention (Model 3) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior 0.012** -0.034* -0.007 0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.020) (0.025) (0.006) 
NCLB 0.009 -0.020 0.018* 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006) 
No Prior_NCLB -0.005 0.005 -0.042 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.027) (0.009) 
Constant 0.839*** 0.798*** 0.837*** 0.847*** 
 (0.009) (0.041) (0.031) (0.010) 
     
Observations 106,260   6,480   4,580  95,200 
R-squared 0.025 0.026 0.035 0.027 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color).  All models also include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
123 
In Table 5.1, I do not find a meaningful difference in retention resulting from the SBA 
provisions of NCLB.  More specifically, I do not find a significant relationship on my interaction 
variable (No Prior_NCLB) overall or across teacher race/ethnicity.  However, this DD model 
assumes a linear relationship of the impact of NCLB following its passage, yet I do not believe 
that to be the case given NCLB’s uneven implementation.  Therefore, next I continue to examine 
the impact of NCLB by including interactions with years (Model 4), where I predict seeing the 
full impact of NCLB in 2007, since I am most confident that the 2007-2008 administration of the 
SASS data reflects the full implementation of the SBA provisions as articulated in NCLB.  In 
Table 5.2 column I, I continue not to find a meaningful impact of SBA provisions of NCLB in 
2007 on teacher retention (No_Prior_2007).  However, Table 5.2 columns II-IV continues to 
explore this impact by race/ethnicity and surfaces a slightly more nuanced story.  More 
specifically, I find that Hispanic teachers in 2007 in No Prior states experience a significant 
negative decline in retention (-0.069); however, I do not find that relationship for black or white 
teachers.   
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Table 5. 2: Impact of NCLB on retention (Model 4) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior 0.012** -0.032 -0.018 0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.024) (0.006) 
YEAR_2003 0.009 -0.005 0.025** 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
YEAR_2007 0.009 -0.037* 0.011 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.011) (0.006) 
No_Prior_2003 -0.004 -0.018 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.028) (0.011) 
No_Prior_2007 -0.005 0.032 -0.069* -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.047) (0.040) (0.009) 
Constant 0.839*** 0.792*** 0.834*** 0.847*** 
 (0.009) (0.040) (0.030) (0.010) 
     
Observations 106,260     6,480     4,580    95,200 
R-squared 0.025 0.027 0.036 0.027 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color).  All models also include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
These findings are peculiar for a couple of reasons.  First, while my conceptual 
framework predicts that Hispanic teachers in No Prior states would experience a significant 
decline in retention following the full introduction of NCLB, that prediction assumes that there is 
a meaningful relationship between Hispanic teachers’ retention and their perceptions of 
classroom autonomy.  Yet, as seen in Chapter 4 (Table 4.6 column III), I did not find that 
relationship for Hispanic teachers in 2007.  Therefore, it is unclear what factor is driving this 
decline for Hispanic teachers in No Prior states in 2007.  Second, I predicted to see a meaningful 
decline in retention for black teachers in No Prior states in 2007 given my conceptual framework 
and the significant relationship between low autonomy and retention seen in chapter 4 for black 
teachers in 2007 (Table 4.6 column II).  While these results do not align with my predictions, 
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they match the changes in retention illustrated in Figures 5.1-5.4.  Further, Table 5.2 column II 
shows that black teachers in Prior states in 2007 have a significantly lower retention rate 
following the introduction of the SBA provision of NCLB.  These findings are counterintuitive 
since black teachers in Prior states had previous exposure to SBA prior to the introduction of 
NCLB; however, these findings are consistent to the trends in retention illustrated in Figure 5.2 
and the trends in perceptions of classroom autonomy shown in Figure 5.6.  
 Next, I re-estimate this model for two subsets of teachers that may feel a concentrated 
effect of NCLB: (1) teachers who teach in a tested subject, and (2) teachers in schools serving 
high proportions of low-income students.  Table 5.3 illustrates the results for teachers who teach 
in tested subjects and Table 5.4 illustrates the results for teachers who teach in low-income 
schools (schools with 50 or more percent of students qualifying for free or reduced lunch).  For 
all teachers and across race/ethnicity, I do not find a significant impact of NCLB on retention for 
teachers in tested subjects.  In other words, the negative impact seen for Hispanic teachers in 
Table 5.2 column III is no longer present when specifically looking at Hispanic teachers teaching 
in tested subjects (Table 5.3 column III).  However, I continue to see that significant negative 
relationship for Hispanic teachers in low-income schools (Table 5.4 column III).  Again, while 
my conceptual framework would predict that Hispanic teachers in tested subjects would 
experience an even more concentrated impact of NCLB, I did not find a significant relationship 
for Hispanic teachers between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention that would drive 
the decline in retention.  Further, I continue to see a significant and negative impact of NCLB on 
retention in Prior states in 2007 for black teachers in tested subjects.  However, I also find a 
significant and positive impact of black teachers’ retention in No Prior states in 2007 for black 
teachers in low-income schools.  These results are entirely counterintuitive since I predicted 
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seeing a negative relationship for teachers in low-income schools.  One potential explanation for 
these counterintuitive results for black teachers in low-income schools is that low-income 
schools may not act as a good proxy for schools targeted by NCLB.  A more accurate subset of 
teachers who may have experienced a concentrated impact of NCLB would be those teachers 
teaching in schools that missed Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).  For example, Reback, 
Rockoff, and Schwartz (2014) leveraged idiosyncrasies in AYP across state policies to determine 
the impact of accountability pressure on teachers, where they found NCLB reduces teachers’ 
perceptions of job security.   
Table 5. 3: Impact of NCLB on retention for teachers teaching in tested subjects 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior -0.041*** -0.161** -0.359*** -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.062) (0.036) (0.010) 
YEAR_2003 -0.002 -0.060* 0.002 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.056) (0.013) 
YEAR_2007 0.012 -0.054* 0.025 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.028) (0.012) 
No_Prior_2003 -0.002 0.028 -0.060 -0.008 
 (0.016) (0.061) (0.069) (0.019) 
No_Prior_2007 -0.019 0.008 -0.080 -0.025 
 (0.016) (0.086) (0.071) (0.015) 
Constant 0.886*** 0.887*** 0.881*** 0.897*** 
 (0.014) (0.078) (0.059) (0.016) 
     
Observations   20,260    1,240     820   18,200 
R-squared 0.028 0.051 0.096 0.036 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, school size, rural, suburban, proportion of 
students of color, and proportion of teachers of color).  All models also include state fixed effects 




Table 5. 4: Impact of NCLB on retention for teachers in low-income schools 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior 0.008 -0.026 0.044 0.030* 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.038) (0.016) 
Year_2003 0.009 0.002 0.037* 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) 
Year_2007 0.012 -0.041 0.024 0.022* 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.028) (0.013) 
No_Prior_2003 -0.030 -0.006 -0.067 -0.028 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.046) (0.026) 
No_Prior_2007  -0.008 0.085* -0.155** -0.016 
 (0.019) (0.045) (0.059) (0.020) 
Constant 0.801*** 0.688*** 0.939*** 0.812*** 
 (0.023) (0.059) (0.033) (0.021) 
     
Observations    29,430     3,690     2,380    23,360 
R-squared 0.024 0.034 0.040 0.032 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, school size, rural, suburban, proportion of 
students of color, and proportion of teachers of color).  All models also include state fixed effects 
and cluster at the school-level. 
 
In addition to the SBA provisions included in NCLB, the highly qualified teacher (HQT) 
provision may also influence teacher retention.  To address this potentially confounding factor, I 
re-estimate my model incorporating the highly qualified teacher provision (Model 5).  Similar to 
my approach with SBA, I identify states that had previous provisions similar to the HQT 
provisions prior to the signing of NCLB.  To the extent that NCLB had a positive or negative 
effect on retention, I predict to see the within-state changes most distinctly in states that did not 
adopt SBA nor HQT provisions prior to NCLB.  Further, I predict to see the greatest impact in 
No Prior states in 2007 following the full implementation of both SBA and HQT as captured by 
the “NoPrior_SBA_HQT_2007” variable.   
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Table 5. 5: Impact of NCLB on retention, including HQT (Model 5) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior -0.005*** -0.013 -0.034** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.014) (0.002) 
No_HQT -0.006*** 0.007 0.106*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) 
NoPrior_SBA_HQT 0.013* -0.031 -0.009 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.034) (0.024) (0.008) 
YEAR_2003 0.007 -0.006 0.020* 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) 
YEAR_2007 0.007 -0.037* 0.007 0.011* 






















     
Constant 0.846*** 0.787*** 0.729*** 0.859*** 
 (0.009) (0.040) (0.027) (0.010) 
     
Observations   106,260     6,480     4,580    95,200 
R-squared 0.025 0.027 0.037 0.027 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color).  All models also include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
Similar to the results found in Table 5.2, I continue not to find a meaningful impact of 
NCLB’s SBA and HQT provisions overall and for black and white teachers (Table 5.5 columns 
I, II, and IV).  Further, the significant impact on retention seen for Hispanic teachers in Table 5.2 
column III is no longer significant when incorporating the HQT provisions into the model (Table 
5.5 column III).  However, I continue to find a modest, negative impact on the retention of black 
teachers comparing black teachers in states with Prior SBA and HQT provisions in 2007 to black 
teachers in those states in 1999 (-0.037).   While these findings are counter to my predictions, 
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they further confirm that black teachers’ retention has meaningfully declined in Prior states 
following NCLB.   
Impact of NCLB on Perceptions of Classroom Autonomy Overall and by Black, Hispanic, 
and White Teachers 
Similar to my hypotheses for retention, to the extent that NCLB-like accountability had a 
positive or negative effect on perceptions of classroom autonomy, I predict seeing the within-
state changes most distinctly in states that did not adopt consequential accountability prior to 
NCLB as captured in the interaction variable No Prior_NCLB.  Recall that the low autonomy 
variable represents the proportion of “no control” responses to classroom autonomy questions.  
As a result, a positive relationship suggests a reduction of perceptions of classroom autonomy 
since a positive relationship indicates an increase in “no control” responses.  Therefore, given my 
conceptual framework, I predict finding a positive effect on my interaction variable and that 
those effects are larger for the black and Hispanic teachers in my sample.  In Table 5.6 column I, 
I do not find a meaningful differential impact of NCLB in No Prior states.  However, I find a 
significant increase in the low autonomy in Prior States following the introduction of NCLB 
(0.019).  In fact, these findings are consistent for black, Hispanic, and white teachers as 
illustrated in Table 5.6 columns II-IV.  While these results are counterintuitive, they match the 
changes in low autonomy illustrated in Figures 5.5 – 5.8.   
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Table 5. 6: Impact of NCLB on low autonomy (Model 3) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior 0.009*** 0.024** 0.011 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003) 
NCLB 0.019*** 0.016** 0.037*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
No Prior_NCLB -0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) 
Constant 0.029*** 0.055*** 0.0304*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.009) (0.003) 
     
Observations 106,260    6,480   4,580  95,200 
R-squared 0.061 0.054 0.037 0.060 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color).  All models also include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
Unlike the DD model used for the results in Table 5.6, the DD model used for the results 
found in Table 5.7 does not assume a linear relationship in the time following the introduction of 
NCLB (Model 4).  Therefore, in this model I predict seeing a significant, positive relationship on 
the No Prior_2007 if the SBA provisions of NCLB negatively affected perceptions of classroom 
autonomy.  In Table 5.7 column I, I find two counterintuitive results.  One, I find an increase in 
perceptions of classroom autonomy in No Prior states following the introduction of SBA 
provisions of NCLB.  More specifically, I see a significant decline in low autonomy in No Prior 
states in 2007 as compared to No Prior states in 1999 (-0.008).  These findings are peculiar since 
I would predict that teachers in No Prior states would experience the greatest decline in 
perceptions of classroom autonomy following the introduction of SBA.   
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Table 5. 7: Impact of NCLB on low autonomy (Model 4) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 All teachers Black Hispanic White 
     
No_Prior 0.009*** 0.024** 0.021 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.013) (0.003) 
YEAR_2003 0.007** 0.004 0.010*** 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
YEAR_2007 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.060*** 0.027*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) 
No_Prior_2003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006) 
No_Prior_2007 -0.008** 0.014 0.002 -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.018) (0.012) (0.003) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) 
     
Observations  106,260    6,480    4,580   95,200 
R-squared 0.067 0.062 0.059 0.065 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All models control 
for teacher characteristics (male, younger, older, experience, master’s degree, and union 
member) and school characteristics (secondary, tested subject, school size, rural, suburban, 
proportion of low-income students, proportion of students of color, and proportion of teachers of 
color).  All models also include state fixed effects and cluster at the school-level. 
 
Two, consistent with the DD model seen in Table 5.6, I find a significant impact on 
perceptions of classroom autonomy in Prior states in 2007 as compared to Prior states in 1999.  
These findings suggest that perceptions of classroom autonomy decreased in Prior states 
following the introduction of NCLB as evident by an increase in low autonomy (0.030).  These 
findings are puzzling since teachers in Prior states had previous exposure to SBA policies.  
However, those findings are consistent with the trends found in Figure 5.5.    Further, I continue 
to find a significant impact on perceptions of classroom autonomy across race/ethnicity (Table 
5.7 columns II, III, and IV).  This significant increase in low autonomy in Prior states helps 
explain why black teachers experienced a significant decline (-0.037) in retention in 2007 in 
Prior states (Table 5.2 column II) given the significant relationship between low autonomy and 
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retention confirmed in chapter 4 (Table 4.6 column II).  These findings support my hypotheses 
that the reduction in perceptions of classroom autonomy would lead to a lower retention rate for 
black teachers.   
Similar to black teachers, Table 5.7 column III and IV shows that Hispanic and white 
teachers also experience a significant decrease in perceptions of classroom autonomy in Prior 
states in 2007 as evident by an increase in low autonomy (0.060 and 0.027, respectively).  
However, given that I did not find a significant relationship between Hispanic or white teachers’ 
low autonomy and retention (Table 4.7 column III and IV), it is not surprising that I do not also 
find a significant decline in the retention of Hispanic or white teachers resulting from the 
introduction of SBA provisions through NCLB (Table 5.2 column III and IV).  Table 5.7 column 
IV also shows a significant decrease in low autonomy for white teachers in 2007 in No Prior 
states as a result of NCLB.  This increase in perceptions of classroom autonomy is 
counterintuitive; however, the size of the decline in “no control” responses is quite small (-
0.007).   
Summarizing 
In this chapter, I presented the results of my third research question: How has the 
widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB influenced teacher retention, and how does that 
vary by teacher race/ethnicity?  This final research questions sought to establish a causal 
relationship between the widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB on the retention of 
teachers of color.  Ultimately, I did not find a meaningful relationship between the introduction 
of SBA of NCLB and the retention of teachers.  Overall, I found different patterns of retention 
over time and across No Prior and Prior states for black, Hispanic, and white teachers.  Black 
teachers counterintuitively experienced a significant decline in retention following the 
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introduction of SBA through NCLB in Prior states, Hispanic teachers experienced a significant 
decline in retention during that time in No Prior states, and white teachers did not experienced a 
significant decline in either No Prior or Prior states.  While I predicted seeing differences in 
retention patterns across teacher race/ethnicity, I did not predict black teachers to experience a 
significant decline in Prior states, since those teachers already had exposure to SBA provisions 
like those in NCLB.  Additionally, I found a consistent increase in low autonomy in both No 
Prior and Prior states (Figure 5.5).  These trends in low autonomy across No Prior and Prior 
states align with my hypotheses that the SBA provisions of NCLB reduces perceptions of 
classroom autonomy and may also influence retention.  However, I did not predict that 
perceptions of classroom autonomy would similarly decline in Prior states as in No Prior states, 
since teachers in Prior states had previous exposure to SBA provisions prior to the introduction 
of NCLB.   
When I examine those relationships more closely through the DD models, I do not find a 
significant impact of the SBA provisions on retention from comparisons of No Prior states in 
2007 to those states in 1999.  Counterintuitively, I find evidence that black teachers in Prior 
states experience a significant decline in annual retention following the introduction of SBA 
through NCLB by comparing Prior states in 2007 to Prior states in 1999 (Table 5.2 column II).  I 
did not predict seeing meaningful differences in Prior states since my model assumes those states 
would experience little or no impact of NCLB (and thereby be an appropriate control group).  
Similarly, I found the greatest increases in low autonomy in Prior states rather than in No Prior 
states (Table 5.7).  Again, I did not predict seeing meaningful differences in Prior states since I 
assumed those states would experience little or no impact from the introduction of SBA through 
NCLB.   
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Finally, while I did not find a negative differential impact of the SBA provisions of 
NCLB in my comparisons of states with and without prior SBA in 2007, I did find evidence to 
support that decreases in perceptions of classroom autonomy influences the retention of teachers 
different across race/ethnicity.  More specifically, I found a positive and significant relationship 
between perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for black teachers in 2007, where 
black teachers’ perceptions of classroom autonomy significantly decreased in Prior states, as did 
their retention.  As a result, decreases in perception of classroom autonomy following the 
introduction of SBA still explains the decline in retention of black teachers; however, that 
decline is counterintuitively taking place in Prior states.   
 In the next and final chapter, I discuss the implications of the results coming out of my 
three research questions.  More specifically, I first discuss the implications of my results from a 
evaluation perspective.  However, to go deeper, I next introduce institutional theory to further 
unpack and explain my counterintuitive results.  Finally, I conclude with future research and 
policy recommendations for policy makers who are interested in improving the diversity of the 
teacher workforce and ultimately improving the equity of student outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of the standards-based 
accountability (SBA) provisions of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) on the retention of teachers of 
color.  I pursued this topic given a growing body of research demonstrating a more diverse 
teacher workforce would benefit all students, particularly students of color; however, our teacher 
workforce is becoming increasingly homogenous and white, in part, due to the declining 
retention of teachers of color (Villegas & Irvine, 2010; Ingersoll & May, 2011).   My conceptual 
framework posited a chain of events initiated by the widespread introduction of SBA as 
proscribed by NCLB that would end by disproportionately reducing the retention of teachers of 
color.  More specifically, my conceptual framework posits that the SBA provisions of NCLB 
changed teachers’ instructional practices in ways that influence their experience on the job such 
as a reduction in perceptions of classroom autonomy, which then influences teachers’ 
employment decisions, disproportionately declining the retention of teachers of color.  I 
articulated three research questions, identified an appropriate dataset, and established a strong 
methodology that would set me up to confirm the problem, establish the relationship between 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention for teachers of color, and then ultimately 
evaluate the relationship between the SBA provisions of NCLB and retention and perceptions of 
classroom autonomy by teacher race/ethnicity.     
In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of the results from my three research 
questions: (1) How have trends in teacher retention changed over time, and how does that vary 
by teacher race/ethnicity? (2) What teacher-, school-, and organizational-factors influence 
teacher retention, and how do those vary by teacher race/ethnicity? (3) How has the widespread 
introduction of SBA through NCLB influenced teacher retention, and how does that vary by 
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teacher race/ethnicity?  Before diving into the implications of my findings, I first provide an 
overview into the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), which replaced NCLB and now 
represents the most recent reauthorization of ESEA.  In the overview, I discuss how ESSA is 
similar and differs from NCLB, which will inform my recommendations.  Additionally, I 
highlight the widespread adoption of the Common Core State Standards that was first catalyzed 
by the Race To The Top (RTTT) competition.  Next, I discuss the implications of my results as 
an evaluation of SBA as a program or policy.  However, to go deeper, I introduce institutional 
theory as an alternative perspective to interpret my findings, and then re-interpret my results 
from that perspective.  Finally, I conclude with future research and policy recommendations for 
policy makers seeking to increase the diversity of the teacher workforce and ultimately to 
improve the equity of our educational system.   
Providing an Overview of ESSA 
NCLB continued until its reauthorization in December 2015 as the Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA).  While ESSA differs from NCLB, ESSA represents a continuation of the 
standards and accountability regime by continuing to push for greater rigor in academic 
standards to prepare students for college and careers, and by continuing the requirements of 
annual statewide assessments that measure students' progress toward those rigorous standards 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2016).  Similar to NCLB, ESSA continues to require states to 
test students in reading and math in grades three through eight and once in high school (Klein, 
2016, March 31).  It also continues to require that ninety-five percent of students participate in 
those tests, and that data must be broken down by subgroups of students (e.g., English-learners, 
students in special education, racial minorities, and those in poverty) (Klein, 2016, March 31).   
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However, ESSA seeks to address some of the key criticisms of NCLB and, therefore, 
differs from NCLB in three important ways.  First, ESSA gives states more autonomy in setting 
accountability goals and is less prescriptive in its approach to intervening in low-performing 
schools (Marsh, Bush-Mecenas, & Hough, 2017).  This shift represents a restoration of 
autonomy to states that addresses one the criticisms of NCLB, that it was too prescriptive and 
rigid (Marsh, Bush-Mecenas, & Hough, 2017).  In particular, ESSA does not require calculating 
and reporting Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP).  In place of AYP, the majority of states plan to 
use a summative rating system, such as A-F grades, to rate school performance (Woods, 2017).   
Unlike NCLB, ESSA does not prescribe how states and districts transform their lowest-
performing schools; therefore, states will be able to choose their own intervention strategies 
(Klein, 2016, January 6). 
Second, states have greater autonomy to increase or decrease the stakes of assessments 
and must incorporate multi-measures of student achievement.  For example, forty-seven states 
plus the District of Columbia plan to include growth as an accountability indicator in elementary 
and middle school (Woods, 2017).  In twenty of those states, growth will be weighted more than 
proficiency, while in thirteen states, growth and proficiency will be weighed equally (Woods, 
2017).  This shift addresses another key criticism of NCLB that it did not account for growth, 
which disproportionately impacted low-income schools that may have experienced much growth 
but still did not meet proficiency cut offs.  Similarly, another criticism of NCLB was that it too 
narrowly focused on test scores, where ESSA requires a more comprehensive approach to 
measurement by requiring multi-measures of student academic achievement (Marsh, Bush-
Mecenas, & Hough, 2017).  For example, thirty-six states currently plan to use a chronic 
138 
absenteeism or attendance measure (Woods, 2017).  However, only nine states currently plan to 
use measures such as a school climate or culture measure (Woods, 2017).   
Third, ESSA requires states to adopt “challenging” academic standards; however, it does 
not define what “challenging” means and it explicitly prohibits the U.S. Secretary of Education 
from forcing or encouraging states to pick a particular set of standards such as the Common Core 
Standards (Klein, 2016, March 31).  This shift addresses the concern that NCLB inadvertently 
incentivized states to lower their standards.  Currently, thirty-five states plan to include a college 
and/or career readiness measure in their ESSA plan (Woods, 2017).  While ESSA explicitly 
cannot encourage the adoption of the Common Core State Standards, most states have adopted 
those standards (DeNisco, 2017).  The Common Core State Standards’ goal is to offer a set of 
college- and career-ready standards designed to ensure students graduating from high school are 
prepared to take credit-bearing courses in college or enter the workforce (Koretz, 2017).   
The impetus for the Common Core State Standards started before ESSA.  RTTT, a 
competitive grant program that was a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, sought to encourage educational innovation and reform and acted as major catalyst for 
states to adopt the Common Core State Standards (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  
Further, RTTT allocated $350 million to the development of a Common Core assessment 
(Koretz, 2017).  Initially, forty-six states had adopted the Common Core State Standards; 
however, given some backlash, eight states have repealed or withdrawn and twenty-one states 
have revised or made changes to the Common Core (DeNisco, 2017).   However, closer analysis 
shows that many of those states are simply rebranding the standards, changing the name or 
making slight tweaks (DeNisco, 2017).  Therefore, RTTT was successful getting most of the 
states to adopt the Common Core, or a version of the Common Core Standards (DeNisco, 2017; 
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Loveless, 2016).  While it is too early to predict with confidence what states will do since full 
implementation will not occur until the 2017-2018 school year, this understanding of ESSA and 
Common Core will influence the implications and recommendations of this study.   
Discussing the Implications of My Findings 
 Overall, in examining the trends in teacher retention over time, I first confirm that black 
and Hispanic teachers continued to be under-represented in the teacher workforce despite an 
increase in the number of teachers of color in the teaching population during this time.  I also 
confirm an increasing decline in the retention of black and Hispanic teachers, which coincides 
with the widespread introduction of standards-based accountability (SBA) through the signing of 
NCLB in 2002.  However, that decline is only significant for black teachers and not for Hispanic 
teachers by 2008-09.  Further building the foundation of my conceptual framework, I confirm 
that there has been a reduction in the perceptions of classroom autonomy for all teachers since 
the widespread introduction of SBA.  Additionally, I found that the relationship between 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention varies by teacher race/ethnicity, and that there 
is a significant relationship between low autonomy and retention for black teachers in 2007.  
However, I did not find that relationship for Hispanic teachers.   
While this study does not explore factors that drive this different relationship for black 
and Hispanic teachers, it did uncover differences in characteristics between these two groups of 
teachers.  For example, Hispanic teachers are less likely to be in a union and more likely to be 
younger and less experienced than black teachers are, all of which influence both perceptions of 
classroom autonomy and teacher retention as seen in Table 4.3.  Further, notions of 
professionalism, and therefore the desire for classroom autonomy, may vary based on a teacher’s 
age and on when they entered the profession (Mockler, 2011; Buchanan, 2015; Stone-Johnson, 
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2014).  Abbott defines a profession as an “exclusive occupational group applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases” (Labaree, 1992).  Professionals exchange technical 
knowledge for technical autonomy (Labaree, 1992).  However, young teachers may be more 
comfortable trading their classroom autonomy for more guidance in those earlier years (Stone-
Johnson, 2014).  Additionally, teachers whose careers have only taken place during the era of 
SBA may be forming new definitions of what it means to be a good teacher, more specifically to 
be a good teacher is to raise test scores (Koretz, 2017; Buchanan, 2015; Stone-Johnson, 2014).  
These differences in definitions of professionals and what it means to be a good teacher may 
explain why Hispanic teachers, who are younger and less experienced than their black peers are, 
respond differently to SBA and why there may not be as strong of a relationship between their 
perceptions of classroom autonomy and retention.   
Additionally, perceptions of power and control of schools at the local level may also 
influence the differences between how black and Hispanic teachers responded to the introduction 
of SBA.  In the thirty years leading up to NCLB, there had been a growth in black representation 
on school boards (Marschall, Ruhil, & Shah, 2010).  In other words, the black community had 
gained more control over schools at the local level, and therefore, black educators may respond 
more negatively than Hispanic educators may, to losing some of that newly gained power and 
control as a result of increased federal control over education.  Overall, my findings suggest that 
the chain of events articulated in my conceptual framework should not group teachers of color 
together as one homogenous group; rather, the specifics of teacher race/ethnicity matter.  Figure 




Figure 6. 1: Updating my conceptual framework by further distinguishing teachers of color 
by race/ethnicity 
 
Given those findings, I expected to find a significant decline in retention and perceptions 
of classroom autonomy for black teachers, but not Hispanic or white teachers, as a result of the 
widespread introduction of SBA through NCLB.  More specifically, I predicted finding 
significant declines most distinctly in states that had not previously adopted SBA provisions like 
those proscribed by NCLB (No Prior states) since teachers in those states had not previously 
been exposed to those polices.  Ultimately, I only found a significant decline in retention for 
Hispanic teachers in No Prior states in 2007; however, it is unclear what about the SBA 
provisions of NCLB is driving that decline, since I did not find a meaningful relationship 
between low autonomy and retention for Hispanic teachers.  
I did not find a significant decline in the retention of black teachers in No Prior states in 
2007.  On the contrary, I found that black teachers in 2007 in states that had previously adopted 
SBA provisions similar to those in NCLB (Prior states) experienced a significant decline 
retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy, despite previous exposures to those SBA 
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provisions.  I did not predict seeing meaningful differences in Prior states since I assumed those 
states would experience little or no impact from the introduction of SBA through NCLB given 
their previous exposure.   
From a coarse program/policy evaluation standpoint, I could come to two conclusions.  
One that the SBA provisions initiated by NCLB are driving the decline in retention for Hispanic 
teachers, and further research is necessary to understand what aspects of NCLB are negatively 
affecting the retention of Hispanic teachers since it is not a result of declining perceptions of 
classroom autonomy.  Two that the SBA provisions of NCLB are not driving the decline of the 
retention of black teachers, and further research is necessary to understand what factors are 
driving the decline of black teachers’ retention during that period.  Unfortunately, a coarse 
program/policy evaluation standpoint is not well set up to explain the counterintuitive results that 
black teachers in Prior states in 2007 experience a significant decline in retention and perceptions 
of classroom autonomy.  
 However, there are a couple of potential explanations for these counterintuitive results.  
First, my model assumes that teachers in No Prior states did not have prior exposure to SBA 
policies prior to NCLB.  While those teachers were not directly impacted by those prior policies, 
the national conversation about SBA through President H.W. Bush’s America 2000 and 
President Clinton’s Goals 2000 and the number of states with those policies may have resulted in 
a level of exposure that reduced the “shock” of those policies to teachers in No Prior states once 
NCLB was introduced.  Second, the level of implementation of the SBA provisions of NCLB by 
2007 would greatly influence teachers’ exposure to the treatment.  For example, it is possible 
that the impact of SBA takes time to take hold, particularly to allow for fidelity of 
implementation and for increasing sanctions to set it.  If that is the case, the Prior states may be 
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the best representation of the impact of SBA provisions in 2007-08, and may represent what will 
eventually be true for No Prior states once more time has passed.  In fact, Lee (2010) created an 
NCLB policy implementation rating and found that even by 2007, states on average only had a 
2.76 rating on a three-point scale and that there was much variation in implementation across 
states ranging from “partially on target” (2.26) to “on target” (2.97).  For example, Kentucky had 
one of the highest ratings since it was able to put the large-scale testing in place earlier than other 
states in order to meet the 2005-06 deadline that required states to administer reading and math 
assessments, given their prior testing system (Lee, 2010).  Further, Lee (2010) found that Prior 
states were able to implement NCLB more actively than No Prior states.   
This uneven implementation across Prior and No Prior states in 2007 helps explain why I 
find a significant, negative impact in retention for black teachers, and perceptions of autonomy 
for all teachers, in 2007 for Prior states, rather than for No Prior states.  However, it contradicts 
SBA’s theory of action that promises a tight feedback loop and ultimately a more tightly coupled 
institution.  These contradictions surface a need to re-interpret my results from an institutional 
theory perspective, which may better explain the counterintuitive results and thereby result in 
stronger recommendations for future research and policy interested in increasing the diversity of 
the teacher workforce.   
Introducing Institutional Theory and Re-Interpreting My Results 
 SBA’s theory of action involves creating a feedback loop intended to change and 
improve educational practices, thereby improving student outcomes (Meyer & Rowan, 2006; 
Hamilton et al., 2007).  This theory of action aligns to the rational perspective of organizational 
theory, where organizations are rational in that they exist to attain a specific goal and align their 
technologies to attain those goals efficiently (Ogawa et al., 2003).  As a result, SBA intends to 
144 
encourage a recoupling of the historically decoupled technical core (Meyer & Rowan, 2006; 
Hallett, 2010).   
On the surface, the context of our educational landscape seemed ideal for SBA to take 
hold and recouple our historically decoupled, highly institutionalized public school system.  
First, the 1983 publication, “A Nation at Risk,” questioned the assumption that, on average, 
schools were doing well and, thereby raised questions about the legitimacy of the institution of 
public school education.  Next, President H.W. Bush’s America 2000 and President Clinton’s 
Goals 2000 laid the foundation for the accountability regime, where thirty-nine states had 
adopted accountability policies by the signing of NCLB (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005).  From 
the rational perspective, I would predict states, schools, and teachers would implement the SBA 
provisions of NCLB with fidelity, thereby resulting in states, schools, and teachers adjusting 
their instructional practices and ultimately improving outcomes for students.  However, the 
literature does not confirm those predictions.  The small set of studies that sought to isolate the 
causal effect of NCLB found mixed or no significant effects on NAEP scores that can be 
attributed to the law (Dee & Jacob, 2010; Lee & Reeves, 2012; Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 
2014; Ladd, 2017).  More specifically, there is evidence that fourth grade NAEP math scores 
modestly increased; however, those gains are not found in math in other grades or in reading in 
any grades (Koretz, 2017).  Therefore, although the rational perspective acts as the foundation of 
SBA and describes the reform’s theory of action, institutional theory may continue to better 
describe the educational landscape and be the most useful tool to understand how the institution 
ultimately responded to the introduction of SBA.   
Institutional theory assumes organizations do not have the capacity to demonstrate their 
effectiveness and efficiency such as specified goals, aligned technologies and mechanisms for 
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feedback, and therefore rely on myth and ceremonies to maintain their legitimacy and ensure 
their survival (Ogawa, Sandholtz, Martinez-Flores, & Scribner, 2003).  Indeed, while the SBA 
provisions of NCLB name specific goals (e.g., standards and benchmarks) and mechanisms for 
feedback (e.g., annual assessments), NCLB did not provide the corresponding technologies (nor 
the adequate resources) necessary for schools and teachers to implement NCLB as intended 
(Meyer & Rowan, 2006).  This lack of corresponding technologies disrupts SBA’s theory of 
action and leaves the door open for much variation in states’, districts’, schools’, and teachers’ 
response to NCLB.  As Koretz (2017) reminds us, “If you put enough pressure on people to meet 
goals that they can’t reach by doing what you want, they will do what you don’t want rather than 
fail.”   
New institutional theory further posits that school systems conform to institutionalized 
myths for survival and decouple the technical core from the consequences of institutional 
conformity (Meyer & Rowan, 2006).  Since loose coupling disconnects structures from the 
organization’s core work, institutionalized organizations are able to bridge or buffer external 
demands (Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Honig & Hatch, 2004).  Buffering can be defined as the 
regulation and/or insulation of organizational processes, functions, entities, or individuals from 
the effects of environmental uncertainty or scarcity (Lynn, 2005), while bridging is defined as 
cooperative strategies that schools employ to increase the interdependence of the organization 
with elements in its environment (DiPaola & Tschannen‐Moran, 2005). 
Given this bridging and buffering, Spillane and Burch (2006) argue that loose coupling 
does not describe all aspects of the institutional environment and that different dimensions of the 
technical core can be either tightly- or loosely-coupled to different aspects of the institutional 
environment.  For example, some dimensions of the technical core such as academic content 
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appear more tightly coupled with state and district policies compared to other dimensions such as 
teaching strategies (Spillane & Burch, 2006).   I found evidence of this uneven loose and tight 
coupling in teachers’ responses to the classroom autonomy survey questions.  More specifically, 
I found that only two classroom autonomy survey questions show  significant decline and those 
were related to selecting textbooks, content, and topics, while the other four autonomy questions 
regarding aspects of the classroom such as teaching techniques and discipline did not change 
following the introduction of NCLB (see Figures 4.3-4.8).  Given NCLB’s focus on standards, 
but not on teaching strategies, it is not surprising that only certain aspects of the institution such 
as content more tightly coupled in response to the law.   
This understanding of institutional theory, particularly of bridging and buffering, helps 
explain the variation in response to the introduction of SBA as proscribed by NCLB rather than a 
tightly coupled response as suggested from SBA’s theory of action and the rational perspective.  
Applying institutional theory to my conceptual framework would lead to a different chain of 
events than I presented in Figure 6.1, where institutional theory pushes me to incorporate 
bridging and buffering, and therefore introduces uncertainty of shifts in instructional practices 
Figure 6.2 illustrates how institutional theory would change my conceptual framework.   
  
147 
Figure 6. 2: Updating my conceptual framework to incorporate institutional theory 
 
The level of bridging and buffering varies on several important factors that will help me 
understand ultimately, why I found the greatest impact on retention and perceptions of classroom 
autonomy for black teachers in Prior states rather than in No Prior states.  Lee (2010) found that 
states are more likely to bridge due to the level of their pre-NCLB history of activism in high-
stakes accountability policies, the level of compatibility with their own policies, a shared belief 
in the effectiveness of the policy, the states’ capacity to implement the policy, and/or a 
dependence on funding that makes noncompliance not an option.  There is evidence that the 
states, schools, and teachers bridged some of the external demands of SBA.  For example, states 
bridged through developing content and achievement standards and administering annual 
assessments linked to those standards.  It is no surprise that states would chose to bridge in these 
ways, given the direct connection between developing standards and administering assessments 
and federal funding.  Schools and teachers also bridged by aligning curriculum with those 
148 
standards and spending more time on tested subjects such as math and English Language Arts 
(Hamilton et al., 2007; Hannaway & Hamilton, 2008; Dee & Jacobs, 2010; McMurrer, 2007).   
Conversely, in states where those conditions are not present, Lee (2010) suggests that 
they are more likely to engage in buffering activities such as lowering content standards or 
proficiency cutoffs.  These buffering strategies are particularly appealing if the policies are 
relatively expensive and complex, as NCLB was (Lee, 2010).  There is evidence that the states, 
schools, and teachers engaged in this type of buffering.  For example, states buffered by 
strategically setting proficiency or cut-off scores on their state tests (Fuller, Wright, Gesicki, & 
Kang, 2007).  This buffering strategy results in higher proficiency rates on tests, thereby 
maintaining their legitimacy and survival, even if that proficiency does not result in actual 
improved or adequate student learning (Fuller et al., 2007).  Principals may also buffer their 
teachers from external demands, thereby reducing the burden on the teacher.  Additionally, 
schools and teachers buffered by spending more time on test preparation, such as coaching 
towards highly assessed standards or standards that are frequently and predictably tested, 
teaching test-taking skills, and instruction geared towards the test (Jennings & Bearak, 2014; 
Abrams, 2004; Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Murnane & Papay, 2010).  These buffering strategies 
can lead to score inflation, thereby allowing schools and teachers to maintain their legitimacy 
and survival.  Although, the adoption of the Common Core State Standards, and their more 
rigorous assessments, may make it harder for schools and teachers to engage in these sorts of test 
preparation or score inflation buffering strategies (Koretz, 2017).  Overall, these findings help 
explain why black teachers in Prior states in 2007 were more impacted by the introduction of 
SBA than No Prior states since Prior states were more likely to bridge, given the alignment with 
their own policies and increased capacity to implement that policy.   
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Overall, institutional theory provides a useful tool to interpret the implementation and 
therefore ultimate impact of NCLB.  More specifically, the institution of public education’s need 
for legitimacy and survival and its ability to bridge and buffer helps explain the variation in 
response to NCLB.  Further, understanding the factors that influence the likelihood that a state 
bridges or buffers, in other words, the likelihood of more fully implementing NCLB with 
fidelity, helps explain why black teachers in Prior states in 2007 rather than in No Prior states 
were more likely to be influenced by NCLB despite their previous exposure to those policies.  In 
fact, states’ previous engagement in SBA policies made it more likely for them to implement 
SBA with higher levels of fidelity, thereby reducing perceptions of classroom autonomy and 
ultimately black teachers’ retention, given the significant relationship between their perceptions 
of classroom autonomy and retention.  Overall, SBA itself may have become an institutional 
myth that articulates a rational model of how schools should operate, particularly for No Prior 
states (Hallett, 2010).   
Articulating Recommendations for Future Research and Policy 
Using institutional theory to interpret my results and update my conceptual framework 
leads me to a different set of research and policy recommendations than I would have if I only 
interpreted my results from an evaluation standpoint based on my initial conceptual framework 
(Figure 6.1).  From an evaluation standpoint, I would conclude that the SBA provisions initiated 
by NCLB are driving the decline in retention for Hispanic teachers, and further research is 
necessary to understand what aspects of NCLB are negatively affecting the retention of Hispanic 
teachers since it is not a result of declining perceptions of classroom autonomy.  Additionally, I 
would conclude that the SBA provisions of NCLB are not driving the decline of the retention of 
black teachers, and further research is necessary to understand what factors are driving the 
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decline of black teachers’ retention during that period.  As a result, I would not recommend 
policy changes to ESSA needed to address the decline in the retention of teachers of color.  Of 
course, the literature suggests a number of changes necessary to address other consequences of 
SBA; however, those recommendations are out of the scope of this study.   
While these conclusions and recommendations align with my initial conceptual 
framework, the absence of institutional theory would have led me to produce an inaccurate, 
narrow, and incomplete set of recommendations for future research and policy.  From an 
institutional theory perspective, I instead conclude that the negative impact I found in Prior states 
on perceptions of classroom autonomy broadly and on the retention of black teachers 
specifically, best captures the impact of the SBA provisions of NCLB.  Applying institutional 
theory to my conceptual framework, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, helps me articulate a more 
accurate and complete set of research and policy recommendations to address and reverse the 
decline in the retention of black teachers, thereby increasing the diversity of the teacher 
workforce and ultimately improving a broad range of student outcomes.   
Outlining research recommendations. 
I start by offering recommendations for future research surfaced from this study.  The 
first set of recommendations focus on helping researchers and policy makers better understand 
teacher retention and how that varies by teacher race/ethnicity and, therefore, how to design 
policies that improve the diversity of the teacher workforce.  The second set of research 
recommendations focus on improving policy evaluations more broadly.  This study illustrated 
how important understanding policy implementation, given states, schools, and teachers’ 
bridging and buffering, is to policy evaluation and, therefore, ultimately improving reform 
policy.    
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Calling for more research on the diversity of the teacher workforce. 
To improve the diversity of the teacher workforce, I have two research recommendations.  
First, I recommend that research must continue to distinguish teacher race/ethnicity subgroups 
and not group teachers of color together.  This study acts as an important reminder that teachers 
of color do not represent a homogenous group who similarly responds to policies.  More 
specifically, the important differences found between black and Hispanic teachers in terms of the 
relationship between their retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy and in terms of 
NCLB’s impact on their retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy highlight the 
importance to view teachers separately by their race/ethnicity.  While this approach does not 
account for the heterogeneity within a teacher’s race/ethnicity, it ensures that future research will 
not overgeneralize or mask important differences across teachers of color.  Further building upon 
that recommendation, additional research is necessary to understand how SBA provisions of 
NCLB affect the retention and perceptions of classroom autonomy of other teacher 
race/ethnicities not included in this study.  Additionally, I discourage future research from 
looking at teachers as a whole, given white teachers make up about eighty percent of the 
population, thereby potentially masking important differences in the experiences of teachers of 
color.   
As a second recommendation, I encourage additional research on understanding the 
drivers of teacher retention.  While I found that the SBA provisions of NCLB influenced the 
retention of Hispanic teachers in No Prior states, more research is necessary for understanding 
how SBA is influencing their retention, since it is not a result of declining perceptions of 
classroom autonomy.  Understanding the drivers of retention across teacher race/ethnicity will 
help policy makers design policies that will more accurately address the unique drivers of teacher 
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retention across teacher race/ethnicity, thereby improving the diversity of the teacher workforce.  
Improving the diversity of the teacher workforce will improve student outcomes broadly and 
specifically in hard-to-staff schools where teachers of color are more likely to teach (Ingersoll & 
May, 2011).   
Improving policy and program evaluation. 
This study uncovered the importance of understanding implementation through 
institutional theory in policy or program evaluation; therefore, I offer three research 
recommendations to improve policy and program evaluation.  More specifically, this study 
illustrated how ignoring implementation in evaluation can lead to false conclusions and therefore 
faulty recommendations.  As a result, I first recommend future research interested in 
understanding the impact of policies must also study the implementation of that policy, and 
account for that implementation in their evaluations.   Understanding the implementation of these 
policies and accounting for that implementation will help researchers avoid falsely assuming that 
a policy was implemented with sufficient fidelity, and therefore better understand drivers of 
policy outcomes.  As seen with this study, I falsely assumed that No Prior states would have 
fully implemented NCLB by the 2007-08 school year, and therefore could have falsely 
concluded that SBA does not affect the retention of black teachers.  This inaccurate conclusion 
would lead me to make recommendations that at best do not address the problem, and at worst 
exacerbate or create new problems.   
Second, I recommend that researchers continue to understand the implementation of SBA 
policies continuing under ESSA.  This understanding is particularly important, since ESSA is 
likely to perpetuate variation in the implementation of SBA across states.  ESSA continues the 
requirements of annual statewide assessments that measure students' progress toward those 
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rigorous standards; however, it is less prescriptive in its approach to intervening in low-
performing schools, thereby restoring some autonomy to states to increase or decrease the stakes 
of assessments (Marsh, Bush-Mecenas, & Hough, 2017).   
"Given the range of state capacity, and states' different K-12 priorities, ESSA 
implementation could look radically different on the ground from one state to the next. I 
think there's going to be a lot of different stories told throughout the country,"  
 
said Maria Voles Ferguson, the executive director of the Center on Education Policy at the 
George Washington University (Koretz, 2017).  Continuing to apply institutional theory, this 
increased autonomy suggests that states will continue to bridge and buffer and, therefore, the 
impact of ESSA’s accountability will prove even harder to establish than NCLB’s without 
greater attention to implementation.   
Further applying the institutional theory perspective, this increased state autonomy will 
allow states to further bridge and buffer to maximize their legitimacy and survival.  "There are 
bright-shining-star [states] that are going to run and do really interesting things, and then there'll 
be some sad, not-great stories. It's a little bit of survival of the fittest," said Mrs. Ferguson (Klein, 
2017).  Therefore, future research seeking to understand the impact of SBA under ESSA will not 
only need to consider its implementation, but will need to examine directly how ESSA changes 
the institutional setting, how that varies across states, and therefore how it ultimately influences 
teacher and student outcomes.  Understanding how ESSA changes the institutional setting will 
require researchers to identify process variables that could begin to identify and distinguish 
between symbolic posturing and substantive technical processes in order to predict and 
understand teacher and student outcomes.  These understandings will guard against any future 
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false assumptions and better prepare state policy makers to design policies that improve 
outcomes given their unique institutional context.   
Third, I recommend that future research is necessary to understand the increasing 
complexity of public education as an institution, particularly the changes in definitions of 
professionalism and in the policy landscape.  My conceptual framework posits that reductions in 
perceptions of classroom autonomy influences teachers’ employment decisions, where I found a 
significant relationship between perceptions of classroom autonomy and black teacher’s 
retention by 2007.  However, new generations of teachers, particularly those that were students 
during the era of SBA, may have different definitions of professionalism and what it means to be 
a good teacher.  Buchanan (2015) observed that over the past two-decades, since NCLB has been 
law, the focus on measureable performance and individual responsibility for student success 
(e.g., through value-added measures and more rigid teacher evaluations) have introduced new 
professional norms and have begun reshaping the nature of teachers’ professional identities.  In 
her qualitative study of nine teachers in California, Buchanan (2015) found that, while eight out 
of nine of the participants were critical of standardization, they altered their instructional 
practices and saw achievement on standardized tests as a marker of their own success.  For 
example, one participant defined a successful teacher as a teacher whose students meet the goals 
set out by accountability policies (Buchanan, 2015).  Similarly, Stone-Johnson (2014) explored 
how standardization differentially affects different generations of teachers.  More specifically, 
Stone-Johnson (2014) found that Generation X and Millennials, who had spent the majority of 
their time in schools in the context of standardization, appear to feel less bounded and even 
empowered by the demanded and prescribed forms of professionalism, while Boomer teachers 
were more troubled by these impositions.  Overall, the relationships between perceptions of 
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classroom autonomy, professionalism, and employment decisions may be shifting over time and 
further research is needed to understand its impact on teachers’ decisions to enter, stay, or leave 
the profession.   
Further, the policy landscape has continued to changes the federal government has taken 
on a greater role in educational policy.  Prior to Brown and ESEA, much of education policy and 
practice was historically left to the states, given the right to a free public education is found in 
state constitutions and not the U.S. Constitution (Mills, 2008; Egalite, Fusarelli, & Fusarelli, 
2017).  However, since “A Nation at Risk,” the role of the federal government has increased, and 
NCLB represented the most far-reaching federal education policy since its origin in 1965.  
NCLB replaced the past cooperative federal-state relationship, referred to as “marble cake” 
federalism, with a more complex relationship driven by both cooperation and competition, 
referred to as “bipolar federalism” (Lee, 2010).  Cooperative federalism describes the 
interactions between the national, state, and local governments as cooperative, while competitive 
federalism describes those interactions best in terms of conflict and bargaining (Lee, 2010).  Like 
bridging and buffering, these two concepts of federalism may occur simultaneously as states 
enact multiple strategies to maximize their survival in response to federal policy (Lee, 2010).  
Further, ESSA offers a reset in the dynamics between national, state, and district policymakers, 
where how those dynamics will evolve is still to be seen (Egalite, Fusarelli, & Fusarelli, 2017).  
Therefore, as long as the federal government continues to influence educational policy through 
ESEA and competitive grants, it is critical for researchers and policy makers interested in federal 
educational policy to understand those dynamics such that they can design federal policies that 
maximize the uptake and ultimately impact.   
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Overall, these research recommendations encourage researchers to embrace the 
complexity and nuance of teachers and of our educational landscape.  More specifically, these 
recommendations caution researchers to not overgeneralize by grouping teachers of color 
together so that future research and policy can account for important differences across teacher 
race/ethnicity and ultimately improve the diversity of the teacher workforce.  Further, they 
encourage researchers to directly study and take into account implementation in evaluations and 
to explore the increasing complexity of the federal-state relationship.  Brewer, Killeen, and 
Welsh (2013) come to a similar recommendation in their study of Oklahoma’s accountability 
system, where a lack of independent oversight, few checks and balances, and little in-state 
technical capacity limited the effectiveness of their accountability system.  As a result, they urge 
researchers and policy makers to consider the “messy” governance and politics of educational 
accountability systems (Brewer, Killeen, & Welsh, 2013).  These recommendations will improve 
researchers’ and policy makers’ ability to design and implement policies that improve the quality 
and equity of our education system.   
Proposing policy recommendations. 
In addition to offering recommendations for future research, I offer two categories of 
policy recommendations.  The first set offers recommendations on how to improve SBA policies 
in ways that improve the diversity of the teacher workforce.  The second set of recommendations 
offers suggestions on a wider range of policies would improve the school environment and 
thereby improve the diversity of the teacher workforce.  Including a wider range of school 
improvement policies feels important, given this study found that SBA does not fully account for 
the decline in teacher retention over time.  While the following recommendations are varied, all 
would result in increasing the perceptions of classroom autonomy of teachers.  As found in this 
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study, improving the perceptions of classroom autonomy of teachers will improve the diversity 
of the teacher workforce, particularly by improving the retention of black teachers. 
Improving SBA policies to increase the diversity of the teacher workforce. 
ESSA represents a critical opportunity to rethink how to best achieve equity in education 
(Egalite, Fusarelli, & Fusarelli, 2017).  Therefore, I offer three recommendations to improve 
SBA such that it improves the diversity of the teacher workforce.  First, I recommend the process 
for establishing SBA policies, such as those being planned for in response to ESSA, include 
teacher participation and feedback.  More specifically, involve teachers the process of setting or 
implementing performance standards and assessments and of establishing appropriate 
consequences when performance standards are missed (Klein, 2017).  For states designing and 
implementing state accountability plans precipitated by ESSA, this process includes bringing 
teachers unions to the table (Klein, 2017).   
"Don't go off into a room somewhere in the back and build a plan. Don't wait until you 
have a final draft of a plan before you reach out to your stakeholders. Make sure you've 
really gotten buy-in by the time you're done building your plan,"  
suggested Donna Harris-Aikens, the director of policy and practice for the National Education 
Association (Klein, 2017). 
Including teachers in the process would result in several positive outcomes.  One, it 
should increase teachers’ perceptions of classroom autonomy.  This study illustrated the 
importance between perceptions of classroom autonomy and the retention of black teachers.  
Similarly, Achinstein and Ogawa (2011) found that opportunities for teacher voice to be heard 
was an important factor that influenced a teachers’ decision to stay in their school.  Two, 
including teachers in the process ensure states setting more realistic and differentiated goals for 
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academic improvement, and for the newly required multiple measures (Koretz, 2017).  Setting 
more realistic goals will not only help states avoid having the majority of their schools not meet 
those standards (further reducing their legitimacy), but it will help avoid practices, such as 
cheating, that are not educationally beneficial (Koretz, 2017).  Koretz (2017) notes that with 
NCLB, “[o]nce policy makers set performance standards, they just assumed that teachers would 
find a way to reach them, regardless of how high the targets were or how quickly teachers could 
reach them.”  Therefore, he recommends “setting targets that the majority of teachers can reach 
by legitimate means, while still exerting pressure to lesson inequities in education” (Koretz, 
2017).  In this case, involving teachers in the process will not only result in improving 
perceptions of classroom autonomy, but it will improve the goals.  And, three, involving teachers 
in the process should increase teacher buy-in and thereby reduce the likelihood that SBA will 
become a fully institutionalized ceremony that does not actually improve the technical core of 
teaching and learning.  Overall, involving teachers in the process will likely result in several 
positive outcomes, including increasing perceptions of classroom autonomy, that will ultimately 
improve the diversity of the teacher workforce and the effectiveness of SBA policies.   
Second, I recommend SBA policies include other factors into the process of measuring 
the quality of schools.  Koretz (2017) argues that a fundamental flaw of NCLB was the 
assumption that performance as measured by standardized tests was sufficient to establish the 
quality of a school and therefore to result in sanctioning schools and suggests that accountability 
systems broadly will only work if they are designed based on what society hopes to be true about 
our schools.  Grounding his argument in Campbell’s law, Koretz (2017) encourages 
accountability policies to focus on all of the important factors of school.  ESSA creates space for 
multiple measures, including attendance measures and school climate measures (Woods, 2017); 
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however, those additions fall short of comprehensive multiple-measure systems that reflect what 
society hopes to be true about our schools.   
Third, I recommend improving state assessments and cut scores such that it reduces the 
possibility of score inflation and of other instructional practices that negatively impact a 
teachers’ experience and therefore their likelihood to remain in the classroom.  The creation of 
assessments aligned to college- and career-ready standards, such as the Common Core State 
Standards, have the opportunity to reduce the possibility of score inflation.  In particular, design 
the assessments to reduce the predictability of the tests and include formats and problem styles 
that encourage higher-order thinking.   These changes to the assessments will reduce the pressure 
teachers feel to engage in homogenous instructional practices, such as test preparation, that does 
not improve student learning and restricts their classroom autonomy.  Overall, these policy 
recommendations should improve SBA policies such that it improves perceptions of classroom 
autonomy and, therefore, the diversity of the teacher workforce.     
Creating supportive school environments to increase the diversity of the teacher 
workforce. 
In addition to improving SBA policies, I offer policy recommendations districts and 
schools could take to create a more supportive school environment conducive to improving the 
diversity of the teacher workforce.  Exploring policies outside of SBA that improve the diversity 
of the teacher workforce is important since this study showed that SBA alone does not account 
for the decline in the retention of teachers of color.  First, I recommend improving the support 
teachers of color receive from administration and peers, given limited support is a top reason 
teachers of color decide to leave their schools (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  More specifically, I 
recommend schools provide more and higher quality professional development and mentoring 
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opportunities for teachers.  Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of professional 
development and mentoring for teachers broadly and for teachers of color specifically 
(Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011; Koretz, 2017; Ingersoll & Kralik, 2004; Borman & Dowling, 2008; 
Bristol, 2014).  Further, Koretz (2017) highlights that teachers will need substantial support if 
they are going to make substantial improvements in their students’ performance.   
To further improve support from administration, I recommend improving the diversity of 
school administrations.   More specifically, I recommend attracting teachers of color into 
leadership preparation programs and improving mentoring of those teachers into leadership 
positions to improve diversity of school administrations and thereby the diversity of the teacher 
workforce (Grissom & Keiser, 2011).  This recommendation draws on the theory of 
representative bureaucracy, which posits that bureaucracies’ racial and ethnic representation 
should be similar to the community’s population (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999; Grissom & 
Keiser, 2011).  Building off of this theory, Grissom and Keiser (2011) argue that the ability to 
attract and retain representative street-level bureaucrats (e.g., teachers) relies on the maintenance 
of representation in the supervisory ranks (e.g., principals and superintendents).  Overall, 
Grissom and Keiser (2011) find teachers report higher job satisfaction and less turnover when 
supervised by principal of the same racial/ethnic background.  Additionally, Grissom and Keiser 
(2011) find that black teachers report higher job satisfaction in schools with a black principal, 
given reports of feeling somewhat higher levels of administrative support, classroom autonomy, 
and recognition than other teachers report.  These feelings matter, particularly perceptions of 
classroom autonomy, since they influence employment decisions as seen in this study.   
Next, I recommend increasing classroom autonomy by establishing systems for shared 
decision-making and teacher voice in curriculum and pedagogy (Achinstein & Ogawa, 2011).  
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This recommendation is particularly important for schools in Prior states, where this study found 
a significant decline in perceptions of classroom autonomy and of the retention of black teachers.  
More specifically, I recommend allowing more flexibility to increase classroom autonomy in 
critical areas of their classroom such as the selection of texts, content, and topics – the two 
organizational factors that significantly declined following the introduction of SBA (Figures 5.1. 
and 5.2).   Restoring some of that classroom autonomy would be a relatively easy and affordable 
way to improve the retention of black teachers, particularly compared to more costly reforms 
such as salary increases, professional development, class-size reduction, etc (Ingersoll & May, 
2011).  Overall, these sets of policy recommendations offer a number of approaches to improve 
both SBA policies and a broader range of policies in ways that would improve the diversity of 
the teacher workforce.   
Concluding Thoughts 
As former Secretary of Education John King said,  
“Without question, when the majority of students in public schools are students of color 
and only 18 percent of our teachers are teachers of color, we have an urgent need to act. 
We’ve got to understand that all students benefit from teacher diversity. We have strong 
evidence that students of color benefit from having teachers and leaders who look like 
them as role models and also benefit from the classroom dynamics that diversity creates. 
But it is also important for our white students to see teachers of color in leadership roles 
in their classrooms and communities. The question for the nation is how do we address 
this quickly and thoughtfully?” (King, McIntosh, & Bell-Ellwanger, 2016).   
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If our educational system is ever going to become more equitable and better serve our 
increasingly diverse student population, that system must prioritize increasing the diversity of 
our teacher workforce.   
While numerous factors influence the diversity of the teacher workforce, this study 
highlighted the declining retention of teachers of color as one important factor with significant 
research and policy implications.  More specifically, this study illustrated that perceptions of 
classroom autonomy matter to black teachers’ retention; therefore, recommended that districts, 
schools, and policymakers should seek to improve perceptions of classroom autonomy.   Of 
course, this study also highlighted that not all teachers of color respond similarly to policies and, 
therefore, surfaced the importance of future research to explore the impact of policies separately 
by teacher race/ethnicity, and for policy makers to consider how policies will differentially affect 
different subgroups of teachers.  This study also illustrated the importance of considering 
implementation and institutional theory in designing and evaluating policies, particularly 
considering how it will differentially affect teachers across race/ethnicity.  Lastly, this study 
showed that the SBA provisions of NCLB alone does not account for the decline in the retention 
of teachers of color and, therefore, districts and schools need to take steps in creating a more 
supportive school environment conducive to improving the diversity of the teacher workforce.   
Above all, this study calls on researchers, policymakers, states, districts, and schools to commit 
to taking steps to improve the diversity of the teacher workforce, thereby improving the equity of 
our education system.     
163 
REFERENCES 
Abrams, L. M. (2004). Teachers’ Views on High-stakes Testing: Implications for the 
Classroom. Education Policy Studies Laboratory. 
 
 
Achinstein, B., & Ogawa, R. T. (2011). Change(d) Agents: New Teachers of Color in Urban 
Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
 
 
Achinstein, B., Ogawa, R. T., Sexton, D, & Freitas, C. (2010). Retaining Teachers of Color: A 
Pressing Problem and a Potential Strategy for ‘Hard-to-Staff’ Schools. Review of 
Educational Research, 80(1), 71-107. 
 
 
Achinstein, B., Ogawa, R. T., & Speiglman, A. (2004). Are We Creating Separate and Unequal 
Tracks of Teachers? The Effects of State Policy, Local Conditions, and Teacher 
Characteristics on New Teacher Socialization. American Educational Review Journal, 
41(3), 557-603.  
 
 
Ahn, T. & Vigdor, J. (2014). The Impact of No Child Left Behind’s Accountability Sanctions 
on School Performance: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from North Carolina. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 20511. 
 
 




Amrein, A. L. & Berliner, D. C. (2002, March 28). High-Stakes Testing, Uncertainty, and 




Au, W. (2007). High-Stakes Testing and Curricular Control: A Qualitative Metasynthesis, 
Educational Researcher, 36(5), 258-267.  
 
 
Aydeniz, M., & Southerland, S. A. (2012). A national survey of middle and high school science 
teachers' responses to standardized testing: Is science being devalued in schools?. Journal 




Ballou, D. & Springer, M. G. (2016). Has NCLB Encouraged Educational Triage? 
Accountability and the Distribution of Achievement Gains. Education Finance and 
Policy, 12(1), 77-106.  
 
 
Berliner, D. (2011). Rational responses to high stakes testing: the case of curriculum narrowing 
and the harm  that follows. Cambridge Journal of Education, 41(3), 287-302. 
 
 
Booher-Jennings, J. (2006). Rationing Education in an Era of Accountability. Phi Delta 
Kappan, 87(10), 756-761. 
 
 
Borman, G. D. & Dowling, N. M. (2008). Teacher Attrition and Retention: A Meta-Analytic 
and Narrative Review of the Research. American Educational Research Association, 
78(3), 367-409.  
 
 
Boyd, D., Lankford, H., Loeb, S., & Wyckoff, J. (2008). The Impact of Assessment and 
Accountability on Teacher Recruitment and Retention: Are There Unintended 
Consequences?. Public Finance Review, 36(1), 88-111.  
 
 
Brewer, D. J., Killeen, K. M., & Welsh, R. O. (2013). The Role of Politics and Governance in 
Educational Accountability Systems. Education Finance and Policy, 8(3), 378-393.  
 
 
Bristol, T. J. (2014). Black Men of the Classroom: An Exploration of How the Organizational 
Conditions, Characteristics, and Dynamics in School Affect Black Male Teachers’ 
Pathways into the Profession, Experiences, and Retention (Doctoral dissertation). 
Columbia University New York, N.Y 
 
 
Brunetti, G. J. (2001). Why Do They Teach? A Study of Job Satisfaction among Long-Term 
High School Teachers.  Teacher Education Quarterly, 28(3), 49-74.   
 
 
Buchanan, R. (2015). Teacher Identity and Agency in an Era of Accountability. Teachers and 
Teaching, 21(6), 700-719. 
 
 
Campbell, D. T. (1979). Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change. Evaluation and 




Carnoy, M. & Loeb, S. (2002). Does External Accountability Affect Student Outcomes? A 
Cross-State Analysis. Educational Education and Policy Analysis, 24(4), 305-331.  
 
 
Cherng, H-Y. S. & Halpin, P. F. (2016). The Importance of Minority Teachers: Student 




Chiang, H. (2009). How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student 
Achievement. Journal of Public Economics, 93(9-10), 1045-1057. 
 
 
Clewell, B. C., Puma, M. J, & McKay, S. A. (2005). Does it matter if my teacher looks like me? 
The impact of teacher race and ethnicity on student academic achievement. Paper 
presented at the meeting of the American Educational Research Association.  
 
 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & Vigdor, J. L. (2009). The Academic Achievement Gap in 
Grades 3 to 8. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), 398-419.  
 
 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., Vigdor, J. L., & Diaz,  R. A. (2004). Do school accountability 
systems make it more difficult for low performing schools to attract and retain high 
quality teachers?. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23 (2), 251-71. 
 
 
Cochran-Smith, M. (1991). Learning to teach against the grain. Harvard Educational Review, 
61(3), 279-310.  
 
 
Cole, B. P. (1986). The Black Educator: An Endangered Species. The Journal of Negro 
Education, 55(3), 326-334. 
 
 
Collins, C. (2006).  “Ethnically Qualified:” A History of New York Public School Teachers 




Crocco, M.S. & Costigan, A.T. (2007). The narrowing of curriculum and pedagogy in the age of 
accountability: Urban educators speak out. Urban Education, 42(6), 512-535.  
 
 
Cronin, J., Kingsburgy, G. G., McCall, M. S., & Bowe, B. (2005). The Impact of the No Child 
Left Behind Act on Student Achievement and Growth: 2005 Edition.  Northwest 
166 
Evaluation Association, Retrieved from http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/EPRU-0504-117-
OWI.pdf 
 
Davidson, E., Reback, R., Rockoff, J., & Schwartz, H. L. (2015). Fifty Ways to Leave a Child 
Behind: Idiosyncrasies and Discrepancies in States’ Implementation of NCLB. 
Educational Researcher, 44(6), 347-358.  
 
 
Dee, T. S. (2004). Teachers, race and student achievement in a randomized experiment. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 86 (1), 195-210. 
 
 
Dee, T. S. (2005). A Teacher like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter? The American 
Economic Review, 95(2), 158-165.  
 
 
Dee, T. S. & Jacob, B. A. (2010). The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Students, Teachers, 
and Schools. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
 
 
Dee, T. S. & Jacob, B. A. (2011). The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Student 
Achievement. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30(3), 418-446. 
 
 
Dee, T. S., Jacob, B. A., & Schwartz, N. L. (2013). The Effects of NCLB on School Resources 
and Practices. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 35(2), 252-279. 
 
 
DeNisco, A. (2017). Common Core No More? New York and Twenty-One Other States Revise 





Deniston, R. D. & Gerrity, K. W. (2010). Elementary School Teachers’ Perceptions of No Child 
Left Behind and Its Effect on Morale.  scholarlypartnershipsedu, 5(2), Article 4.  
 
 
Diamond, J. B. & Spillane, J. P. (2004). High-Stakes Accountability in Urban Elementary 




DiPaola, M. F. & Tschannen-Moran, M. (2005). Bridging or Buffering?: The Impact of 
Schools’ Adaptive Strategies on Student Achievement. Journal of Educational 




Dixon, A. D. (2003). “Let’s Do This!” Black Women Teachers’ Politics and Pedagogy. Urban 
Education, 38(2), 217-235. 
 
 
Dixon, A. D. & Dingus, J. E. (2008). In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Black Women 
Teachers and Professional Socialization. Teachers College Record, 110(4), 805-837.  
 
 
Dizon-Ross, R. (2013).  How Do School Accountability Reforms Affect Teachers? Evidence 




Egalite, A. J., Fusarelli, L. D., & Fusarelli, B. C. (2017). Will Decentralization Affect 
Educational Equity? The Every Student Succeeds Act. Educational Administration 
Quarterly, 53(5), 757-781.  
 
 
Egalite, A. J. & Kisida, B. (2018). The Effects of Teacher Match on Students’ Academic 
Perceptions and Attitudes. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 40(1), 59-81. 
 
 
Egalite, A.J., Kisida, B., & Winters, M. A. (2015). Representation in the Classroom: The 
Effects of Own-Race/Ethnicity Teacher Assignment on Student Achievement. Economics 
of Education Review, 45, 44-52. 
 
 
England, R. E. & Meier, K. J. (1986). From desegregation to integration: Second generation 




Evans, M. (1992). An estimate of race and gender role-model effects in teaching high school. 
Journal of Economic Education, 23(3), 209–217. 
 
 
Feng, L, Figlio, D. N., & Sass, T. (2010). School accountability and teacher mobility. CALDER 
Working Paper No. 47. 
 
 
Figlio, D. & Loeb, S. (2011). School accountability. In Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and 
Ludger Woessmann, editor: Handbook of Economics of Education, Volume 3, The 




Finkeldei, J. (2016). The Influence of High Stakes Testing on Elementary Classroom Instruction 
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Wichita State University.  
 
 
Finn, C. E. Jr. & Ravitch, D. (2007, August 8). Not By Geeks Alone. The Wall Street Journal, 
Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118653759532491305 
 
 
Fletcher, S. H. & Raymond, M. E. (2002). The future of California's academic performance 
index. CREDO, Retrieved from http://credo.stanford.edu/downloads/api.pdf 
 
 
Fraga, L. R., Meier, K. J., & England, R. E. (1986). Hispanic Americans and educational policy: 
Limits to equal access. The Journal of Politics, 48(4), 850–876. 
 
 
Fuller, B., Wright, J., Gesicki, K., & Kang, E. (2007). Gauging Growth: How to Judge No Child 
Left Behind?. Educational Researcher, 36(5), 268-278. 
 
 
Fuller, E. & Alexander, C. (2002). Teachers Quit, Transfer, and Turnover Rates by School 





Fultz, M. (2004). The Displacement of Black Educators Post-Brown: An Overview and 
Analysis. History of Education Quarterly, 44(1), 11-45.  
 
 
Gershenson, S., Holt, S. B., & Papageorge, N. (2015). Who Believes in Me? The Effects of 
Student-Teacher Demographic Match on Teacher Expectations. Upjohn Institute 




Gershenson, S., Hart, C. M. D., Lindsay, C. A., & Papageorge, N. W. (2017). The Long-Run 




Grissom, J. A. & Keiser, L. R. (2011). A Supervisor Like Me: Race, Representation, and the 
Satisfaction and Turnover Decisions of Public Sector Employees. Journal of Policy 




Grissom, J. A., Nicholson-Crotty, S., & Harrington, J. R. (2014). Estimating the Effects of No 
Child Left Behind on Teachers’ Work Environments and Job Attitudes. Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 36(4), 417-436.  
 
 
Grissom, J. A., Nicholson-Crotty, J., & Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2009). Race, Region, and 
Representative Bureaucracy. Public Administration Review, 69(5), 911-919.  
 
 
Grissom, J. A., & Redding, C. (2016). Discretion and Disproportionality: Explaining the 
Underrepresentation of High-Achieving Students of Color in Gifted Programs. AERA 
Open, 2(1), 1-25.  
 
 
Hallett, T. (2010). The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Process, Turmoil, and Inhibited Institutions 
in an Urban Elementary School. American Sociological Review, 75(1), 52-74.  
 
 
Hamilton, L.S., Stecher, B.M., Marsh, J.A., McCombs, J.S., Robyn, A., Russell, J.L., Naftel, S., 
& Barney, H. (2007). Standards-based accountability under No Child Left Behind: 




Hannaway, J. & Hamilton, L. (2008). Performance-based accountability policies: Implications 
for school and classroom practices. A report commissioned by the U.S. Congress as part 
of Title I, Part E, Section 1503 of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.  
 
 
Hanushek, E. A. (1992). The trade-off between child quantity and quality. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(1), 84–117. 
 
 
Hanushek, E. A., & Raymond, M. E. (2005). Does School Accountability Lead to Improved 
Student Performance?. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(2), 297-327. 
 
 
Hess, F. M. & Leal, D. L. (1997). Minority teachers, minority students, and college 
matriculation. Policy Studies Journal, 25, 235–248. 
 
 
Hodges, G. W., Tippins, D., & Oliver, J. S. (2013). A Study of Highly Qualified Science 
Teachers' Career Trajectory in the Deep, Rural South: Examining a Link Between 





Hoffman, J. V., Assaf, L. C., & Paris, S. G., (2001). High-stakes testing in reading: Today in 
Texas, tomorrow?. The Reading Teacher, 54(5), 482-492.  
 
 
Holt, S. B. & Gershenson, S. (2017). The Impact of Teacher Demographic Representation on 
Student Attendance and Suspensions. Policy Studies Journal, doi:10.1111/psj.12229. 
 
 
Hong, W.-P., & Youngs, P. (2008). Does high-stakes testing increase cultural capital among 
low-income and racial minority students?. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 16(6). 
Retrieved 21 August 2016 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v16n6/ 
 
 
Honig, M. I. & Hatch, T. C. (2004). Crafting Coherence: How Schools Strategically Manage 
Multiple, External Demands. Educational Researcher, 33(8), 16-30.   
 
 
Ingersoll, R. M. (2001). Teacher Turnover and Teacher Shortages: An Organizational Analysis. 
American Educational Research Journal, 38(3), 499-534.  
 
 
Ingersoll, R. & Kralik, J. M. (2004). The Impact of Mentoring on Teacher Retention: What the 




Ingersoll, R. & May, H. (2011). Recruitment, Retention, and the Minority Teacher Shortage. 
CPRE, DOI: 10.12698/cpre.2011.rr69 
 
 
Irvine, J. J. (1988). An Analysis of the Problem of Disappearing Black Educators. The 
Elementary School Journal, 88(5), 503-513. 
 
 
Jackson, K. F. (2008). Educators’ Perceptions of the Impact of Test-Based Accountability 
Policies on Teaching and Learning in High-Poverty and Low-Poverty Schools (Doctoral 
Dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
 
 
Jacob, B. (2005). Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing 




Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2003). Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and 
Predictors of Teacher Cheating. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 843-878.  
 
 
Jennings, J. & Rentner, D. S. (2006). Ten Big Effects of the No Child Left Behind Act on 
Public Schools. Phi Delta Kappan, 8(2), 110-113. 
 
 
Jennings, J. L. & Bearak, J. M. (2014). ‘Teaching to the Test’ in the NCLB Era: How Test 
Predictability Affects our Understanding of Student Performance. Educational 
Researcher, 43(8), 381-389. 
 
 
Jennings, J. & Sohn, H. (2014). Measure for Measure: How Proficiency-Based Accountability 




Jones, G. M., Jones, B. D., Harden, B., Chapman, L., Yarbrough, T., & Davis, M. (1999). The 




Keigher, A. (2010). Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results From the 2008–09 Teacher Follow-
up Survey (NCES 2010-353). U.S. Department of Education. Washington, DC: National 
Center for Education Statistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch 
 
 
Kim, I. & Loadman, W. E. (1994). Predicting Teacher Job Satisfaction. The Ohio State 
University, Retrieved from https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED383707.pdf 
 
 
Kim, J. S. & Sunderman, G. L. (2005). Measuring Academic Proficiency under the No Child 




King, J. B., McIntosh, A., & Bell-Ellwanger, J. (2016). The State of Racial Diversity in the 





Klein, A. (2016, January 6). Under ESSA, States, Districts to Share More Power. Education 




Klein, A. (2016, March 31). Issues A-Z: The Every Student Succeeds Act: An ESSA Overview. 




Klein, A. (2017). Tricky Balance in Shifting from ESSA Blueprint to K-12 Reality. Education 
Week, 36(16), 2.  
 
 
Koretz, D. (2008). Measuring Up: What Educational Testing Really Tells Us. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
Koretz, D. (2017). The Testing Charade: Pretending to Make Schools Better. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
 
Koretz, D. & Barron, S. (1998). The Validity of Gains in Scores on the Kentucky Instructional 
Results Information System. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 
 
Koretz, D., Mitchelle, K., Barron, S., & Keith, S. (1996). Final Report: Perceived Effects of the 




Kreis, K., & Brockopp, D. Y. (1986). Autonomy: A Component of Teacher Job Satisfaction. 
Education, 107(1), 110-115.  
 
 
Labaree, D. F. (1992). Power, Knowledge, and the Rationalization of Teaching: A Geneology 




Ladd, H. F. & Lauen, D. L. (2010). The Distributional Effects of School Accountability 
Policies. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 29(3), 426-450. 
 
 
Ladd, H. F. (2017). No Child Left Behind: A Deeply Flawed Federal Policy. Journal of Policy 




Lauen, D.D. & Gaddis S. M., (2012). Shining a Light or Fumbling in the Dark? The Effects of 
NCLB’s Subgroup-Specific Accountability on Student Achievement. Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 34(2), 185-208.  
 
 
Lauen, D. L. & Gaddis S. M., (2016). Accountability Pressure, Academic Standards, and 
Educational Triage. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 38(1), 127-147. 
 
 
Lee, J. (2010). Trick or treat: new ecology of education accountability system in the USA. 
Journal of Education Policy, 25(1), 73-93, DOI: 10.1080/02680930903377423. 
 
 
Lee, J. & Reeves, T. (2012). Revisiting the impact of NCLB high-stakes school accountability, 
capacity, and resources state NAEP 1990–2009 reading and math achievement gaps and 
trends. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 34(2), 209–231. 
 
 
Lewis, C. W. (2006). African American Male Teachers in Public Schools: An Examination of 
Three Urban Districts. Teachers College Record, 108(2), 224-245.  
 
 
Lindsay, C. A. & Hart, C. M. D. (2017). Exposure to Same-Race Teachers and Student 
Disciplinary Outcomes for Black Students in North Carolina. Educational Evaluation 
and Policy Analysis, 39(3), 485-510. 
 
 
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
 
Loeb, S. & Cunha, J. (2007). Have Assessment-Based Accountability Reforms Influenced the 
Career Decisions of Teachers and Principals?. A report commissioned by the U.S. 





Loveless, T. (2016). How Well are American Students Learning? With Sections on Reading and 
Math in Common Core Era, Tracking and Advanced Placement (AP), and Principals as 
Instructional Leaders. The 2016 Brown Center Report on American Education, 3(5).  
 
 
Luekens, M.T., Lyter, D.M., & Fox, E.E. (2004). Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results from 
the Teacher Follow-up Survey, 2000–01 (NCES 2004–301). U.S. Department of 
174 




Lynn, M. L. (2005). Organizational Buffering: Managing Boundaries and Cores. 
Organizational Studies, 26(1), 37-61. 
 
 
Manna, P. (2011). Collision Course: Federal Education Policy Meets State and Local Realities. 
Washington DC: CQ Press. 
 
 
Margolis, J., Meese, A. A., & Doring, A. (2016). Do Teachers Need Structure or Freedom to 
Effectively Teach Urban Students? A Review of the Educational Debate. Education and 
Urban Society, 48(9), 783-806.  
 
 
Marschall, M. J., Ruhil, A. V. S., & Shah, P. R. (2010). The New Racial Calculus: Electoral 
Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures. American Journal of 
Political Science, 54(1), 107-124. 
 
 
Marsh, J. A., Bush-Mecenas, S., & Hough, H. (2017). Learning from Early Adopters in the New 
Accountability Era: Insights from California’s CORE Waiver Districts. Educational 
Administration Quarterly, 53(3), 327-364. 
 
 
Marvel, J., Lyter, D.M., Peltola, P., Strizek, G.A., & Morton, B.A. (2006). Teacher Attrition and 
Mobility: Results from the 2004–05 Teacher Follow-up Survey (NCES 2007–307). U.S. 
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
 
McGuinn, P. J. (2006). No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal Education 
Policy, 1965-2005.  Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 
 
 
McGrady, P. B. & Reynolds, J. R. (2013). Racial Mismatch in the Classroom: Beyond Black-
White Differences. Sociology of Education, 86(1), 3-17. 
 
 
McMurrer, J. (2007). Choices, Changes, and Challenges Curriculum and Instruction in the 
NCLB Era. Centre on Education Policy.  
 
175 
Meier, K. J. (1993). Latinos and representative bureaucracy: Testing the Thompson and 
Henderson hypotheses. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3(4), 
393–414. 
 
Meier, K. J., Wrinkle, R. D., & Polinard, J. L. Representative bureaucracy and distributional 
equity: Addressing the hard question. Journal of Politics, 61(4), 1025-1039. 
 
 
Meyer, H-D. & Rowan, B. (2006). The New Institutionalism in Education. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
 
 
Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. (1978). The Structure of Educational Organizations.  San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers.  
 
 
Mills, J. I. (2008). A legislative overview of No Child Left Behind. New Directions for 
Evaluation, 2008(117),9-20.  
 
 
Mockler, N. (2011). Beyond ‘What Works’: Understanding Teacher Identity as a Practical and 
Political Tool. Teachers and Teaching, 17(5), 517-528. 
 
 
Moon, T. R., Callahan, C. M., & Tomlinson, C. A., (2003). Effects of State Testing Programs 
on Elementary Schools with High Concentrations of Student Poverty - Good News or 




Moore, C. M. (2012). The Role of School Environment in Teacher Dissatisfaction Among U.S. 




Murnane, R. J. & Papay, J. P. (2010). Teachers’ Views on No Child Left Behind: Support for 




Neal, D. & Schanzenbach, D.W. (2010). Left Behind By Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-




Nicholson-Crotty, J., Grissom, J. A., & Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2011). Bureaucratic 
Representation, Distributional Equity, and Democratic Values in the Administration of 
Public Programs. The Journal of Politics, 73(2), 582-596.  
 
 
Nieto, S. (2009). From Surviving to Thriving. Educational leadership, 66(5), 8-13.  
 
 
Ochoa, G. L. (2007). Learning from Latino teachers. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
 
Ogawa, R. T., Sandholtz, J. H., Martinez-Flores, M., & Scribner, S. P. (2003). The Substantive 
and Symbolic Consequences of District’s Standards-Based Curriculum. American 
Educational Research Journal, 40(1), 147-176. 
 
 
Ouazad, A. (2014). Assessed by a Teacher Like Me: Race and Teacher Assessments. Education 
Finance and Policy, 9(3), 334-372. 
 
 
Pabon, A. (2016). Waiting for Black Superman: A Look at a Problematic Assumption. Urban 
Education, 51(8), 915-939.  
 
 
Pearson, L. C. & Moomaw, W. (2005). The Relationship between Teacher Autonomy and 
Stress, Work Satisfaction, Empowerment, and Professionalism. Educational Research 
Quarterly, 29(1), 38-54. 
 
 
Pedulla, J.J., Abrams, L. M., Madaus, G. F., Russell, M. K., Ramos, M. A., & Miao, J. (2003). 
Perceived Effects of State-Mandated Testing Programs on Teaching and Learning: 
Findings from a National Survey of Teachers. Boston: National Board on Education 
Testing and Public Policy. 
 
 
Pitts, D. W. (2007). Representative bureaucracy, ethnicity, and public schools: Examining the 
link between representation and performance. Administration & Society, 39(4) 497–526. 
 
 
Polikoff, M. S., McEachin, A. J., Wrabel, S. L., & Duque, M. (2013). The Waive of the Future? 
School Accountability in the Waiver Era. Educational Researcher, 43(1), 45-54.  
 
 
Reback, R. (2008). Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of 




Reback, R., Rockoff, J., & Schwartz, H. L. (2014).  "Under Pressure: Job Security, Resource 
Allocation, and Productivity in Schools Under No Child Left Behind. American 
Economic Journal: Education Policy, 6(3), 207-241.   
 
 
Rentner, D. S., Scott, C., Kober, N., Chudowsky, N., Chudowsky, V, Joftus, S., & Zabala, D. 
(2006). From the capital to the classroom: Year 4 of the No Child Left Behind Act. Center 
on Education Policy.  
 
 
Rocha, R. R. & Hawes, D. P. (2009). Racial Diversity, Representative Bureaucracy, and Equity 
in Multiracial School Districts. Social Science Quarterly, 90(2), 326-344. 
 
 
Rockoff, J. E. & Turner, L. J. (2010). Short Run Impacts on Accountability on School Quality. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(4), 119-147.  
 
 
Rodman, B. B. (1985, 20 November). Teaching’s ‘Endangered Species.’ Education Week. 
Retrieved from https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1985/11/20/06100026.h05.html 
 
 
Rouse, C. E., Hannaway, J., Goldhaber, D., & Figlio, D. (2013). Feeling the Florida heat? How 
low-performing schools respond to voucher and accountability pressure. American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, 5(2), 251-81. 
 
 
Rowan, B. & Miskel, C. G. (1999). Institutional theory and the study of educational 
organizations. In J. Murphy & K. S. Louis (Eds.), Handbook of Research in Educational 
Administration. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 359-382. 
 
 
Rubin, D.I. & Kazanjian, C.J. (2011). ’Just another brick in the wall:’ Standardization and the 
devaluing of education. Journal of Curriculum and Instruction, 5(2), 94-108. 
 
 
Russell, M. & Abrams, L. (2004). Instructional Use of Computers for Writing: The Effect of 
State Testing Programs. Teachers College Record, 106(6), 1332–1357. 
 
 
Santoro, D. A. (2011). Good teaching in difficult times: Demoralization in the pursuit of good 
work. American Journal of Education, 118(1) 1-23. 
 
178 
Santoro, D. A. & Morehouse, L. (2011). Teaching’s conscientious objectors: Principled leavers 
of high-poverty schools. Teachers College Record, 113(12), 2670- 2704. 
 
 
Schiesel, S. (2008, June 9). Former Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, The New York 
Times, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/09/arts/09sand.html?_r=0 
 
 
Shirrell, M. (Forthcoming). The Effects of Subgroup-Specific Accountability on Teacher 
Turnover and Attrition. Education Finance and Policy.  
 
 
Sims, D. P. (2009). “Going Down With the Ship?” The Effect of School Accountability on the 





Smith, M. L.(1991). Put to the Test: The Effects of External Testing on Teachers. Educational 
Researcher, 20(5), 8-11.  
 
 
Spillane, J. P. & Burch, P. (2006). The Institutional Environment and Instructional Practices: 
Changing Patterns of Guidance and Control in Public Education. In The New 
Institutionalism in Education, Albany: SUNY Press.  
 
 
Springer, M. G. (2008). The Influence of an NCLB Accountability Plan on the Distribution of 
Student Test Score Gains. Economics of Education Review, 27(5), 556-563. 
 
 
Srikantaiah, D. (2008). Lessons from the Classroom Level: Federal and State Accountability in 
Illinois. Center on Education Policy. 
 
 
Stone-Johnson, C. (2014). Parallel Professionalism in the Era of Standardisation. Teachhers and 
Teaching, 20(1), 74-91.  
 
 
Strauss, V. (2013, April 6). Teacher’s resignation letter: “My profession…no longer exists.’ The 






Su, Z. (1997). Teaching as a profession and as a career: Minority candidates’ perspectives. 
Teaching and Teacher Education, 13(3), 325–340. 
 
 
Sunderman, G.L., Tracey, C.A., Kim, J. & Orfield, G. (2004). Listening to teachers: Classroom 




Taylor, G., Shepard, L., Kinner, F., & Rosenthal, J. (2003). A Survey of Teachers’ Perspectives 
on High-Stakes Testing in Colorado: What Gets Taught, What Gets Lost. Boulder: 
University of Colorado, School of Education, Education and the Public Interest Center. 
 
 
Tye, B. B. & O’Brien, L. (2002). Why Are Experienced Teachers Leaving the Profession?. Phi 
Delta Kappan, 84(1), 24-32.  
 
 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2000, January 13). Projections of the Resident Population by Race, 





U.S. Census Bureau. (2000, January 13). Projections of the Resident Population by Race, 





U.S. Census Bureau. (2000, January 13). Projections of the Resident Population by Race, 





U.S. Department of Education. (2016a). Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). Retrieved 
January 31, 2016 from http://www.ed.gov/essa  
 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (2016b) National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core 
of Data (CCD), "State Nonfiscal Survey of Public Elementary and Secondary Education," 
1998-99 through 2013-14; and National Elementary and Secondary Enrollment by 
Race/Ethnicity Projection Model, 1972 through 2025. National Center for Education 




U.S. Department of Education. (2013).  “Public School Teacher Data File," 1987-88 through 
2011-12; "Private School Teacher Data File," 1987-88 through 2011-12; and "Charter 
School Teacher Data File," 1999-2000. National Center for Education Statistics, Schools 
and Staffing Survey (SASS). 
 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (2009). Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary. 
Retrieved from https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf 
 
 
U.S. Department of Education. (2004). Meeting the Highly Qualified Teachers Challenge: The 




U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data 
(CCD), "State Nonfiscal Survey of Public Elementary and Secondary Education," 1995-
96 through 2014-15; and National Elementary and Secondary Enrollment by 




Villegas, A. M., & Irvine, J. J. (2010). Diversifying the Teaching Force: An Examination of 
Major Arguments. The Urban Review, 42, 2010, 175-192. 
 
 
Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 21(1), 1-19.  
 
 
Woods, J. R. (2017, December 18). Fifty-State Comparison: States’ School Accountability 




Woody, E. L., Buttles, M., Kafka, J., Park, S., & Russell, J. (2004). Voices from the Field: 
Educators Respond to Accountability. Policy Analysis for California Education.  
 
 
 
